The military and modernization in Peru and Brazil : a comparative study. by Werder, Peter
THE MILITARY AND MODERNIZATION 
IN PERU AND BRAZIL: 
A COMPARATIVE STUDY 
A thesis 
_____ .1..! __ ., 
.L" .... ,.r.-.!, ..... - ...... J.. 
jJctJ.· 1,,.Lct..l. J. U..1..J..L.LHJ.t:ill V 
of the requirements for the Degree 
of 
Master of Arts in History 
in the 
University of Canterbury 
by 
Peter Werder 
Univeisity of Canterbury 
February 1978 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis looks at the military establishments of 
Peru and Brazil with two aims in view, first to judge the extent 
of their 'revolutions' and second, to determine how and why 
they came to occur. A comparative study of the Peruvian and 
Brazilian military would illuminate important aspects of both. 
The latter entered politics in 1964 for the first time in the 
twentieth century and adopted conservative, suppressive and 
pro-US policies typical of military governments in Latin America. 
However, the Peruvian military initiated a wide-re~ching reform 
and modernization programme which earned the Revolutionary 
Military Government a 'left wing' populist reputation. 
Both military governments were moulded first, by their 
respective military establishments, and second, by the nature 
and circumstance of their interventions. The Supreme Revolutionary 
Command took over in 1964 when the military saw that the 
traditional political and economic order were being undermined. 
This situation also affected the military itself, which feared 
disunity and civil war. Having replaced the Goulart 
administration the Brazilian military then proceeded to restore 
and strengthen the status quo. This meant a re-affirmation of 
capitalism, 'responsible' democracy and good relations with the US. 
In Peru the military intervened because the Belatnde 
government had failed to fulfil its mandate to initiate change. 
Officers dissatisfied with the government and with the US, used 
the public and national uproar over the IPC Talara Agreement 
as a pretext for replacing the government with a military j_u~-~~ 
capable of modernization. The RMG was able to mix together 
Peruvian nationalism and structural change. 
The Peruvian and Brazilian military institutions also 
influenced their respective governments. The latter had close 
contacts with the US and business, and feared subversion and 
critic ism which were denounced as Communist-inspired. The Peruvian 
military had much weaker contacts with the US and business, but 
was very anxious about domestic and national security. Partly 
due to its benign traditions, but mostly due to the need to 
undercut guerrilla support, the Peruvian military also maintained 
welfare programmes, etc. 
Both governments were fully representative of the military 
establishment. Both were conservative and authoritarian, and 
neither would sanction spontaneity or public initiative. Control 
was their common feature. Nor did they reject capitalism, 
although both sought a greater degree of state control in the 
economy. Both military governments are significant not as 
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From the time the Latin American republics gained their 
independence in the early 19th century, the military had been 
typified by its conservatism and its predatory manner. How, 
then, was it possible for a military.government to gain a 
reputation for left-wing reform? Previously, Latin American 
military governments came to be characterized by the personalism 
of caudillismo, 1 • political reaction and collaboration with 
economic elites. Military dictatorships as they were, they 
proclaimed a revolutionary break with the past and a friendship 
with the US. 
However, by the early 196O 1 s, the republics were 
sufficiently modernized as to indicate their readiness to 
join the developed and democratic nations of the world. Many 
observers ~redicted that militarism in Latin America was in 
decline and soon to expire. 2 • The 1964 coup d'etat in Brazil 
< 
helped_disperse this view. The displacement of President 
Goulart was more.significant than his replacement (by the 
military government of General Castelo Branco) because the 
military had stepped beyond the moderator role it had filled 
in Brazilian politics since 1894. Previously the military 
was represented by numerous maleable Presidents, especially 
GetJlio Vargas. After 1964 the Brazilian military ruled in 
its own right, hoping for civilian, constitutional co-operation. 
1. (See Humphreys; pp 155 in Howard (ed) 1957; and Maingot; 
pp 66-73 in Tulchin (ed) 1973) . 
2. (See Needler, pp 242 in Von Lazar and Kaufman; (ed) 1969; 
Lieuwen; 1961; pp 152,163; Alba pp 166~ I8O-I8I in 
Johnson (ed) 1967~ Linares C-~uintana WPQ; Vol 4; No 2 
June 1951; pp 254J 
2. 
However, it did promise new elections to be held within 
a few years. The pmlicies of the Supreme Revolutionary 
Command (SRC) were repressive, and they strengthened the 
political and economic status quo. This military government 
was only the second in Brazilian history, but it never the 
less corresponded in manner with those occuring elsewhere in 
Latin America at the same time, 1 • 
When the Peruvian military deposed President Belatnde 
Terry in 1968, a new military government was set up which 
broke with the militarism of the Peruvian and Latin American 
past. The R~volutionary Military Government (RMG) completely 
rejected civilian participation in politics and made no 
promise of elections. Unlike any other military government 
the RMG instituted a massive reform programme, expropriated 
US and locally owned property, ·and discarded old political 
allies, It exercised a low level of suppression which 
indicated a high level of public support. In taking a 
nationalist and populist stand on issues, the RMG gained very 
quickly an international reputation for being "left-wing." 
This study aims first to trace the development of the 
military and civil-military relations in Peru and Brazil 
from independence to the I960 1 s; second to describe and 
explain the 1964 and 1968 interventions, and third to analyse, 
compare and contrast the Brazilian and Peruvian military 
institutions and their respective military governments. By 
discussing the military governments and the military together, 
the writer has tried to relate the actions, policies and 
achievements of the governments to the military institutions 
1. (See Miguens; SCID; Vol VI; No 1; I970-I97I; pp 7) 
3. 
themselves. It is not the intention of this study to judge 
either military government a success or failure. Nor does it 
intend to criticize their actions and assess the consequences 
in anything but very general socio-economic terms. It 
concentrates instead on the military element of Brazilian and 
Peruvian politics and tries to answer the following questions: 
were the 1964 and 1968 interventions turning points in Latin 
American militarism? Were the military governments, especially 
that of Peru, truly "revolutionary" in nature, bent on radical 
reform and Nasserist modernization and.development, or were 
they ":revolutionary" merely by justification and rhetoric? 
·rn trying to answer these questions, the study concentrates 
only on the first few years of military rule. No attempt is 
made to relate the events in Brazil during the 1960 1 s, and those 
in Peru during the late 1960 1 s and early I970's with the 
present day. 
Some precision in definition is required. The terms 
"military", "officer corps" and 11officers 11 are used inter-
changeably because officers are the professional administrators 
of force which is the purpose of the military. Officers form 
a class ahd elite of their own which heads and represents the 
military instituti0n. 1 • Non-commissioned officers, enlisted 
men and non-combatant ~ersonel are not included. Although 
these terms will usually refer to the army, since it is the 
most politically significant of the services 2 · they do 
encompass all the services of the military establishment. 
These are the army, navy, airforce and marine corps, but not 
1. (See Huntington; 1967; pp 11-18) 
2. · (See Corbett; 1972; pp 7-8) 
the national or civil guard militia and police. Where 
services, branches and ranks are specified, for example, 
colonel of army intelligence, the writer refers to them 
specifically to the exclusion of other services, branches and 
ranks. 
"Revolution" in the Latin American context refers to an. 
extra legal method of replacing one government with another, 
but the writer prefers the more traditional definition of 
"fundamental change in the nature of the state, 
the functions of government, the principles of 
economic_production and redistribution, the 
relationship of the social classes particularly 
as _regards the control of government - in a 
word, a significant breaking with the past. 111 • 
·rt also infers the participation of popular forces. The 
above definition refers not only·to the displacement of a 
government by military intervention but also to its 
replacement by a progressive military junta. 
The coup d'etat (or golpe · de estado) is a specific term 
refering to the displacement of a government by a "seizure of 
power within the present sys tern. 112 • Tee hnically it. is the most 
efficient and most highly organized method of intervention. 
The coup tak.es place very suddenly and very quickly, 
frequently without bloodshed. It requires efficient, reliable 
troops operating in an environment free of defending and 
loyalist forces.3• 
1 • (Stokes; WPQ; Vol 5; No 3; September 1952; pp L1.6I} 
2. (Luttwak; 1969; pp II) 
3. (See also Glossary) 
5. 
Three definitions cover militarism. Alfred Vagts 
(1937) interpretes militarism to be military domination over 
the civilian, an excess of military demands and the emphasis 
on military values, spirit, ideals and considerations. Kurt 
Lang (1965) defines militarism as the exaltation of the 
military as supreme, the encouragement of a military or 
militant ideology among the people and the influence on 
social and political life of the representatives of the 
military, According to the Encyclopedia of Social Sciences 
(Vol 1, 1933) it is an attitude toward public affairs which 
conceives of war and preparation for war as the chief 
compo~ents of foreign policy, and the highest form of public 
service. 1 • Militarism, however, should be seen in its own 
social context, Judged from a western, Anglo-Saxon, liberal 
point of view, it is a political aberration and completely 
undemocFatic and unconstitutional in nature. 
"Intervention" usually refers to the displacement of a 
government, and is a general term. Le~s noticeable and 
dramatic is covert military pressure on a non-military 
leadership. Cases abound of such ~ressure. 2 • In this study, 
intervention usually refers to direct, overt military action 
against an uncumbent regime, but pressure and interference 
will also be considered. 
It is also necessary to differentiate between development 
and modernization, Development refers not only to the 
expansion of capability, (increased production from industry, 
mining, plantations, fishing, etc.) but also to self sustaining 
1 , ( See Corbett; 1972; pp 3) (wc.sA) 
2, (See Lieuwen; 1964; pp 29-30; Patch; AUFS;AVol IX; No 6; 
September 1962; pp 15; Skidmore; 1967; pp I4I) . 
ability, efficiency, high capital investment, production 
diversity and industrial predominance over agriculture. 
6. 
Mere expansion does not automatically signify development. 
Modernization refers to rationalized, tentralized and 
specialized organization, increased State investment, the 
participation of all, or a great majority of the people in 
political and social processes and a capacity to itritiate and 
adopt change. A decline in both death and birth rates, 
urbanization, class mobility and changes among institutions, 
for example the church, unions, military, bureaucracy, etc., 
also signify.modernization. 1 • 
The terms dictatorship, authoritarianism and conservatism 
also require elaboration. Dictatorships in Latin America are 
usu~lly personalist, permanent and maybe civilian (for example 
. ; ,,. ~ ' 
Leguia and Vargas) or military (for example Odrta. and Peron). 
They exist without constitutional mandate. 2 • Authoritarianism 
refers to the forcing of values and lifestyles by an authority 
upon a poTierless and receptive population. It is intolerant 
and patronist in nature. Conservatism refers to the 
maintainence of the status quo, and is usually religious, 
rural and propertied. Conservatives usually favour centralism 
for the maintainence of order and-protection of privilege and 
free trade. 
Professionalism in the military was characterized by 
technical expertise, officer corps corporateness or loyalty, 
and responsibility. However, defining professionalism in 
these terms has proved inadequate, and North (I966) has put 
forward more succinct details. First, a professional military 
1. (See Germani; SCID; Vol V No 8; I969-I970; pp I55-I57) 
2. (See Needler pp 247 in Von Lazar and Kaufman (ed) 1969) 
institution recognizes its duties to protect the state 
against foreign aggression. Second it operates within a 
hierachic structure in a highly disciplined manner. Third, 
officers receive formal training, a regular salary and are 
promoted according to ability and achievement. 1 • 
1. (See Huntington; 1967; pp 7-I9; and Corbett; 1972; pp 4-5) 
8. 
Inherent in comparative studies is the assumption that 
direct relationships exist between the ·cases being compared 
so that the similarities and disimilarities will appear to 
reflect each other. Unfortunately it is not possible to 
present and compare cases in such clear, bold relief. The main 
reason is that the material, authors' viewpoints and their 
handling of material are too diverse to conform to strict 
comparison. For example, Thomas Skidmore (1967) and Alfred 
Stepan III (I97I) provide valuable work on the Brazilian 
military, and its role in the 1964 intervention, and in that 
subsequent government. However, there is no work of 
comparable value in English on the Peruvian military, and 
its role in the 1968 intervention, and in that subsequent 
government. David Chaplin (1976), EVK Fitzgerald (1976) and 
Abraham Lowenthal (1975) provide very useful material on the 
RMG itself, but not much on the Peruviin military. Unfortunately, 
the material available also restricts one's access to data. 
Military Histories, career sketches and biographies of officers, 
military expenditures, promotions, appointments and salaries 
would have been invaluable, had they been available. The 
shortage of material is indicated strongly in Chapter VIII; 
pp 120,,·1here it has not been possible to corroborate any of the 
interpretations of the I962 junta and its reform programme, 
An additional factor affecting comparison is that the 
dramatic and far-reaching aspect of modernization and reform 
in Peru are more significant to the political historian than 
are the economic data relating to economic development. 
Never-the-less, the use, presentation and.interpretation of 
material in this study are the sole responsibility of the 
writer who apologises for undue or uneven emphases. 
Chapte·r II traces the development of the La tin American 
military and its civil-military relations from independence 
to the I960 1 s. It provides a background for the presentation 
of the Peruvian and Brazilian cases. Chapter III describes 
the Brazilian military up to the March 1964 intervention which 
is analysed in Chapter IV. The following chapter concentrates 
on the subsequent Supreme Revolutionary Commands of Generals 
Castelo Branco and Costa e Silva up to the promulgation of the 
fifth Institutional Act of December 1968. The Peruvian case 
begins with Chapter VI with a description of the military up 
to the mid - 1960 1 s. Interpretations of the October I968. 
intervention are given in Chapter VII, and Chapter VIII looks 
at the Revolutionary Military Government of General Velas~o 
Alvarado. The study·ends with an attempt to compare the two 
military governments as progenies of their respective military 
institutions. 
During the writing and preparation of this study the 
writer came to rely on the services of numerous people, and he 
would novr like to acknowledge and thank them, Brian Wear.ing 
was of great assistance at all times. His comments and 
suggestions were invaluable, and he was always rea~y to 
discuss the work at any time. His experience and encouragement 
were frequently sought during the year •. 
Mrs. Mary Privilege and Miss Donna Boock had the hapless 
task of typing the work, and the writer appreciates and thanks· 
them for their patience and efficiency. 
Finally, the author expresses his heartfelt thanks to his 
parents who,provided much encouragement and support. 
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raised by the revolutionary governments were co~posed of 
royalist militias turned republican, peasants,and liberated 
slaves. They lacked discipline, organization and equipment. 
Institutional cohesion and expertise were low. Officers 
were usually promoted on the battlefield. Personalist 
leadership and patriotic zeal compensated for grave 
institutional deficiencies. 
After the collapse of Spanish rule in the I820 1 s, the 
new republics had to decide on the most suitable means of 
defending themselves against reconquest. In 1823, with 
Bol{var's encouragement, Peru formally decided on a permanent 
. 
standing army, instead of a citizen-soldier militia mobilized 
only when needed. Most of the other republics followed the 
Peruvian example. 1 • The republics thus prefered to keep their 
makeshift armies and they continued to pay them and offer 
officers land and promotions. Because the republics £eared 
reconquest by Spain they were most reluctant to reduce military 
strength, and retire under-employed and unreliable officers. 
Four factors led to the rise of militarism in the new 
republics. First, the bond between the State and the army was 
weak because uni ts usually ovred their loyalty to their leaders 
and regions of recruitment. Army subordination and loyalty to 
the State existed in practice only when the Great Liberators 
were Presid~nts. When the Liberator-Presidents departed, State 
control of the army was weakened. It was further weakened by 
soldiers' dislik~ even hatred of civilians and politicians. 
They had little respect for constitutionalists who broke 
promises about pay, and who did little or nothing to help the 
1. (Johnson; 1974; pp 33) 
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army fight for independence. The intellectuals~turned-
soldiers, once progressive and liberal, now became 
disillusioned, reactionary and predatory. 
Second the republican armies lacked institutional unity 
and cohesion. Regionalism divided units against each other, 
and leaders like Rosas in Argentina, Santa Ana in Mexico and 
Santa Cruz in Bolivia used their military power for personal 
and predatory reasons, protecting their rank, prestige and 
power against State attempts to reduce or control them. 1 • The 
11revolutions 11 made. by this predatory military caste were merely 
palace revolts by a few officers • 
. 
Third republican governments were very weak in the post-
independence period. Communications had collapsed, treasuries 
were empty, violence was widespread and central authority 
usually non-existent in the periphery. Often the armies were 
the only organized bodies in the latin American continent, and 
central governments often had to rely on the military to 
exercise some authority. 
Fourth the republican armies faced strong military 
competition from the private armies of hacendados and caudillos. 
Some priyate armies were strong enough to defeat the State army 
and overthrow the government. After mid-century, when the 
economic power of the State had grown,it was possible to 
modernize and strengthen the national republic armies so that 
the weaker, less well equipped private armies were no longer 
able to challenge or threaten them. 
After the I850's there was a decline in militarism and a 
return to political stability, but this was not due entirely 
to the predominance of State military power over civilian 
rivals, or of improved military discipline. During the 
1. (See Lieuwen; 1961; pp 19-22, Johnson; 1974; pp 49-50,52) 
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mid-century period, the politically important military and 
economically important rural landed elite both recognised 
an affinity of interest. Both were conservative, elitist and 
self preserving. Both relied on a personalist ideology and 
leadership. 1 • The oligarchy's export earnings paid military 
salaries and pensions, and made possible the purchase abroa¢l 
of arms, ammunition and equipment. The military provided 
the stability and order the oligarchy needed to run their 
plantations and mines efficiently easily and profitably. 
Together the military and oligarchy eliminated or suppressed 
political and social rivals, thus preserving their own 
monopolies and interests. The common interests and 
interdependence of each institution would last almost a 
century. A series of conservative and military governments 
ensured free trade, institutional autonomy and public order.-
Few Liberal governments were able to impose duties on imports, 
·stimulate local industry or reduce military autonomy. 
Although militarism had declined after 1850 its future 
occurance was greatly influenced by developments taking place 
in the military, after 1880 when it was modernized, retrained, 
re-equiped and professionalized. There was a va~t expansion 
of military power and technical capability. Navies were 
created, military academies built, entrance qualifications 
raised and foreign missions hired. Truly national, regular 
armies emerged in the I880 1 s in Chile, Peru, Mexico, Argentina 
and Brazil. United and cohesive, these new armies were less 
prone to political and regionalist influences. Professionaliz-
ation and officer coq)s efficiency coincided with job 
1. (See Stokes; WPQ; Vol 5 No 3 September 1952; pp 448) 
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security, regular pay, promotion by merit, bureaucratic 
organization, discipline and retirement pensions. These 
reduced the susceptability of individual units to partisan 
influence at a time when new urban groups began to challenge 
the old traditional elites. 
Modernization and professionalization of the military 
was stimulated by concern about territorial and frontier 
security. Because each republic depended on extractive 
industries (coffee, sugar, cotton plantations, beef, and 
nitrate and mineral mining) for its wealth it was vital that 
such wealth was protected against greedy neighbours. Even 
barren territories needed defending since their true worth was 
yet unknown. This nationalism was defensive and political as 
• 
well as economic in nature.'• 
Professionalization also strengthened the ideological 
co~mitment of the officer corps to support the status quo. 
Officers recruited prior.to the professionalizing era of the 
I880's were conservative because of the uncertainty and 
insecurity of the social class, and they sided with the 
oligarchy against popular groups which threatened them. 2 • 
Officers who were recruited after professionalization began 
were also conservative but this was a result of institutional 
factors rather than social class or background reasons. 
They identified with their profession, their brother officers 
in the corps and their careers. Institutional instincts were 
conser1rative, cautious, authoritarian, and elitist. Officers 
were concerned about defence, military strength, equipment 
.3. and pay. 'After independence, individual officers had 
1. (Johnson; pp 123; in Johnson; (ed) 1967) 
2. (See Lieuwen; I96L; pp 19; Johnson I97,4; pp 52) 
3. (See Huntington; 1967; pp 59-79) 
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identified ·their personal career and social class interests 
with those of the oligarchy. After the I880 1 s, the new 
professional officer identified the interests of the military 
institution, of which he was part, with the government and 
State. The~e interests were order, respect for law, authority 
and private property, and security. 
Neither the military, nor the oligarchy felt secure with 
liberal governments which mobilized public opinion, widened 
the electorate, permitted dissent and threatened both to 
reduce the military budget and increase customs taxes in order 
to finance development, services and industries. Officers 
were, ·however, becoming more sympathetic toward progressive 
and developmentalist civilian sectors and were more 
1 
understanding of soc·io-economic change.·· rrhat the military 
continued to support the oligarchy was a result of two factors. 
First, the common interest and interdependence of the 
military and oligarchy still held them together. Neither 
-could do without the other, and neither wanted any change in 
the prevailing system. Also, professionalization had yet to 
reduce military susceptability to patronage and favour because 
many pre-professional men still occupied the senior ranks. 
Second, although the military was more developmentalist 
minded, and more tolerant than in the past, it accepted the 
oligarch~dominated State for lack of a constitutional or 
practical alternative. The oligarchy continued to dominate 
the State because the emerging middle sectors identified with 
that upper class instead of challenging it for dominance, and 
accepted its elitist authoritarian and repressive standards. 
1. (Johnson; 1974; pp 79) 
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The oligarchy (with its middle sector supporters) continued 
to enjoy the support of the military through the State and 
the constitution it dominated. When the middle sectors and 
oligarchy did part political company the military often 
found itself divided in a civil war. 1 • 
Under these political conditions, the incidence of overt 
militarism was comparatively low, during the last d~cades of 
-the 19th century, and first decades of the 20th. There were 
few dramatib and brutal changes of government by milit~ry 
intervention. First, reformist liberal governments, which 
aggravated the oligarchy and military, were few, The 
governments which did exist usually had vested interests to 
d d t l 'k 1 t 1 t t· 2 • guar, an were no 1 e y o encourage popu ar expec a ions. 
Second, it was no longer necessary for the military to 
overthrow governments. By neutralizing challenges to the 
incumbent regime by anticipatory revolt, the military allowed 
governments to stay in office. (continuismo)3• The 
conservative, oligarch-dominated governments possessed control 
of the military through its adherence to the constitution. 
Strike-breaking, evicting squatters and quelling peasant 
uprisings were carried out by the military under the legal 
pretense of "maintaining order." 
The depression of the thirties caused a sudden increase 
in the incidence of military intervention.in Latin America. 
It shattered their dependent economies and exasperated their 
social problems. 4 The military remained dependent on imports 
_ 1. (See Nun; 1969; pp 24-26, 26-28) 
2. (See also Nun; 1969; pp 2I) 
3. (See Kling; ~PQ: Vol 9 No. I; March 1956; pp 24) 
4. (See Needler; pp 233; 2~5 in Von Lazar & Kaufman; (ed) 
1969; Alba; pp 173 in Johnson (ed) 1967.) . 
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of equipment, arms and ammu~ition, and its pay and privileges 
came out of expbrt earnings which were declining. It was 
unwilling to reduce expenditure in line with a common natural 
retrenchment policy. Apart from the danger of reduced 
salaries, pensions and armament expenditure, officers were 
also concerned about discipline which could fail if enliste4 
men became disgruntled about reduced pay and worsening 
conditions. 
The new interventionism was more than the military 
reacting to economic uncertainty. It remained as always a 
conservative institution which disliked change and prefered 
instead a predictable, controllable and patient society. 
Represen ta ti ves of .·~ highly organized and disciplined 
profession, office·,s were confident of their power, judgment 
and administrativf ability. Leading a martinet and honourable 
existenc~ amid ci?ilian corrµption, disorder and economic 
inefficency, military men felt that they were equipped and 
morally bound to intervene in politics in order to apply their 
strengths to save the situation. 1 • Officers felt a strong 
sense of obligation. 
Influencing the military and contributing t~ the sense 
of national obligation was European Fascism which emphasised 
nationalism, militarism, uniformity and strong dictatorial 
leadership. Fascism also de-emphasised compromise and 
political bargaining. The feeling that the military had a 
duty to intervene, to be policeman in power giving orders 
instead of receiving them from selfish incompetent 
politicians was nurtured throughout the I930's by Italian, 
1. (Fitzgibbon; JIAS Vol XII No 2 April 1970; pp 192; 
Stepan; I97I; pp 90; Welch & Smith; 1974; pp 12,26) 
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German and Spanish political agencies and military missions. 
Related to the institutional factor was the growing 
social and political unrest which threatened the military 1 s 
monopoly on force. As the economic situation worsened, social 
groups, which had benefitted marginally from growth and 
development (for example, labour, peasantry, urban middle 
sectors) found themselves in dire straights. They began to 
make virtually impossible demands on the State and political 
system for equal rights, protection and employment. 
Disgruntled people influenced by Bolshevism, Fascism and 
nationalism formed themselves into numerous extremist groups 
which proceeded to·arm themselves. The discontents, 
frustrations and emotionalism fueled in Chile the White 
Guard and the Red I1ili tia, and in Mexico, the Labour Militia · 
and Gold Shirts. Peru was troubled by APRA, and Brazil by 
th~ Prestes Columnists and Integralistas. These groups fought 
each other, and the military. Officers feared that if these 
armed groups successfully challenged the military's monopoly 
on violence, they might try to integrate with the military, 
or disband it because of its identification with the status quo. 
Officers also feared that institutional solidarity and 
discipline were being undermined since some civilian groups 
were gaining the support of junior officers and enlisted men. 
Interventionism in the I930 1 s was also encouraged by 
politicians who wanted military support either to gain power 
for themsel7es or to force upon the waivering State system 
some military decisiveness and determination. 
The frequency and success of intervention after 1930 
indicated a high degree of military Unity, discipline~ 
organization and consensus. Conspirator~ could now trust the 
reliability of military commanders and units, so ~hat it was 
19. 
possible to employ the more sophisticated coup d'etat method 
of displacing the government. The quality of the military 
institution, greatly improved since the I880 1 s made possible 
forms of intervention which were less dangerous and more 
decisive than the civil wars and- putsch of old. 1 Counter-
revol ts vrere riot uncommon, but they indicated the break dovm 
of military unity and resolve after, not during, the initial 
intervention. 
Another feature of military sophistication Tias the junta 
of three or four ranking officers representing each service in 
the military government. The junta was indicative of the 
decline of personalism and individualism, and the growth of 
esprit de corps in the officer corps. 2 The junta military 
govern• ent which became quite common after the I930's was an 
important by-product of institutionalization. Consensus in 
government was vital for unity and decision maldng. There was 
a "care-taker" connotation to the junta since it was a distinctly 
military not personalist government reacting to military not 
personalist anxieties, After ruling for a time by decree, the 
junta was able to terminate itself by holding elections or 
appointing a successor. 
The junta, comprised of several officers, and responsible 
to the military establishment was able to discipline itself 
and thus ignore the evil, corrupt brandishments of civilian 
politicians, bureaucrats and lobby-ists, 
Most military governments up to I945 acted in defence of 
gn&er and @tatus quo against mass unrest and poor civilian 
governmen~. However, there were also military governments 
1. (See below in Glossary, Luttwak; 1969; pp 2L1.-27) 
2. (Johnson; 197li-; PI) 114) 
20 
which acted against the status quo and instituted reforms in 
Chile, Bolivia, Cuba, Guatemala, Argentina and Colombia. In 
the cases of Vargas in Brazil (1930-19~5), Velasco lbara in 
Ec'O:dor (I9L14-I947) and Betancourt and Gallegos in Venezuela 
(1945-1948) military men participated in coups or sustained 
reforming civilian governments. 1 • These governments, whether 
military or military-supported civilian governments appealed 
to the masses for support, granted reforms, and in passing 
new labour and social regulations, extended the power of the 
State. 2 • Interested in industrialization and economic 
modernization, military men in power promised economic-
nationalist measuret and control of landlords. 
A major contributing factor to this new militarism was 
the social class diversity of the officer corps. More officers 
were coming from the lower social sectors and were mestizo, 
mulatto and even cholo. 3 • The expansion of education for lower 
classes greatly facilitated their entry into, and progress in 
the officer corps. 4 • Many reached middle 11 jefe 11 rank (major 
and colonel rank) 5 • during the I940's and were concentrated 
in the army. They were very aware of their national identity, 
having studied with foreign officers or at foreign missions. 
Their nationalism sometimes made them super-patriots. 6 • They 
were also aware of popular feeling and demand for change. 
The unity and discipline of the profe~sional military 
al so made i t possible for individuals to dominate a nation for 
1. (Lieuwen; 1961; pp 129) 
2. (See Johnson; 1914; pp 97) 
3. (See below; Glossary) 
4. (Johnson; 1974; pp I06) 
5. (Corbett; 1912; pp I2) 
6 •. (See Johnson; 1974; pp 67, I08, 112, I4I) 
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a short timeo To prolong the hold on power, the military 
leaders usually tried to reduce their political reliance on 
the military and gain the allegiance of civilian groups. 
They appealed directly to the masses and called themselves 
11 saviourrc;." They announced a plebian dict:Jtorship, promi'--'ed 
new dignity for the workers and appealert to popular 
xenophobia. They were the new urban caudillos. They also 
represented a substahtial cross-sectio.n of middle 11 jefe" rank 
of fie ers. 
Secret societies within the officer corps encouraged the 
new caudillos·. 1 They inclucled Major lbcfnez of Chile, Colcrnel 
Per6'n of Argentina, .Colonel Franco of Paraquay, Colonel Busch 
and Major Villanroel of Bolivia, Colonel Arbenz of Guatemala 
and Major Osorio of El Salvador, However, there were many 
officers of senior rank, for oxam]le General Benavides of Per~ 
who can not be excluded. 2 Unlike the old territorial caudillos, 
these men did not attain power on their onn initiative s:Lnce 
they had to earn the support of their officer coJlet-=i.gues, 
One officer however, could not dominate the active officer 
corps for long. 
Military confidence to intervene was also high; Officers 
considered the upper classes, which dominated political power, 
as ~ncompetent and ignorant. 3 The new caudillos and their 
brother officers were often highly trained and saw ther1oel voe 
as the enlightened modern generation sponsoring change. Juan 
Peron himself epitomized military confidence when·he said that 
government was a battle ·.vh:Lch the mili Lary vroulcl \';in because 
only soldiers had the will, spirit and agcression necessary.lf 
1 • (Gru1,o de Oficales Unidos GOU in /\.rgentina, R:i_zti1 de P,.:itria 
in Bali via, Por un llaffa.na J\.uspicioso and Line,::, ;/cc ta in 
Shil~~ ~ee_Jp~ns?n;_ I~~~· pp I25) 
(,..,,ee Liernren, J)6J, 1,p f:c.,,, 
(Maingot; pp 352-353 in Tulchin (ed) I973) 
(hlha; pp I7I; in Johnson; (ed) 1967) 
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Revolutionary rhetoric was an important component in 
intervention, especially to justify it and gather support. 
In post-war_manifestos issued by the new government the 
military frequently declared either a revolutionary, or a 
"restorati ve-0 moveinen t. 
Fascism, and the war which destroyed it also influenced 
militarist officers. 1 • During the war, the military had to 
accept the entire responsibility for internal security 
because political instability and the international situation 
made it impossible to share it. 2 • In addition, the military 
took a greater interest in development, moderni~ation and 
industriilization since they had agreed to supply the allied 
armies as models - models which represented modernization 
and industrialization.3• Civilians recommended to the military 
national control·of raw resources. The military looked 
- forward to maintainine security and taking some part in 
national development under civilian aegis. 
In the I950's, two matters impressed themselves upon 
military thinking. First, prolonged intervention \:ms a failure, 
and a danger to the military. Military dictators like Per6n, 
Rojas Pinilla and Odr{a enjoyed considerable popularity at the 
beginning of their rule, but they and their military 
supporters usually over-estimated their ability to govern 
their nations. Frustrationi as plans fail to live up to 
expectation, graft, civilian manipulation of officers and the 
subtle craft of political influence, dealing and compromise 
all served to induce political fatigue among officers in 
government. The efficiency, incorruptability, prestige, 
1. (See above; Chapter· II; pp 17-18) 
2. (Lambert; pp 356-357 in Tulchin (ed) 1973) · 
3. (Nun; I969; pp 6; Johnson; pp I2I-l22_and Pye; pp 78-79 
in Johnson (ed) 1967) 
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discipline and unity on which the officers prided themselves 
were tarnished. The public insubordination of officers, and 
their complaining in public, the proliferation of cliques in 
the officer corps and the purging, transfering and demotion of 
officers are manifestations of p9litical fatigue in the 
military. 1 • 
Experience in the I9l1.0' s and 1950' s taught the military 
the dangers to itself of prolonged intervention. If it was to 
rule even for a short time, it must have popular support for 
intervention. If the military government lacked legitimacy, 
that is, if the public did not recognise its right to hold 
power, it had to rule against the will of the country. The 
military never wanted a confrontation with the people. When 
it became obvious that the milite.ry was "occupying" its own 
country, armed violence and terrorism were possible. When the 
military lost its prestige, and incurred widespread hate, it 
found \'Ii thdrawal from politics very difficult and painful 
because civilian governments, and the enemies the military 
had made while in po~er might persecute officers or even 
destroy the military in order to punish or control it. 
, Consequently when Peron, Odr:f'a, Rojas Pinilla and P~rez Jirntnez 
brought disrepute upon the military by the inefficency, 
corruption, oppression and unpopularity, it removed them. 
Second, military thinking became more conservative in 
the I950's. Older and senior officers disliked reform and 
especially the nationalist and'populist movements of their 
younger subordinate officers. ·The very junior officers and 
1. (See De Hoyos; 1973; pp 7-36) 
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cadets were more j_nterested in professionalism and their 
careers, and looked to the officer corps for ideological 
leadership. They saw in the US the epitome of civil-military 
relations and State control of the armed forces. However, 
the success of the allied \1,ar effort in World War II 11 provecl 11 
to officers that State control of the economy was not as 
successful as laissez faire economic policies as a means of 
mobilizing national wealth. This realization reduced th~ 
Officers' interest in politics. The Latin American navies 
and airforces were also fairly conservative in their mood and 
were disinclined to support reform movements. Their personel 
which were much more highly educated and trained were. not 
sympathetic toyrar,d the less privileged· classes. Officers 
of all services prefered to rely on institutional obligations 
of loyalty and solidarity which were conservative values, 
rather than enter politics and lead popular movements which 
encouraged inter-service conflicts. 1 • Officers felt the 
natural conservatism and caution of the profession. Since 
they were not socialist by ideology, officers accepted the 
status auo and the principles of private property. Ownership 
and savi~gs were vital ·parts of their professional status. 
Third, institutional control was greater than previously. 
, 
·Prior to the I950 1 s the generals' institutional authority over 
their subordinates had been weaker than the personal and 
ideological authority enjoyed by jefe officers (majors and 
lieutenant colonels) but when institutional authority 
strengthened in the I950's and I960 1 s it was no longer possible 
for jefe officers to run their units as private armies. 
In theory, constitutionalism was the predominant military 
1. (See Lieuwen;· I96l; pp 66, I3I) 
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principle, but officers wanted a margin of autonomy from 
State control in order to protect their profession and their 
11 ri6ht 11 to intervene. Consequently, there was written into 
numerous constitutions an arbiter obligation permitting the 
military to act in times of political crisis. This obligation 
was sought not only by military men, but also by civilians who 
wanted a check on the exercise of executive power. The 
military had a formalized role to play in the political process 
for several reasons. First, the 11 revoltttion of rising 
expectations'', the popular demand for social economic and 
political justice had grown considerably int he 1950 1 s. 
Officers and civilians were fearful of 11levelling11 movements 
encouraged by populist, charismatic military caudillos and by 
communists. The Bolivian Revolution of 1952 and the rise of 
Castro in 1959 epitomised successful 11 levelling 11 movements, 
emotional· nationalism and expropiiation of property. 
Second, caudillos, Comsunists and_populists, fully 
apprec~ating the role played by the military in defending 
the status ouo, .~ere likely to destroy its monopoly on force, 
or even replace it entirely with a militia. Officers 
continually feared during times of uncertainty that political 
rivals and revolutionaries were smugeling arms, and that a 
secret mass popular army was being created. Tho Cuban experience 
showed that when the smaller elitist and specialist army uas 
being replaced, its officers were jailed, exiled, or shot. 
C.ommunism i:ras especially ana therna to the military. I ts 
revolutionary ageressiveness conflicted with institutional· 
caution, its disavowal of private property negated the 
entire socio-economic system, and its atheism struck at 
Roman Catholicism, • Communism also conflicted with the US 
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position on the Cold War and since US friendship was vital 
for arms, ammunition, credit and security the military was 
not prepared to risk losing this friendship by associating 
with Communists in domestic or international politics. 
Nationalist movements were prone to weaken US ties. 
Third, officers vrere concerned not only for institutional 
preservation, but also for security and unity. Internal 
subversion by Communists and partisan civilians of the 
military ranks could divide service again"st service, unit 
against unit or enlisted men against officer corps. The 
military wanted safeguards to prevent such subversion even if 
it was resting peacefully in its barracks. 
Against these personal and institutional dangers, the 
officers reaffirmed their professional conservatism. Even 
progressive officers were averse to the unsettling, 
unpredict~ble affects of mass mobilization and change. The 
constitutional arbiter role permitted the military some 
political participation within the legal framework of the 
State. Since it distrusted civilians, the military reserved 
for itself the ri5ht to ascertain the military budget, pay, 
promotion and discipline. It deliberat~d on matt~rs which 
were not always its direct concern, and in general favoured 
·statism and centralization of political power. Officers 
even considered private enterprise, the individual, and the 
profit motive with some distru~t. 1 • 
Although the military rema~ned in its barracks in most 
of the republics, officers wished to play a role in national 
development, modernization and industrialization. Officers 
occupied numerous civilian government positions in welfare 
1,. (,See Stepan; I97I; pp 2l:6 and Johnson;. I97L:-; pp ILtO) 
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and development projdcts. They often took an active part in 
road construction, education, housing~rojects and 
establishment of public utilities, Such work, and participation 
with civic action programmes greatly improved military 
prestige, and helped alleviate in the tangible way popular 
distress in the cities and countryside. Encouraging military 
participation in civic action was the new Kennedy Administration 
which hoped that military concentration on non-military 
projects would combat Casto-1st insurgency. 1 • 
The entire military establishment was becoming more aware 
of the need for national modernization and development, and 
that hltimately, military strength rested on these, This 
awareness was a result of improved military education, 
especially at • -. "'I , L 1. ··--' _, • -- .,_ - -- ~ - - .J:t .. _ .- ,_ ._.,.,..: -1-- -~ ....... ,....,. -1--s e ni or .LeV8J.' a!lU l,!lt: VL.l.Ut:l." l."c:l.llt,C: U .L .L tv.L l.L.J.. vlllvll v 
which made the army in particular more progressive in outloo~ 
than the other armed services. 
The military retained into the I960 1 s its political 
autonomy. Its own officers held service minister positions 
i~ cabinet, and they were able to protect the military from 
abuse by oligarch-dominated governments. The state apparatus 
and the growth of middle sectors in the republics no longer 
made necessary the symbiotic military-oligarchy relationship, 
although the affinity of interest continued. Now the 
military accepted, perhaps grudgingly, any constitutional 
government which enjoyed public support, which acted according 
to law and which did not compromise military power or 
integrity. 
1. (See Baines; JIAS Vol I4.No 4-November I972; pp 473-474, 
lt79) 
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Although this background introduces in a generalized 
way the military and militarism of Spanish speaking Latin 
America, there were differences in the case of the Portuguese 




THE MILITARY IN BRAZIL 
Disorganization, rebellion, and violence characterized 
the imperial army of Brazil at independence in I822. 
Inefficien½ it lost the Cisplatina War against Argentina in 
1825, and divided and disloyal it helped fo~ce the abdication 
1 • 
of the unpopular Portuguese - born emperor Pedro I in 183I. 
Despite the unreliability and indiscipline of the army, 
Brazil was riot scarred by military interference in politics 
as were the Spanish-American republics, The army was just 
too small and too weak to dominate a vast country like Brazil, 
and in I832 the Reg.ency succeeded in depriving it of its 
privileges and immunity from prosecution in political crimes. 2• 
Army rioting, insubordination and street fighting in Rio 
de Janeiro made necessary the creation of a national guard 
which was recruited &nd led by the rural fazendeiro 
(landowner) supporters of the government. The new guard 
countered the indisciplined army, but accentuated regionalism 
in Imperial Brazil by mak.ing·central authority dependent on 
the good will of the provincial leadership 3~. 
The Brazilian ~rmy did not perform well in either 
territorial wars or regional insurrections, The Para~uayan 
War, which began in 1864 was long and costly to Brazil in 
men and money, despite the military heroes it produced. 
After the war, .the army was reorganized, reformed and 
modernized. Military schools were updated, and provided a 
scientific education unavailable elsewhere in Brazil. They 
1. (Wc.rcester; I973; pp 79-81) 
2. (Johnson; 1974; pp 184) 
3. (See Wcrcester; 1973; pp 88) 
produced a new generation o{ officers who were disciplined 
and conservative. 
A major influence on these officers was Positivism 
which stressed science, progress and order. The monarchy and 
slavery were anathema to these exponents of liberalism and 
republicanism. During the I870 1 s and I880's the younger 
officers became disillusioned with the empire and their 
dislike grew for the perfidious casacas or "frock-coat" 
politicians. Morale suffered through reduction of budget 
1 • 
allocation, and lack of promotion and pay increases. Some 
officers felt that they had to save Brazil from civilians and 
politi'cians. 
Reflecting the political divisions amourig civilians in 
the I880i s, the officer corps 1:,as divided beLween Lhtl ,YOu.11i,:;ei·, 
republican and liberal officers in the army, and the 
conservative officers of the navy and army who were 
monarchists. While the older and senior officers like Field 
Marshal Deodoro da Fonseca and the navy ·admirals had 
consid~rable personal respect for the aging and infirm emperor, 
Pedro II, the younger and lower ranking officers in the army 
were critical and growing more insubordinate. In these 
uncertain times, a Clube Militar was founded representing a 
majority of the army officer corps. Initially intended to 
give voice to abolitionist and republican issues, the Clube 
became a forum for debate on political issues between armyJ 
factions. It also gave minority factions a representation 
that made unnecessary the formation of cliques and secret 
societies which might endanger officer corps unity. 2. 
1. (See Dudley; HAHR: Vol 55, No 1; Feb I975. pp 52-53;5L1.; 
55;56. Wsrcester; I973· pp II8-II9) 
2. (Johnson; I974 pp 219-220~ 
The aging emperor was easily deposed in 1889 by the 
idealist and well educated cadets and junior officers of the 
army. Senior, pro-monarchist offic~rs identified more with 
their profession than with the empire, and rather than 
splitting the military and inviting civil war by defending 
Pedro, they led their irrepressible subordinates in a coup 
d'etat, Deodoro, who was a personal friend of the emperor 
joined the conspira t·ors and, as head of the army, became 
provisional President of the new republic. While in power, 
he ordered a fifty percent pay rise for the military, and 
. 1 
doubled army strengthi: but his authority over_ the military 
was weak. In 1890,-Deodoro resigned in order to avert civil 
war, but military unity collapsed under his successor, 
General Floriano Peixoto,. The monarchist navy attempted a 
counter-revolt in Rio de Janeiro harbour, and a regionalist 
revolt arose in Rio Grande do Sul, 
Civilians were active both in supporting each revolt 
and in suppressing them, Floriano's military dictatorship 
ended°':in 1894 when a civilian with military support was 
elected Brazil's first republican civilian President, 
Internal security was a problem for a large undeveloped 
and thinly populated country. The Canudos rebellion of 
bandits, peasants and ex-slaves in the distant backlands of 
Bahia state in the 1890 1 s required strong military force and 
2. 
several attempts to ensure its suppression, Regional revolts 
led by fazendeiros were also frequent occurances. In 1910, 
two further backland, Canudos-style rebellions had to be 
suppressed by strong military forces. 
-~.2.L 5'5"; f\., Ii fc.\,"'"'l 
1, (Dudley; HAHR:VI975; pp 56) 
2. (See Bello; I966; pp I54-I55) 
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Most of Brazil's frontier problems were solved by 
diplomacy by I9IO, but the direct involvement of Brazilian 
troops in a dispute with Bolivia over the Acre territory0) 
and public concern about US penetration of the Amazon emphasised 
the need for improvement in defence and security arrangements. 
(2) The army held maneouvres in 1905 and sent some officers to 
Prussia for training.(3) 
Military morale, however, was low. Discipline and unity 
were poor. The army lacked the equipment, leadership and 
power needed to defeat quickly and easily even the poorly 
equipped and.irregular forces of the backlands. Inefficiency 
cost prestige. The. crews of two battleships mutinied against 
the discipline and conditions and bombarded Rio de Janeiro. 
Germanophile officers who had studied in Germany, among them 
Bertholdo Klinger, were unhappy when the government employed 
a French military mission.(4) The Brazilian military was 
unable to force on the government its demands for money, 
privilege and equipment, Its very autonomy was threatened by 
the Epitacio Pessoa government in I9I9 when it broke with 
tradition and made a civilian instead of a soldier the new 
Minister of War. Despite its rejection or neglect by civilian 
governments, the military had a strong feeling, originating 
in the I910 1 s that it was destined to play a major part in 
Brazil's future. Bertholdo Klinger, again, was representative 
of this mood.(5) Other officers, including the Minister of 
1. (Johnson; 1974; pp 200) 
2. (Although she had official permission to conduct an 
exploratory cruise of the Amazon, USS Wilmington caused 
a furor among Brazilians who feared US expansion in South 
America. See Hill; pp 354-356 in Hill; (ed) 1947) 
3. (Nunn; JLAS: Vol 4 No I; 1972; pp 35) 
4, (Nunn; JLAS; Vol 4 No I; 1972; pp 40) 
5. (See Nunn; JLAS; Vol ~- No. I; 1972 pp 36,Li.2) 
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War himself used force and subterfuge to gain the governorships 
of five northern states. Officers lacking discipline and 
allegiance to the institution acted in political self interest. 
Anti-civilian feeling grew. Military revolts, including th~ 
famous Tenente revolts of 1922 and 1924 were crushed by loyal 
forces. The tenentes were junior to mid-rank officers who 
were modernist and progressive in their views. Their movement, 
tenentismo, combined· socio-economic modernization, political 
rationalization ~nd authoritarianism 0) Most drama tic of the 
revolts, illustrating the nation-wide discontent with the 
existing republican system was .the Tenente Column of Captain 
Luis Carlos Prestest which marched some 6,000 miles through 
Brazil in 30 months before withdrawing to Bolivia. 
Military discontent was unable to affect the republic 
politically because the Brazilian military lacked unity, 
cohesive leadership and a monopoly on force. State coercive 
power, particularly that of the three major states, Minas 
Gerais, Sao Paulo and Rio Grande de Sul was great. The latter 
state had a militia of 20,000 men supported with tanks 
imported from Europe. (2) Sao Paulo hired its own French 
military mission and even established a State airforce. That 
state's militia usually outnumbered the federal troops 
garrisoned there by ten to one. (3) National or federal army 
units stationed in a state were also subordinated to the armed 
fore es of that state, (4) for there was no central supreme 
command which had overall control. The states, then, held 
great coercive power, and immobilized both the federal govern-
ment an« the powerless army co~mand. 
~-I' \ . . 
1. (Johnson; 19?4; pp 203 
2. (Worcester; 1973; pp 166) 
3. (Stepan;I97I·_ pp I7) 
4. (Lieuwen; 19lr; pp 74) 
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So it was that when the three states were in agreement, 
the military was able to overthrow the federal government of 
President Washington LU:is and install Get~lio.Vargas as 
provisional President in November I930. 0) Two years later in 
July I932, General Bertholdo Klinger led a counter-revolt 
of several army units and the Sao Paulo militia against Rio 
de Janeiro. This action failed to displace Vargas because 
Rio Grande do Sul, Minas Gerais and the bulk of the military 
refused to support it. A civil war resulted, during which 
the city of Sao Paulo was bombed. 
It was clear to the central, federal government of 
President Vargas, and the military that in the light of 
regional sentiment and state militia power, federal coercive 
power and authority had to be increased, and state autonomy 
reduced. A communist military revolt in Natal and Recife 
(two northern and isolated states) was easily crushed and 
gave Vargas the military and public support he needed to 
declare a dictatorship. (2) Two factors became evident: the 
·weakness of officer corps unity in a vast country, and the 
susceptability of army ranks to communist influence. 
The I937 constitution which formalized Vargas' 
dictatorship also abolished the independent State militias. 
These were absorbed into regular units, but the regional and 
political affiliation of the new army units was suspect. 
Vargas also consolidated military support behinJ him by 
purchasing defence equipment and encouraging industrialization. 3 
·Brazil participated both passively and actively in 
1. (Stepan; I97I; pp 82) 
2. (Skidmore; 1967; pp 23) . 
3. (See Vargas speech on industry pp I30-I33 in Baily (ed) 
I97I and Hilton; HAHR; Vol 53 No 1 Feb 1973) 
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World \'Jar II. She iWovided raw materials and airfields for 
tho war effort, and in anticipation of preferential 
treatment given to belligerent nations under 1ond-Loase, 
Brazil also sent to Italy in I94L1. Fc3rs8. E:c~oodiciona.ria 
Brasileira (FEB). This participation had important 
ramifications for the future of the military, because it 
crystalized opinion in the officer corps on issues affecting 
Brazil's political, economic and foreign policies, 
particularly where they involved the US. Many officers, 
especially those who had served in Italy were subsequently 
very pro-US and eager to stand with US on Cold CTar-issues. 
They welcomed US in1estrnent in the economy. Other officers 
were less trusting of US and favoured economic-nationalist 
and neutralist policies. Opinion differed on the best Tiay to 
ensure Brazil's naticnal security, and from what threat, 
international Communism or aggressive neighbours. 1 
In keeping with the democratic mood of the time, Vargas 
promised elections for 1945, but the military feared that he 
might ~ancel them and try to re~ain in po~er. Not prepared 
to sanction this, the military deposed Vargas and held the 
2 elections in 1946. Vareas Tias permitted to stand for 
elections in I950, provided he "respected not only the 
Constitution, but also the unalienable ri~ht of the military. 113 • 
The returned President Vargas tried to gain militiry support 
but his nationalist advisers displeased the pro-US officer 
1 • (The Comnhmist three.t ,;:as highlighted in I9lr6 1:rhcn Prestos 
declared that in tho event of war between Brazil and the 
USSR, Brazilian communists would fieht for the USSR. See 
Skidmore; 1967; pp 66. Cautious military men saw more than 
rhetoric in Prestes' announcement. Another matter was 
Argentina, a rival of long standing, TThich had bou5ht 
large quantities of cheap, surplus war equipment fvom BritRir 
while the US had been slow to provide Brazil with compRrable 
equipment l.tnder Lend-Lease) ) 
(See Worcester· I973; p~ /S7-f81 , 
(quoted in SkiJmore; 1967; ~p I03) 
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corps. The populism of Vargas and Labour Minister Joao 
Goulart also antagonised anti-communist officers. The 
military's position was made clear in 1952 when Vargas' 
military supporters were defeated in elections for control of 
Clube Militar. Political partisans led by Carlos Lacerda 
asked army and airforce generals to depose Vargas. They refused 
but a "Colonels' Manifesto" appeared which pressured Vargas 
into dismissing the populist and leftist Labour Minister 
Goulart. (1 + 
When assassins who made an unsuccessful attempt to kill 
Lacerda were linked to the Vargas body guard the service chiefs 
demanded the President's resignation~ They implied that 
Vargas himself might be innocent, but the "criminal corruption" 
around him compromised the presidency's 11indispensible moral 
a~thori ty, 11 (2) On receipt of this ultimatum on 24th August 
1954, Getulio Vargas committed suieide. 
Despite their dislike of Juscelino Kubitschek's 1955 
running mate, Goulart, the military resisted Lacerda's attempts 
to encourage, threaten and shame them into cancelling the 
election. Many officers did favour action, but there was a 
sudden pre-emptive coup led by War Minister General Henr.i8_.ue 
Teixeira Lott, which immobilized the conspirators and ensured 
the inauguration of President Kubitschek and his vice-
president. (3) In 1960, the military accepted Jo:.to Goulart as 
J~nio Quadros 1 vice-president, but when the President resigned 
suddenly in August I96I, the military took immediate steps to 
prevent the populist, left-leaning .Goulart from gaining power. (4; 
1 • ( S_kidmore; 1967; pp 130) 
2. (See Skidmore; 1967; pp 139-141) 
3. (See Stepan; I97I; pp 106, 119) 
4. (See Worcester; I973; pp 222 and Skidm6re; I967; pp 209) 
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The governor of Rio Grande do Sul (and Goulart's brother-in-
law) Leonel Brizola pressured General Ma6hado Lopes, commander 
of the locally garrisoned III Army into declaring his support 
for constitutionalism and Goulart.0) With a civil war looming, 
the military chiefs and Congress decided to give Goulart the 
Presidency, but power would rest with Congress in a 
parliamentary system. A plebiscite in 1965 would decide on 
keeping the new system or returning to executive presidential 
power. Goulart campaigned vigorously for full presidential 
powers and the advancement of the plebiscite date, which was 
moved forward by Congress to January 1963. The military 
accepted the v~rdict of the Brazilian people which voted five 
to one in favour of the Presidential system. 
Violence rather than militarism typified post-
independence Brazil, particularly in the imperial period. 
Brazil gai'ned her independence in 1822 without a long costly 
and destructive struggle against Portugual, and the imperial 
government of Pedro I enjoyed undisputed legitimacy. 
_ Organized, and prosperous, Brazil was able to ignore and then 
proscribe military violence, unencumbered as she was by 
unemployed and embittered war heroes. British naval power 
and diplomacy ensured protection, and by facilitating 
Portuguese recognition, prevented any threat of reconquest .• (2) 
Political life in Imperial Brazil was stabilized by the 
I82l+ Constitution which gave formal "o poder moderador" 
(moderator power) to the emperor so that he could remove and 
replac~ governments. This encouraged patience among 
opposition groups which did not seek military friendships and 
1. (Skidmore; I967;· pp 210) 
2. (See Worcester; 1973; pp 67, 71-72) 
Joa'o Goulart, 
President of Brazil 
1961 - 1964. 
Leonel Brizola, 
Governor of 
Rio Grande do Sul 
during the political 
crisis of 1961. 
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conspiracies. The legitimacy and unity of the empire were 
not questioned by the fazendeiros who owed their status as 
coroneles to the emperor. 
Armed rebellion in Rio de Janeiro, and in the provinces 
were frequent, but not sufficient to affect change unless 
such action corresponded with the wishes of enlightened 
Brazilians spread throughout the empire. Such widespread 
feeling supported the declaration of indep~ndence in I822, 
the forced abdication of Pedro I in I83I, the rise to the 
throne of the under-age crown prince in 1840, and the 
' . 
overthrow of Pedro II in 1889. The disunity, indiscipline 
and unreliability of the Brazilian military prevented it 
from dominating or intimidating the empire. Army units in 
the provinces (and later in the states of the republic) had 
to co-operate with the local militia and coronel or risk 
destruction.0) These.local militias were once the body 
guards of fazendeiros and components of the national guard, 
but when they were taken over, disciplined and equipped by 
the States, their control fell to the governors. State 
politicos were able to use State coercive power in violent 
confrontations with other states and against the federal 
government. Army units in regional garrisons, often 
dispersed, and lacking monopoly of force (supremacy of arms 
and manpower) could not themselves apply pressure on state 
or federal government, or .overthrow them unless active 
suppor~ was widespread. The national federal army was itself 
influenced by regional sentiment because units were recruited 
locally. (2) There existed in Brazil from colonization to the 
1, (Destruction could be achieved not only by physical 
annihilation, but also by boycott which had the effect 
of a siege.) 
2. (See Stepan; 1971; pp 13) 
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I960 1 s not one, but several individual militaries devoid 
of strong, centralized and unified military control. 
Professionalization in the I890's and I900 1 s did not improve 
this situation because the French military missions hired 
represented a politicalized and divided French army, and 
they tended to accentuate politicalization and disunity in 
the Brazilian.(1) These were particularly evident in the 
intermittant inter-service street fighting and the course of 
the I889-I894 military government. Only the Rio garrisons 
had overthrown the emperor, but many officers who were 
uninvolved were not enthusiastic about the republic. The 
1893-1894 civil war was made possible by this disunity.(2) 
No service or unit could enter politic unless it had the 
active or passive support of otber services and units. 
The respect for constitutionalism of individual 
military leaders greatly inhibited militarism in Brazil. 
The Du~ue de Caxias and Manuel Luiz Osorio were both veterans 
of the Para3uayan War, and later both served as military 
cabinet ministers. They controlled and moderated discontent 
within the army, and did not use their power or influence 
for partisan ends.(3) Deodoro da Fonseca also controlled, 
but only for a short time, the rising ideological and 
professional unrest of younger officers. 
Militarism, as opposed to mere violence, occured in 
Brazil for the first time in 1868 during the Paraguayan War, 
when C&xias forced the resignation of the War Minister who 
1 •. (See Nunn; JLAS; Vol 4 No 1; I972; pp 4I) 
2. (The counter-revolt was led by the navy which was white, 
upper class, conservative and monarchist in comparison 
to the more socially and racially diverse, liberal and 
republican army. See Johnson; I974.; pp I92-I93 and Bello 
1966; pp 120) 
3. (Johnson; I9i4; pp 186-IBB. Warcester; 1973; pp II9) 
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was a personal enemy. CThen Caxias resigned himself a few 
months later, he precipitated the collapse of the ministry 
in power. The politicians considered these actions to be 
military interference, (1) 
A "military question" arose in the mid 1880 1 s when the 
government tried to remove from service politicalized officers, 
Colonel dunha Mattos and Lt. Colonel Senna Madureirra were 
deeply involved in politics, but their insubordination caused 
a serious rift between politicians and the army over questions 
of honour and violation of regulations.(2) 
In 1889, Colonel Benjamin Constant publically attacked 
the government. Constant, the positivist ideologUe who had 
inspired generations of officers was not disciplined at any 
time before the oveithrow of the empire;a mere three weeks 
later.(3) After Osorio died in 1879, and Caxias in 1880, army 
discontent and indiscipline were permitted to grow. Positivism 
the abolition of slavery and political corruption created a 
-
moralism and modernism among officers akin to fanaticism,(4) 
Civilians also wanted change, modernization and a break with 
the past, so that the 1889 coup d'etat did receive wide 
support, active, passive and grudging. 
The military stayed close to politics, protecting its 
political rights and manipulating the 1910 ~lection~ to get 
Marshal Hermes da Fonseca the Presidency. When he proved 
difficult to control, the military realized that elections 
and soldier-Presidents were not effective methods of 




(See Worcester; 1973; pp 108-109) 
(Worcester; 1973; pp 119-122) 
(Nunn; JLAS: Vol 4 No 1 1972; pp 32, See also Bello; 
1966; pp 62) 
(Nunn; JLAS: Vol 4 No 1 1972; pp 33, .See also Wo.rcester; 
1973i pp 138 on FlorianQ and corruption in Brazil.) 
(See 0tepan; 1971; pp 77) 
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Personalism played a part in Brazilian militarism. 
Caxias in 1868 and Deodoro in 1889 both took exception to 
public servants they disliked for personal reasons. Floriano, 
who most resembled the typical caudillo in his demand for 
power, betrayed the monarchy and Deodoro for his personal 
benefit. (:i) 
Young military men and junior officers were the 
progressive men of ihe 1910 1 s and 1920 1 s. · They were well 
educated, and confident of their technical and institutional 
abilities. However, Brazil's assurance of territorial 
soverignty was a result of diplomacy, not of military force, 
and as future war seemed improbable, the officers felt a lack 
of purpose. The vast interior, which was a source of awe to 
civilians and officers alike beckoned the officers who saw 
the exploration and development of Brazil as alternatives to 
preparing for war. Accordingly, many officers joined the 
expeditions of General Rondon, exploring, mapping, contacting 
Indians and stringing telegraph lines. The belief became 
standard in the early 20th century that the military should 
participate in national development&. ~) 
National security remained a vital concern. Argentina 
was a rival not to be under-estimated and some of Brazil's 
frontiers were disputed by her neighbours. Officers were 
keen on greater military power, but civilians were unwilling 
to increase the military budget in the pacific euphoria of 
the post Great War period. The young, junior officers 
blamed the government and the political system for Brazil's 
lack of progress, her malaise and the undermining of military 
1. (see Worcester; 1973; pp 109, 125-127) 
2. (see Nunn; JLAS; Vol 4 No 1; 1972; pp 36) 
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. unity. (1) The Tene nte re vol ts were sympte.ma tic of this 
mood among the junior officers, and the survival of the 
Prestes Column against attempts to destroy it was indicative 
of the determination of the men involved, and of the level 
of civilian support for them. 
A rebellious mood existed in military and civilian 
circles when the 1930 election took place. Civil war seemed 
possible because Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul opposed 
the President-elect who hailed from S~o Paulo. A political 
assassin linked to President Washington Luiz caused military 
units in Rio Grande do Sul, Minas Gerais and Para!ba to rebel 
against the government. Faced with the prospect of a civil 
war. if President Luiz remained, senior officers in Rio de 
Janeiro deposed him and cancelled the election result.(2) 
Vargas was made provisional President, but he remained in 
power for fifteen years. The Authority, and centralization 
of political and military power of Estado Novo appealed to 
military men. When the federal government took control of 
the States' purchase and importation of armament, the military 
gained superiority (but not supremacy) in coercive power.(3) 
Military unity and centralization of command were possible. 
Vargas proved responsive to military wishes and purchased the 
equipment it wanted. 
Estado N6vo created professional militarism and a 
professional officer class. Professional concepts of hierachy, 
authority, bureaucracy planning and centralism could be applied 





(Nunn; JLAS; Vol 4 No 1i I972; pp 47) 
(Skidmpre; I967; pp 5-6/ 
(See Stepan; I97I; pp I8) 
(See Nunn; JLAS; Vol 4 No 1; 1972; pp 50-5I) 
Estado Novo was a decisive beginning. The military worked 
with the president (in defending Brazil) instead of having 
to lobby the polfticos. Officers were greatly concerned 
about national security during the I93O 1 s and I9L~O 1 s. Border 
conflicts, the Leticia war between Peru and Colombia, 
0932-1933) and the Chaco War between Bolivia and Para;J.uay 
\1932-1935) were taking place. Officers also feared that a 
future European war would threaten Brazil's security. 1 Fiscist 
and communist subversion and populist politics justified 
authoritarianism, but the military also had to protect its 
unity and reputation by withstanding the lobbying subversion 
of pe~fidious civilians who sought intervention. 
The military, recruited regionally and well educated also 
reflected the mood of society. To this extent officers 
considered themselves 11 0 povo fardado 11 (the people in uniform), 
Their interests in national development and defence coincided 
with th?se of the people. Although they believed themselves 
non-political, officers also felt that they had a duty to 
purge the political system of corruption and peculation. In 
1945 the military was aware of the mood for democracy in 
Brazil, and Vargas was deposed because he did not reflect 
this mood. 2 
Articles I76-I78 of the 1946 Constitution reserved for 
the military 11 0 poder inoderador" formerly held by the emperor. 
This reservation or obligation appeared also in the I89t and 
1934 Constitutions3, Military intervention was a constitutional 
obligation. The military was expected to ensure domestic law 
1 - (Hilton; HAHR: Vol 53 No 1; Feb, 1973; pp 73-75) 
2. ( See Worcester; 1973; pp 186-188. Nunn; JLAS; Vol L~ No l 
1972; pp 4-8) 
3, (Stepan; RAND; R-586-DOS; April 1971; pp 73) 
and order, and to accept the authority of the President only 
11 dentro dos lirnites da lei" (within the li;nits of the law). 
This gave the military the right to deliberate on constitutional 
matters and pass judgment. It also justified civilian 
approaches to the military. The Brazilian public accepted 
this constitutional obligation and it was able to set publically 
the goals and limits of intervention because the military 
prefered to ~a-operate rather than compete with civilians. 1 
The military permitted Vargas to return to power in I950 
when he won the Presidential election. Although his enemies 
including Carlos Lacerda gained some support among junior 
officers for a cou-p d'etat, Vargas was safe as long as he 
held senior officers' respect. Unfortunately this respect 
became tenuous because of the corruption and economic failure 
of Vargas' Presidency, which also seemed oblivious to growing 
social instability. Vargas lost this respect when his body 
guard was found implicated in the attempt on Lacerda 1 s 
life. Because an airforce major died in the attempt the 
senior officers were unable to ignore their subordinates 
demands that Vargas resign. 
Nor was War Minister Henrique Teixeira Lott able to 
ignore the junior officers who were opposed to the populist, 
left-wing and nationalist policies of President-elect 
Juscelino Kubitschek and his running mate Jo~o Goulart. The 
young officers also enjoyed considerable civilian support, 
1. (The military did not always want this constitutional 
responsibility. When Rui Barbosa drew up the I89I 
Constitution, many officers, including Deodoro, opposed 
this discretionary duty because it endaggered military 
discipline. See Stepan; I97I; pp 76-77) 
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- civilians including Lacerda even approached them about a 
possible coup d'etat. Military discipline was about to crack 
but General Lott acted first, overthrowing the provisional 
President who was opposed to Kubitschek and surprising the. 
conspiring officers into passivity. By Lott's action, the 
full prestige of the army was committed to the inauguration 
of Kubitschek and Goulart. 1 • 
When President·J~nio Quadros resigned suddenly in 
August I96I, the three military ministers immediately 
declared martial law, and announced that Vice President 
Goulart could not resume his new duties. 2 • Many officers 
were opposed to thin defiance of constitutionalism, but they 
would not disobey the military ministers' veto. In the 
suddenness of the ~risis, the ministers neglected to seek the 
regional and military commanders' agreement for their action, 
and they were unprepared for the stand taken by General Lopes 
of the III Army who, pressured by Governor Brizola and his 
militia, declared for constitutionism and Goulart, and thus 
made imminent the ghastly spectre of civil war.3• Goulart•s 
popular support, his constitutional right to power and imminent 
civil war gave heart to the constitutionalist cause. Both 
sides compromised: political power would rest with Congress, 
and Goulart would receive the ceremonial post of President. 
A plebiscite in I965 would decide on Brazil's constitutional 
1. (It also illustrat;d the growing precariousness of 
Brazilian politics in that the constitution had to be 
defied by Lott in order to preserve it. Civilian ctnd 
military conspirators were opposed to Kubitschek 
principally because Goulart, Vargas' former Labour 
Minister, was to be his Vice President. See Worcester; 
1973; pp 2I0-2I2 and Skidmore; 1967; pp I5~-I55) 
2. (Studies do not indicate that Quadros was pressured 
into resigning by the military. See Stepan; I97I; 
pp 68 footnote) 
3. (See Stepan; I97I; pp I9) 
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future - legislative and parliamentary, or executive and 
presidential. Goulart was on probation. 
In the interventions of 1930, 1945 and I954, the Brazilian 
military had a mandate in public opinion to act. Officers 
knew exactly what they were expected to do simply by reading 
the newspapers. The public trusted the military not to exceed 
its "commands" by ruling after intervening. Despite the 
enthusiasm of the junior officers, the military lacked 
confidence in its ability to rule, and prefered civilians to 
replace the government it had displaced. 
The attempts to exclude Jo~o Goulart from office in 1955 
and I96I failed because first, public support for exclusion 
by intervention was poor, and second the military lacked the 
vital pre-requisite of unity. The civil wars of 1893 and 
1932 illustrated the dangers of military disunity. Another 
danger was that entire regions cif Brazil aould rise up in 
revolt and endanger revolutionary successes at the centre. 1 • 
Freq~ently, the military was encouraged to act by 
civilians like Lacerda, but it never did so until a consensus 
among officers had been reached. Discussion and _decision 
o·ccured at the Cl ube Mili tar, and individual sen:i,or officers 
were often instrumental at meetings in gaining support for a 
t · 1 d · · 2 • Wh t d t f t f par icu ar ~c1s1on. hen evens move oo as or 
discussion, as in I95l1- with General Lott's fai t accompli action, 
and in 1961 when an attempt was made to keep Goulart out of 
power, the military accepted a passive role rather than act 
and risk conflict. Under these conditions the I96I compromise 
' 
1 • ( See above; Chapter III; pp 31, 42 , ; and Skidmore; 1967 
PP 5) · · 
2. (See Skidmore; 1967; pp IOI-I02 
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suited War Minister Od{lio Denys and the ot~er service 
ministers since Goulart lacked executive power, but within 
two years, he had regained that pow~r in a national 
plebiscite. 
In 1954, the military had forced President Vargas to 
dismiss Goulart from his cabinet. In 1955 and I96I it was 
ready to keep him from office by preventive intervention. 
Now, in I963 Goulart held power in his own right. Would it 
be necessary or possible to dismiss him again? 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE COUP D1 ETAT OF I96L1-
President Goulart had held full executive power for only 
fifteen months when he was deposed by ~he military on 
31st March 1964. The major reasons for his removil were his 
poor relations with the military and its fears that its 
institutional integrity was being undermined. 
Of great concern to the military was growing discontent 
of the enlisted ranks, especially among the non-commissioned 
officers. Since World War II there had been major improvements 
in the_professional and educational status of non-commissioned 
officers because of ·the increased aemand for specialized and 
technical personal in modern armed forces. Unfortunately, 
this improvement in status was not accompanied by a rise in 
political and social standing. The corporals and sergeants 
became resentful, discontented and consious of their political 
inferiority. In I96I, it was evident that a schism existed 
between officers and the enlisted ranks led by the sergeants, 1 
President Goulart and his brother-in-law, Leonel Brizola, 
both sought sergeants' support in return for greater political 
rights, such as being able to hold public office and vote. 
Both of these rights were denied to enlisted men. The special 
housing and other benefits the sergeants received seemed to 
threaten the military chain-of-command. Perhaps the sergeants 
could be bought, 
At a meeting held in May I963 in Rio de Janeiro, the 
non-commissioned officers decided that they would protect 
1. (See Stepan; I97I; pp I58-I6O) 
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Goulart from any attempt to overthrow him by conservatives. 
They also decided that they would not defend existing la0s 
which protected the rights and privileges of a few. 
In September 1963, the sergeants and enlisted men of the 
airforce, navy and marines mutinied in Bras!lia and tried to 
seize control of the government. The spark for the mutiny 
was the Supreme Court ruling upholding the denial of rights 
of enlisted men to hold public office. The sergeants were 
also influericed by radical leftist labour leaders and 
nationalists, 1 • 
Preside~t Goulart's reaction was equivocal, because by 
not taking action against the mutineers he created the feeling 
among military men that he was unreliable and encouraging 
indiscipline. Although Goulart had not encouraged or praised 
the mutineers he did not denounce them either, 
Political partisanship within the military and the 
weakening of discipline vrere clearly evident when a thousand 
sailors and marines mutinied in Rio de Janeiro on 26th March 
I964. The spark this time was the attempt by the Navy Minister, 
Admiral Mota, to discipline a sailor who was engaged in union 
activity. ~gain, President Goulart failed to take a clear 
stand against the mutineers. He dismissed Admiral Mota and 
consulted pro-Communist labour leaders about the choice of a 
replacement. The new Navy Minister, Admiral Paulo Rodrigues 
' ordered a full amnesty for the mutineers, confirming fears 
throughout the entire military establishment that Goulart was 
deliberately undermining discipline so that military action 
against him would be less likely. 
1. (Skidmore; I967; pp 260-261) 
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At a meeting of sergeants held in Rio de Janeiro, on 
30th March 1964, the President confirmed military fears when 
he asked for the sergeants' support, and then denounced the 
officer-corps as disobedient because it had tried to exclu4e 
him from power in I96I. 1 • 
Goulart 1 s actions accentuated divisions not only between 
the officer corps and the ranks, but also between officers in 
corps itself. As Piesident and Chief Commander of the armed 
forces, Goulart was able to promote and transfer officers. 
General Amaury Kruel, for example, who was a personal friend of 
the President, was given command of the all important II Army 
stationed in Sao Paulo state. Unfortunately, the feeling 
spread that President Goulart was promoting and transfering 
officers for political or personal reasons, instead of relying 
ori professional and military suitability. The President was 
thought to be abusing the system. Resentment among officers 
and personal anxiety over future promotion do appear to have 
contributed to the conspiracy. 2~ 
Numerous officers were conspirators of long standine, for 
example, Od!lio Denys and Cordeiro de Farias. They had sought 
backing and opportunity to overthrow Goulart ever since 
Quadros had resigned in I96I, but of the four army commanders, 
only General Justino Bastos of the IV Army, stationed in the 
distant and isolated Northeast region, was prepared to co-
operate. 3. 
The conspirators then turned to the State governors for 
help. The state militias were often very powerful although 
1. (Skidmore; 1967; pp 296-297. Worcester; 1973; pp 228) 
2. (See Stepan; I97I; pp I66-I67) 
3. (Skidmore; 1967;. pp 295) 
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lacking in heavy equipment. The S~o Paulo militia actually 
outnumbered the local II Army by two to one. 1 Obviously, 
individual army commander could not afford to ignore the Will 
of the local governor for the lethal power he held could 
plunge the state if not the country into civil war, a possibility 
which still plagued the military conspirators right up to early 
March 1964, 2 Although the State governors had the coercive 
power to intimidate the national military, military and 
militia leaders realized that a balance of power existed 
between them. Never-the-less, one State governor, Brizola, 
was able to mobilize l9cal opinion and his militia, and force 
the local army commander to disobey his own superiors at 
Army High Command in I96I. The conspirators of I96I and 1964 
wanted a sharp, short surgical action, and the active or 
passive support of all arm·ed organizations, especially the 
militias of sgo Paulo and Minas Gerais. If the government 
lacked any armed support whatsoever, the insurgent units would 
not meet resistance during a coup d'etat when speed and time 
were vital. 
Unfortunately Goulart had also lost support among the 
State governors. Magalh~es Pinto, governor of Minas Gerais 
was a moderate politician who was attracted to the left. He 
had supported Goulart tn I96I in his struggle for power but 
by late 1963 he was very concerned that the President might 
be engineering a revolution. 3 Pinto controlled a large state 
militia so that his active or passive support was vital to 
\. (See Stepan; I97I; pp 200-201) 
2. (Stepan; I97I;_pp 190) 
3. (Stepan; I97I; pp 92) 
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politicians and conspirators. 1 • 
Governor Miguel Arraes of Pernambuco was like Pinto, a 
possible candidate for the 1965 Presidential elections. He, 
too, feared that Goulart might engineer a revolution that 
would cancel the elections and keep himself in power. Arraes 
competed with Goulart for leftist support and Goulart tried· 
to weaken the competition by appointing strong, anti-Communist 
generals to command the IV Army based in Arraes' state. 
Goulart even tried to eliminate Arraes by having him deposed 
from the governership of his own state in 1963. Arraes had 
no reason to help Goulart. In fact, he even feared that he 
would "suffer" if Goulart executed a coup. 2 • 
Two other states were vital in power plays. Guanabara 
was a small state, (once a federal territory when Rio de Janeiro 
was the capital) but it was densely populated, and it retained 
its political importance as a barometer of public opinion. 
The state governor, Carlos Lacerda, half long been a bitter 
enemy _of Goulart and his mentor Get6lio Vargas. As a 
conservative, L~cerda was vehemently opposed to labour and 
populist m0vements, and as leader of Uni~o Democratica Nacional 
he hoped to stand in the 1965 Presidential election. 3 • Th~re 
were doubts about the military significance of Guanabara where 
the 1 Army was stationed~ but Lacerda's political and 
journalist skills made the State a forum for national public 
opinion. 
Of vital military significance was s'it.o Paulo because of 
its 30,000 man militia which outnumbered the locally garrisoned 
1. (Stepan; 1971; pp 92; 189. Skidmore; 1967; pp 275) 
2. (Stepan; 1971; pp 193-194. Skidmore; 1967; pp 276) 
3. (See Bourne; 1969; pp 206-217; Skidmore; 1967; pp 274) 
· 4. (See Skidmore; 1967; pp 275 and Stepan; 1971; pp I7,I89) 
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II Army, 1 • Governor Adhemar de Barros was like Lacerda, 
militantly anti-Goulart. Rio Grande do Sul was vital to 
Goulart 1 s succession to the Presidency in I96I but the 
significance of the III Army and the militia was reduced when 
Leonel Brizola stepped down as governor in order to enter 
Congress in 1962, 
The state governors who could intimidate or neutralize 
the military were not the Goulart supporters that Brizola and 
Pinto had b~en in 1961. By late 1963 the governors were not 
at all prepared to use their militia against local military 
units, Military men were undecided about Goulart and hoped 
that any coup d'etat against him would be led by a major state. 
Magalhaes Pinto had given assurances to the local army 
commanders of his support during 1962 and 1963, and on 20th 
M~rch 1964 he declared on national television that Minas 
Gerais would resist any "revolution from above." That same 
evening, Adhemar de Barros also announced on television that 
he too was prepared to use force against the central government.2• 
Magalha'.es Pinto helped develop a "defensive" coup strategy 
in late March 1964 by which Goulart would be removed by the 
military in accordance with their duty to protect 
constitutionalism. This strategy helped solidify military 
opinion about Goulart's overthrow because it placed the 
responsibility on the President and placed the military in a 
hapless dutiful light. The state governors, then, did not 
impede military action, rather they permitted and encouraged 
. t 3. J. • 
1. (Stepan; I97I; pp 201) · 
2. (Stepan; I97I; pp I99-20I) 
3. (See Young; pp 455 in Burnett & Johnson; (ed) 1968) 
Carlos Lacerda, 
Governor of Guanabara 
With President Varg as (centre) is Adhemar de Barros 
(left) the future Governor of Sao Paulo. 
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Perhaps a relevant factor nurturing State support was 
that Goulart intended using the wealth of Brazil to develop 
backward regions. This meant that the richest states of the 
republic, S~o Paulo, Minas Gerais and Guanabara would be 
paying for the_ development of Brazil. To the 11 revol u tion of 
rising expectations"-in Brazil, there was a regional aspect: 
the poor, backward Northeast and South regions conflicted with 
the "Big Three" states. The struggle also centred around the 
Presidency, reformers, modernizers and leftist-labour groups on 
one side and Congress and centre-right_ist groups on the other. 
Initially, the 1964 intervention appeared to be a continuation 
of the regional struggle. Certainly, "big business" in Sao 
Paulo had contributed secretly to the coercive and financial 
strength of the militia in order to increase its power 
vis-1-vis the regular army and the central government in 
B ~1 · 1 rasi ia. 
Although the military and state conspirators had spent 
years preparing for a coup d'etat, it was only in late March 
I964 that support was overwhelming, and therefore, sufficient. 
First, Joao Goulart was a vreak President, too easily 
influenced by his rivals Leonel Brizola and Miguel Arraes, and 
too reliant on his advisers who included War Minister General 
Dantas Ribeiro, General Assis Brasil, Raul Riff and Darcy 
Ribeiro. 
2 . 
Their advise was often unsound and unreliable. • 
Second, economic conditions were worsening. Most 
significant was the rising inflation rate which 
1. (Stepan; 1971; pp 200; Lieuwen; 1964; pp 79) 
2-. (Dantas Ribeiro ignored the rising discontent of the army, 
and Assis Brasil was an alcoholic. See Skidmore; 1967; 
pp 255, 265, 284~287) 
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aggravated social unrest. The budget deficit also exceeded 
Brazil's ability to repay. 1• 
Third, as his Presidency foundered on the shoals of 
. 
inflation and Congressional obstructionism, Goulart turned 
more toward leftists and extremists for advice. When Brizola, 
the dynamic, left-wing populist started organizing grupos de-
onze (committees of eleven) of armed men, it appeared very 
much as though Goulart might try to bypass state structures 
and rule directly through a counter-state of local councils. 
The Law, elections, Congress and the bureaucracy might become 
obselete. 
While leftist influence mounted on Goulart during 1963, 
military influence declined. The officers were gravely 
concerned about recent developments. Extremists were becoming 
more powerful. Campaigning in Lacerda's own home state of 
Guanabarai Brizola won a Congre~sional election with an 
unprecedent majority. 2 • In Lacerda 1 s own state, Brizola had 
showed_ how unpredictable popular opinion had become. Rightist 
groups were als~ becoming dangerous because they were arming 
themselves. Strikes were prevalent in the country as well as 
in the towns, and there was an increasirig prediliction for 
violence. Thes~ indicated growing political and social 
instability, but-Goulart was inse~sitive to this. Especially 
concerned about the growing coercive power of its competitors, 
the military convinced President Goulart that he ask Congress 
to declare a thirty day state-of-siege and confer on him 
martial law powers. This Goulart did on 4th October 1963. · 
1. (See Worcester; 1973; pp 226) 
2. (See Skidmore; 1967; pp 281) 
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The military hoped that he would preside over an emergency 
regime resting primarily on the army. Hopefully, it could 
stop the extensive trafficking of guns in Brazil by clandestine 
organizations. Immediate Congressional approval of Goulart•s 
request was necessary, but Congress procrastinated and labour 
leftist leaders convinced the President to withdraw his 
request on 7th October. Goulart had lost his nerve. 1 • He had 
also let down the military, 
Frustrated by the failing economy, 2 • unable to institute' 
reforms, and drawn more to the left, Goulart took a radical-
leftist stand at a rally of 150,000 people in Rio de Janeiro 
on Friday, 13th Mar~h 1964. Flanked by his wife, and Darcy 
Ribeiro, General Brasil and Leonel Brizola, President Goulart 
signed at the rally two decrees nationalizing private oil 
refineries and expropriating certain lands for r~distribution. 
There would be further decrees, he promised, on rent control, 
tax reform and enfranchisement of enlisted men and illiterates. 
By ignoring Congress as a law-making and deliberating 
body, Goulart rejected constitutional proceedure. The 
expropriations also rejected aonstitutionalism because there 
were insufficient funds available to pay compensation as 
demanded by law. The principle of private ownership was 
noticeably under attack. Even worse, Goulart had denounced 
the 1946 constitution as dbselete, and had demanded its 
revision. 3 • 
The Black Friday rally galvanized pol!ticos and military 
men alike. By abandoning certain constitutional obligations, 
1. (Skidmore; 1967; pp 261-263; 280) 
2. (See Skidmore; 1967; pp 239-241) 
3. (Worcester; 1973; pp 227, Skidmore; 1967; pp 288, 29I) 
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Goulart strengthened the fears of aspiring presidential 
candidates that he might postpone the national elections 
scheduled for October 1965, or _alter the electoral rules so 
that he or Brizola, both legally excluded from standing, might 
yet be able to do so. 1 • The Presidential aspirants and the 
governors, especially Lacerda, Magalh'aes Pinto, Adhemar de 
Barros and Miguel Arraes began to conspire against Goulart 
hoping that he might be removed from power like his political 
mentor, Vare;as. 
The military understood the Black Friday rally in terms 
of security, which was already tenuous. Because of Goulart's 
weak leadership and reliance on extreme leftists, and in vievr 
of Brizola's grupos de onze, it appeared quite possible to 
the military that Communists could take control of the 
populist movement President Goulart was creating. Only five 
years previously, Fidel Castro had risen to power and after 
destroying all opposition had proclaimed the Marxist-Leninist 
revolution. 2 • 
In the Black Friday rally, Goulart was identified with 
communist and extremist politics which conflicted with the 
military's anti-communism. The military .could not accept 
expropriation without compensation whether or not it affected 
Brazilian or foreign owned property. To conservative, 
establishment - and legal - minded citizens who hoped to 
retire one day in security, private property was an important 
principle. It was also important to the US, with which the 
Braz,ilian military had, since WW II, developed strong ties. 
Us influence on the officer corps was strong and positive. 
1. (Stepan; I97I; pp 199) 
2. (Stepan; 1971; pp 156-157) 
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Senior officers trusted the US, and considered its business 
interests in Brazil necessary, and no risk to security or 
Brazil's future. 1 • 
Other reasons for the officers' concern about Goulart 
was that his economic mismanagement would affect business and 
that he would cost the military many of its jobs. Large 
numbers of officers were employed in civilian jobs in 
Brazilian administr~tion, and in communication and industrial 
sectors, which greatly improved their personal incomes. 2 • 
Military men were not impressed either by the nationalist 
and xenophobic rhetoric of the radicals around Goulart. The 
last thing officers wanted was a mobilized, volatile mob ready 
to attack physically anything or anybody at whim. 
To gain the popular support he wanted in order to ignore 
with impunity the military and constitution, President Goulart 
had to promise or give something, and currying favour with 
the discontented enlisted ranks both weakened the military's 
capability to resist~ and brousht much needed support. 
Distrust of Goulart was widespread, and he lost the 
authority and prestige he needed to govern. Although he had 
rejected the centre, moderate and cautious groups by aligning 
himself with the radical leftists and nationalists, the 
President gained no hard, firm decisive support. Mtguel 
Arraes, Luis Carlos Prestes, Francisco Juli~o and even brother-
in-law Brizola distrusted their new convert to the radical 
leftist cause. They feared that he might in some way 
compromise or undermine them,3• 
1. (Stepan; I97I; pp 2/+2-243) 
2. (See Johnson; 1974; pp 2II-2I2) . 
3. (Worcester; 1973; pp 223-224; Stepan; I97I; pp I93-I94) 
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Moderate and centre groups which might have backed a 
reform programme were very worried that Goulart 1 s electoral 
and land reforms would bring about dangerous social changes. 
Their representation would be lost if the President dispensed 
entirely with Congress, but it was impossible to get rid of 
Goulart constitutionally because there were insufficient 
grounds for beginning impeachment ~roceedings. 1 • 
The strength of middle class feeling was demonstrated 
on 19th March I964 when 500,000 people crowded the streets of 
s;o Paulo to protest the Black Friday rally of six days 
previously. The following day, Governors Adhemar de Barros 
and Magalh;es Pinto made their television announcements. 
An additional factor in reducing Goulart'~ support was 
the rhetoric of "resentment politics" whereby influential and 
important people were publically insulted by radicals like 
Brizola. Because he was associated with such radicals, the 
President lost many sympathizers and gained new enemies. 2 • 
Goulart 1 s claim to obedience from the military had weakened 
considerably in October I963 when unsuccessful attempts were 
made to kidnap Governors Lacerda and Arraes. Public opinion 
about Pr~sident Goulart was still general and amorphous when 
the military felt that its institution was being threatened 
by the pardons of the mutineers of September 1963 and March 
I96L~. By late March, the officer corps was no longer worr.ie..d 
about the mood of other power groups like business, industry 
and landowners. 3 • It was at this late time, only ten days 
before the coup-d'etat that Brazil's most important power 
1. (Skidmore; 1967; pp 298, 302) 
2. (Sec Stepan; I97I; pp I98) 
3. (Stepan; I97I; pp I63) 
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group, the military, decided to represent public opinion in 
a power play. When it was learned that the coup being planned 
·was merely 11 de fensi ve II in nature, aimed at deposing a 
recalcitrant executive, many officers joined it. Among the 
adherents to the plan was the highly respected Chief of Staff, 
Marshal Humberto Castelo Branco. 1 • Even legalist officers 
were considering the possibilities of a coup, although only 
about IO% of the senior officer corps was actively and 
enthusiastically engaged in planning it. 2 • Few officers in key 
commands were ready to act. 
The first major turning point in the fate of Goulart 1 s 
Presidency was the Black Friday rally which cost him so much 
of his public respect and legal right to power, By attacking 
the I9L+6 Constitution as obselete and archaic, he weakened 
his claim to obedience from the military. This point was made 
. 3. 
frequently in public and in newspapers. 
Military men concluded that Goulart was a threat to 
national security and must be removed. The President was 
incompetent, unable to control the economy or the rising 
violence. A consensus was being reached, but still moderate, 
legalist officers hesitated, 
On 20th March 1964, when Adhemar de Barros and Magalhaes 
Pinto made their television speeches, Marshal Castelo Branco 
circulated among officers a memorandum saying that Goulart 
intended using the government-dominated trade unions to make 
an attack on the State of which he was head, A new constituent 
assembly would be called when the seizure of power was 
completed, This would be a prelude to a dictatorship. The 
1. (Worcester; 1973; pp 226) 
2, (See Stepan; I97I; pp I89) 
3, (Stepan; I97I; pp I99) 
6I. 
memorandum reiterated the military's "historic role" as 
defender of constitutionalism and warned Goulart not to 
exceed his authority. 1 
Two days later, on 22nd March, a manifesto signed by 12 
retired generals was circulated among officers announcing that 
the military had to obey the constitution and the President 
only "dentro dos limites da lei" (within the limits of the Law). 
_The military's obligation to preserve and guarantee the 
government ceased when the government put itself outside the 
law by attac~ing the constitution and Congress. 2 Another 
obligation to the constitution was that the military itself 
must continue in existence to maintain order. 
On 26th Marchi there broke out the seilors' ~nA m~~inP~, 
rebellion in Rio de Janeiro, and four days later on 30th March 
President Goulart made his speech to the meeting of sergeants. 
This meeting was the second and final turning point in the 
fate of the Presidency, and nas the "reactive si;1ing event" 
which made clear to the military that if Goulart would not 
live up to his obligations to consti tutionalism and t·he rnili tary 
the officers had to live up to theirs. With reluctance the 
·legalist, moderate and pro-Goulart officers accepted the 
"defensive coup" plan, although its execution was held up for 
a day while General Kruel made a last appeal to Goulart. 
When the President refused to moderate his stand, Kruel ordered 
his tanks to CTove.3 
After Goulart's departure, Ranieri Mazzilli became acting 
President, (according to the expectations of the conspirators) 




(Worcester; 1973; pp 228; Skidmore; 1967; pp 296) 
(,Stepan; I97I; pp 1011.,_ 199, 202) 
(Skidmore; I9b7; pp 3uO) . 
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CHAPTER V 
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SUPREME REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND ----------- . -------------•·-----------------·-------·--
During the first few days of April 1964, it appeared 
evident to the Brazilian public that the military was acting 
in accordance ~ith the moderator tradition. Jo~o Goulart was 
in exile, and Ranieri Mazzilli now replaced him as acting 
President. The care-ta.ker government v10uld continue in 
office until October 1965 when new elections would place a 
new administration in power. Effective power, however, 
remained not with Mazzilli but with the military Supreme 
Revolutionary Command (SRC) composed of the commanders-in-
chief of the three services, headed by Marshal Humberto 
Castelo Branco. 1 On 9th April, the SRC decided to take the 
initiative itself. An Institutional Act was suddenly 
promulgated which greatly strengthened executive power arid 
weakened ~he Brazilian Congress.· Obstructionism was no 
longer possible and the President was given the power to 
annul for ten years the political rights of individuals, and 
to cancel the electoral mandates of members of state, 
municipal and federal legislatures~ 2 Clearly the military 
was stepping .beyond its traditional modsrator rol~. Having 
declared that a new President must be installed within two 
days, the military then placed in that position its commander-
in-chief, Marshal Castelo Branco, His new government then 
suspended the political rights of 378 people, all in 
accordance with the new Institutional Act. Among those 
banned from politics were President Goulart, ex-Presidents 
Kubitschek and Quadros, and six .State governors. 
1. (Worcester; 1973; pp 229) 
2. (Skidmore; 1967; pp 308) 
During the first year in power, the SRC introduced a 
much needed land reform measure, Heavy taxes were levied 
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on large land oDners forcing them to sell their land or 
increase production. Peasant movements, especially those 
set up by Francisco Juli~o in the Northeast were proscribed. 1 
On 27th October 1964 a second Institutional Act was gazetted 
which confirmed the preceding act, dissolved all political 
parties and made indirect the elections of the president 
and vice-president. Executive authority over the States 
was strengthened, and the Supreme Court was enlarged and 
weighted in favour of the SRC. The government was also 
t d f . , .. 1 . 2 exemp e rom JUa1c1a review. 
On the int~rnational scene, the SRC took immediate steps 
to realign Brazil with the US. The Brazilian cont~nt made up 
the largest part of the inter-American force occupying the 
Dominican Republic and Brazil now took the lead in the 
diplomatic campaign to set up an inter-American peace-keeping 
force.3 
A third Institutional Act on 5th February 1966 ended the 
popular, direct elections of governors and mayors. Governors 
would now be chosen by State legislatures and the governors 
would chose the town mayors. 4 Two new political parties were 
created: the Alianca Renovadora Nacional (National Renovating 
Alliance or ARENA) was the official government party 
representing the SRC, and Movimento Democratic • Brasileiro 
(Brazilian Democratic Movement or MDB) was the official 
opposition party. A simultaneous purge of Congress and the 
1. (Stepan; I97I; pp 236) 
2. (Burns; I97I; Pl) 37l1, .Stepan; I97I; pp 256) 
3, (Stepan; I97I; pp 232) 
4, (Burns; I97I; pp 399) 
new parties made the legislature a rubberstamp for the SRC. 1 
This leveI of control made possible the promulgation of a 
new constitution on 24th January 1967. It served to increase 
greatly executive power, and formaliz~d the Institutional . 
Acts in Brazil's political framework. 
The head of the SRC and first-President of the republic, 
Marshal Humberto Castelo Branco, reaffirmed his decision to 
relinguish office, and he rdid so in March 1967. He chose as 
his successor Marshal Artur da Costa e Silva who was then 
elected by Congress to a four year term, all in accordance 
with the new.constitution; 2 
Substantial changes were made to the military government 
of the SRC on 13th December 1968 when another Institutional 
Act was announced. It confered on the President full 
dictatorial power. Congress was disbanded and the State 
legislatures were closed down. The 1967 Constitution was 
suspended and habeas corpus was waived. In a campaign of 
mass arrests, the military police took into custody Juscelino 
Kubitschek, Carlos Lacerda, and hundreds of students, newsmen 
and intellectuals. Costa e Silva explained that the threat 
of fratricidal conflict in Brazil necestitated the hard 
measures, and that the armed forces were being provoked by 
corruption and subversion.3 
During its first four years in power, ruling as a 
military executive at the head of a constitutional 
administrative body, the SRC had exhibited a high degree of 
conservatism. Eventually, it found that the nuances of 
constitutionalism were too numerous and contradictory to 
1. (Burns; 1971; pp 374) 
2. (Burns; 1971; pp 375) 
3. (Quartim; 1971; pp 72-73. Burns; I97I; pp 377-378) 
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sustain indefinitely, so it soon rejected democratic forms 
for more direct, less subtle methods. 
Numerous reasons account for the abandonment of the 
traditional moderator role. of the Brazilian military. First 
it was absolut~ly vital to restore economic stability. A· 
Three Year Plan for economic recovery and expansion was 
prepared, by Celso Furtado and San Tiago Dantas, but 
President Goulart lacked the fortitude and political powe~ 
needed to force through unpopular but necessary measures. 
This situation remained when President Goulart was deposed 
in 1964, but it was now in the military's power to force 
through those uripopular but necessary me~sures if it chose 
to do. so. However, the military intended holding elections 
in October 1965 in accordance with its moderator mandate, 
and in Article II of the first Institutional Act, it declared 
that it wduld hand power back to the civilians in January 
1966. Octa'vio Bulh oes and Roberto Campos, who were civilian 
economic advisers to the SRC, urged a new vigorous anti-
inflationary campaign. 1 Reluctantly, President Castelo Branco 
agreed to an amendment which extended his term of officB to 
March 1967. In agreeing to support economic recovery, the 
military government further rejected its traditional moderator 
role in Brazilian politics. 
Second, the military was very concerned about the lack 
of strong political leadership in Brazil, and the breakdown 
of law and order. Shortly after he took over from the deposed 
Goulart, acting President Mazzilli felt strong military 
1 • (Slddmore; 1967; pp 239-,2112, 248-251, 3I0-3II. Re fer also 
to the Institutional Act in Burns; I97I; pp 390-393) 
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pressure to obtain from Congress the same emergency anti-
subversion powers Goulart had failed to obtain the previous 
October, These powers, which would involve military~ 
participation in the maintainence of law and order, were 
necessary not only to ensure political stability during 
economic recovery, but also to prevent the growth of violende· 
and subversion, The military always favoured-a high level of 
control, and so the SRC placed rigid controls on labour unions 
shudent movements and peasant organizations, Numerous 
institutions were closed down or purged, 1 The SRC detected 
communists every where and Chinese and Hungarian agents were 
reputed to be assisting Brazilian extremists. 2 Steps were 
taken to stop the spread of arms, stamp out subversion and 
remove from office those officials and governors who might 
threaten the SRC and the military. 3 These measures were 
especially necessary because when the SRC seized power and 
ignored its "terms of reference" as moqerating power, it lost 
almost_ immediately ~ost of its civilian support. The 
politicians and ~ublic, which expected Mazzilli to govern 
pending new elections, could not accept the sudden advent of 
an Institutional Act which appeared Without l~gislative fiat, 
and prolonged the intervention. Nor did the Campos-Bulhoes 
plan recover for the military the public trust and respect it 
had lost. Castelo Dranco placed great emphasis on the SRC 




(Stepan; I97I; pp 235) , , · · 
(Worcester; 1973; pp 225) 
(See Article XIV of the second Institutional Act in 
Burns; 1971; pp 394-398) 
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bankrupcies, the decline in production, or the rise of unrest 
which resulted from the currency and import controls. It was 
hoped that the eventual success of the Campos-Bulhoes plan 
would in itself justify the prolonged intervention and the 
drastic measures taken to restore the economy. 
-Third, the alterations illade to the political system 
by the SRC made it more difficult to return to it. Ndt since 
1889 had the Brazilian military committed itself so fervently 
to a political role, but in I96L}, it learned again that there 
can be no return to the past. The moderator role, which the 
military thought suspended only temporarily, was in fact 
destroyed totally. 
The first two Institutional Acts which exceeded the 
public's expectation of the military's role also _deprived the 
SRC of legitimization. Having lost civilian respect and 
acceptance, the SRC had to rely more on repression for control. 
The militaryybecame very sensitive about its honour, but the 
SRC did not try to gain public support for itself or justify 
it~ policies. 1 As more national figures and politicians were 
jailed or banned from politics, it became more difficult to 
· find men who were acceptable to· the SRC, and who were 
competent to lead Brazil when the military returned to the 
barracks. The politicians dislodged and disbarred by the SRC 
might return to power if elections were held to form a post-
SRC civilian government, and most likely they would be hostile 
toward the military or individual officers who had abused 
them. 
Another problem was the return of those officers who 
1. (See Linz;· pp 238, 253 in Stepan; (ed) 1973) 
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had been purged by the SRC and the military. Amnesty was 
considered unacceptable, yet an agreement had to be reached 
with them. Quite clearly, the military had under-estimated 
the problem of withdrawal from politics. 1 
Forth and- perhaps the most important reason for 
abandoning the moderator role was the growing feeling through 
out Brazil that the political system was unworkable in times 
of rapid change. To the military the moderator role was no 
longer feasible when anarchy appeared more imminent, especially 
after the Black Friday rally. Formation of the SRC as Brazil's 
new gqvernment allowed the military to control.the rising 
public and commercial unrest resulting from the Bulhoes-Campos 
anti-inflati~n campaign. Much civilian middle class sympathy 
for the SRC was lost as a result of its economic measures. 2 
·The SRC also permitted the military to take up a new tutelary 
role. 
Senior officers, including Marshal Castelo Branco, did 
have an intellectual committment to democracy and they hoped 
to return power to the politicians sometime in the future. 
The marshal wanted the elections scheduled for October 1965 
to continue, but he could not ignore the linha dura (hardline) 
officers in the corps. They were not prepared to repeat the 
old performance of turning power over to another subgroup of 
the same elite which might again lead Brazil into the 
cul de sac of corruption and chaos. The political rules 
would be changed to prevent this reoccuring. When candidates 
distrusted by the military were elected in numerous mayoral 
1. (Stepan; 1971; pp 219, 224-225) 
2. (See Quartim; 1971; pp 57-58) 
and gubernatorial elections during 1965, the linha dura 
officers pressured Castelo Branco into issuing the second 
Institutional Act of October 1965. This rcistored many of the 
special powers which had expired under the earlier act. The 
political rules were thus completely revised. 1 
Officers felt that part of their duty in power was to 
conduct an anti-corruption drive in Brazil and ride her of 
the old pol!ticos. Many civilians were jailed or banned from 
politics for ten years~ Governor Adhemar de Barros and ex-
President Kubitschek were banned, although both of them had 
supported the Presidency of Castelo Branco in April 1964. 
Unfortunately the military considered them too corrupt, and 
their support incompatible with honest military government. 
To this extent, then, the SRC was moralistic. Offiders 
believed that Brazil could prosper in the world only if 
leaders and people were honest, hard working, la1:r abiding, 
moderate and respectful of authority, By maintaining 
constitutional forms, even if the elections were meaningless, 
the parties contrived and civil rights violated, the SRC tried 
to continue with Brazil's democratic system. The government 
wanted to end demag68uery and selfish opportunism. vrhile 
showing Brazilians how they should act in politics, 2 
Various groups within the officer corps contributed 
considerably to the rejection of the "moderator role" by the 
SRC. Three identifiable groups tried to direct policy. The 
linha dura officers, who were authoritarian nationalists 
believed that politicians were too corrupt to hold power ahd 
that the military should take over completely, In their 
1 • ( See Skic:Lnore; I 967; pp 307, 312; Q,uartim; I 97I; pp 55 
, Stepan; I97I; pp 256; Burns; 1971; pp 374) 
2, (See Sanders; ~UFS; (ECS~) Vol XIV no 5; 1970; pp 2-3, 
6-7, Stepan; I97I; pp 220) 
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considered opinion, Brazil could not function effectively as 
an economic entity Tiithin the old open political system 
regardless who was President. Also the anti-inflation 
programme, which was so necessary, was certainly impossible 
under the democratic system. Even Quadros and Goulart had 
realized that anti-democratic solutions were necessary. 1 
Discont_ent created by the economic measures of the SRC 
justified absolutist government. Despj_te their rather definite 
ideas, the linha dura officers comprised a rather amorphous 
2 group o. 
•A second group of officers was the linha branda (soft 
line). They prefered a short term intervention in accordance 
with the military 1 s traditional moderator role. A third 
group was comprised of those officers who were strongly 
influenced by the Escola Sunerior de Guerra (Superio~ War 
College or ESG). They prefered to let competent civilian 
technocrats run the country under military aegis, and were 
generally more tolerant and cautious than the linha dura. 
From the ESG group came the Chief of Staff, Castelo Branco 
himself.3 
The first two Institutional Acts showed that the linha 
dura officers had a strong influence on the SRC. Public 
dislike of the measures taken to deflate and control the 
economy" and the need for time for the measures to work 
recommended to the SRC the linha dura view. Greater military 
control was t~ten of the country and Castelo Branco had to 
renege on election plans. However, the new military Pres{dent 
1. (Skidmore; I9G7; pp 3I8, 320) 
2. (See Stepan; RAND; R-586-DOS; April 1971; pp 112) 
3. (See Young; pp L16I-l162 in Burnett and Johnson (ed) 1968) 
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was not dominated by the younger nationalist officers. They 
wanted the suspension of th~ political rights of some 5,000 
11 enemies" of the SRC but only 378 persons vrere actually 
affected, Nor were the linha dura officers able to extend 
the duration of certain expired articles in the first 
Institutional Act. The employment by the SRC of two civilian 
economists, Octavio Bulhoes and Roberto Campos, ignored the 
younger officers' preference for rejecting any civilian help. 
Encourage1:1en t of US penetration in the Brazilian economy also 
ran contrary to nationalist, linha dura wishes. President 
Castelo Branco and the SRC w~re essentially moderate in 
outlook and more responsive to the needs of the situation 
than to linha dura advice, 1 
The new Presidint was closely associated with the ESG 
and its developmentalist, anti-communist, and pro-US ideology. 
The ESG g~ve senior officers, lessons in planning, order, and 
r~tional financing, and also confirmed the indivisibility of 
security and development issues, 2 but it was during March -
April 1964 that they saw the opportunity offered by a prolonged 
intervention to restore Brazil's economy, in association US 
investment and civilian technocrats. The militari could 
purge and ref0vm the country's political and economic systems, 
Many senior officers including Castelo Branco had served 
. It 1 . tl F" E ,.J. • / • n · 1 . (D · 1 · in a y in 1e . 'orS:,9. xpeu1cionar1.a L!r!lsl cnra urazi ian 
r . 
Ex~editionary Force or FEB) during World War II. This 
experience showed the officers that power was a result of 
organization, technology, industry and democratic, capitalist 
1. (See Skidmore; 1967; pp 309-310) 
2. (Stepan; R~ND, R-586-DOS; April-I97I; pp 85) 
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ideology, not of personalism and demagoguery. Democracy 
encouraged initiative and dynamism in a country, especially 
in economics. The best, the most talented and hardest working 
could take advantage of the competitive nature of a truly 
democratic society. This was the conservatism of personal 
liberty above social equality. 
The success of the allied war effort in World War II was 
a cogent reminder of the efficacy of capitalism and democracy. 
In comparis6n, the collapse of Mussolini's Italy showed the 
FEB campaigners the abject failure of totalitarianism and 
demagoguery. These beliefs were so strong that the military 
made virtually no attempt to justify the prolonged intervention, 
prefering instead to rely on suppression rather than 
enlightenment and forbearance, To this extent, the 
~uthoritarian±sm~ the distrust of others and the elitist 
con~ervatism inherent in the military institution tended to 
predominate when military men reacted to criticisms of their 
actions. 
Criticism meant two things to the military. First it 
was a slight to the profession and its honour, and second, 
if th~ criticism continued or appeared valid to non-partisan 
observers, military credibility was threatened. Signs of 
weakness or indecision might encourage subversion or insurgency. 
Groups might attempt to destroy the State and its military 
protector if that State and its protector were thought to be 
vulnerable. President Castelo Branco and the ESG were very 
much aware of the dangers of subversion. For many years the 
ESG had taught counter-insurgency and revolutionary warfare. 1 
1. (Stepe.n; I97I; pp 130) 
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To a great degree ESG teaching provided the SRC with a 
working ideology. It stressed a national development-national 
security nexus, whereby the mobilization of Brazil's resources 
and US investment would increase natiorial wealth, thus 
facilitating national security. Although domestic security 
could be realized by sating discontent with improved conditions 
and better opportunities, the SRC was to reject any reform 
programme which might neutralize discontent and rely instead 
on expanded economic production and the traditional "trickle 
down" theory of attaining social. justice. Until economic 
fortune benefitted the impoverished, the SRC permitted those 
independent and private organizations set up in the I950's 
to continue operating in lieu of a State reform and relief 
programme. 1 
Self generating wealth could provide the economic stability 
and confidence that a democratic society needed, but the ESG 
also believed that since war was imminent between the world's 
two irreconciliable power blocs, Brazil also needed strength 
to help maintain the external and hemispheric status quo. 
As the traditional ally of the US, Brazil would exercise 
regional hegemony and combat internal aggression. 2 To fulfill 
this national security doctrine, Brazil would need wealth and 
powerful, reliable armed forces. Initially, political and 
social suppression were necessary to promote the political 
order and economic recovery vital for future development. The 
suppression was also necessary because the ESG-SRC preferences for 
1 •• (See Burns; I97I; pp 372; Sanders; AUFS; (ECSA) Vol XIV 
No. 5; Dec. 1970; pp I6; Mutchleri SCID; Vol I No 8; I965 
pp I08, I09; Skidmore; I967; pp 9J 
2. (See Latin America; Vol VII; No 22; Friday Ist June 1973; 
pp 172-173; Stepan; I97I; pp I29, I78-I82) 
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the US created discontent among nationalists in both the 
military and society. Neutrality in the Cold War, and 
denunciation of the US, as advocated by the nationalists were 
considered by military men including Castelo Branco to be · 
unrealistic, dangerous and unwise. Not to take a strong stand 
against communism was to encourage it in Brazil. Strategically 
placed, unevenly populated, regional, and in parts poverty 
stricken, she would make an ideal communist State in South 
America. Cold War tensions, and Castro's VO'!! to "export 
revolution" strengthened the military's anti-communism. For 
( 
secur~ty as well as economic reasons, the rising tide of 
nationalism had to be thoroughly subordinated to Brazil's 
strategic role in the Cold War. 1 
The SRC gained an early reputation for heavy handed 
authoritarianism and suppression, but this was more a result 
of circumstance as the military saw it, and not because the 
officer corps was dedicated to the linha dura position. 2 
De~pite interpretations t6 the contrary, Marshal Castelo 
Branco was a moderate in the officer corps, a military 
figure who was beyond reproach in Brazil. He had the prestige 
among officers to hold them together during the stress and 
strain of intervention.3 His prestige suited him admirably 
for the strategic position of "swing man 11 in both the 
displacement and replacement of the Goulart administration. 4 
The prolonged intervention called for sustained military 
unity since disunity would mean vulnerability to subversion, 
1. (See Burns; I97I; pp 370) 
2, (See Skidmore; 1967; pp 30~) 
3. (See Stepan; 1971; pp 217 and Durns; 1971 pp 370) 
4, (See Needler; pp 239-240 in Von Lazar & Kaufman (ed)1969) 
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indecision and possible public humiliation. So it was that 
I22 officers were expelled from the corps by their collegues 
in April 1964 alone. 1 Opinion within the corps would be fairly 
and safely, homogenous, 
Compromise, as in I96I with regard to Goula rt's return, 
was not possible after 1964. Power in Brazil was now the 
sole preserve of the Castelo Branco and the ESG group of 
officers. The linha dura officers were often in conflict 
with this group, They wanted to see a higher degree of 
economic-nationalism in the SRC policies, and they disapproved 
of th~ positive stand taken by the ESG on economic liberalism 
and foreign involvement in the economy. Some linha dura 
officers also wanted a more populist, left~wing reformist 
government. 2 Marshal Artur da Costa e Silva appeared more 
sympathetic to the younger, nationalist officer~ than had 
Castelo Branco. As President after March 1967, he tended 
toward a more humanist and nationalist_government, but he did 
not r~present the linha dura graup,3 Costa e Silva was more 
moderate, more tolerant and less conservative than his 
predecessor, and when he took office he reduced the level of 
repression exercised by Castelo Branco, However,· the 
reduced control made possible, or perhaps encouraged, an 
increase in the level of popular unrest. To military men,. 
unrest was anathema because it threatened control, order and 
security. Costa e Silva realized that if this unrest 
hardened into disorder a leadership crisis was imminent, 
This necessitated the fifth Institutional Act of December 1968 
1, (Stepan; I97I; pp 223) 
2. (Stepan; I97I; pp 251-252) 
3, (Stepan; 1971; pp 252; Burns; I97I; pp 375) 
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which formalized power in a military dictatorship and 
suspended democracy indefinitely. The process, begun in April 
1964, was completed. 
By answering Brazil's "leadership crisis" in this way-, 
the military conformed to a tradition of militarism long 
established in Latin American history. 
77. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE MILITARY IN PERU 
It was a leadership crisis which precipitated the first 
military intervention in Peru. While Congress debated 
constitutional issues, a large royalist army prepared to 
advance on Lima and destroy the new republic. Desperate for 
men, money and decisive leadership, the army overthrew the 
Congress in February 1823. 
. I 
The new military president, Jose 
de la Riva Agilero organized and equipped a national army to 
defend Lima and Peru's Independence. The army took power 
because civilians were failing to provide leadership. 
In the post-independence period, Peru experienced civil 
war, regional insurrection and political conspiracy. This 
chaotic situation was made possible by the numerous semi-
autonomous ,armies in Peru, which were recruited and equipped 
regionally, and led by ambitious military caudillos. These 
men fought for ideological reasons, power or money, and by 
doing so accentuated Peru's disunity. Areg_uipa and Cuzco 
were hot beds of discontent and revolution. Attempts were 
made to force the union of Peru and Bolivia, while Southern 
P . l d . 1 eru even consicere secession. 
Soldiers had little respect for civilians and politicians. 
Because of the long campaign, tardy civilian support and 
political wrangling, military men began to hate the civilian 
creoles of the cities and they assumed for themselves the 
right as valiant patriots to govern t~e country they had 
fought to liberate. Nor were military presidents able to 
1. Marett; 1969; pp 83; Pike; 1967; pp 83-87) 
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assert authority in Peru because the national or republican 
army was so regionalized and lacking in monopoly of force. 
In 1835, President General Luis Josi de Orbegoso was overthrown 
by conservative, autocratic-minded officers w~th church and 
oligarchic sup_~')ort. They believed in strong e:x:ecu ti ve povrnr, 
and objected to a new constitution which gave power to the 
1 liberal-dominated Congress. 
The anarchic, civil war conditions pfevailing in P~ru 
were primarily a result of forceful seizures of power by 
liberator-caudillos and their resisting rivals' attempts to 
overthrow them. This political brutality continued until the 
I8fi.O's when the last of the liberator..;caudillos had departed, 
to be succeeded by General Ram6n Castilla vrho 'ruled twice from 
I845 to I851 and from 1854 to 1862. He was able to bring 
order to Peru more by moderation, and compromise mi~gled crith 
firmness than by coercion. 2 Conflict and dissension were 
minimized by appeals to both liberals and conservatives and 
by increases in State coercive power. Using the financial 
resources of the republic, Castilla purchased modern equipment, 
opened a military school at Bellavista, sent officers abroad 
to study, and established a navy. The large, per~anent army· 
he maintained, \'Illich grevr out of the "revolutionary rabble" 
of independence, Das frequently used to~stroy the less well 
equipped ar~ies of the caudillos Tiho tried t6 overthrow the 
government in civil 1.·ra rs. By spendinc; heavily on the military 
Ramon Castilla sought not only to ensure strong, ·stable 
government and national unity, but also fo force foreign 
1 • (Pike; 1967; P,P 7L1-) 
2. (Film; I967; pp 9L1., 106, I09) 
General Ram6n Castilla, President of 
Peru 1845 - 1851, 1854 - 1862 . 
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compliance with Peru's laws and customs. He was particularly 
concerned about Chilean and US designs in Latin America. 
Ram6n Castilla proceeded also to modernize Peru, 
promulgating in 1860 a constitution which made her a strongly 
unified and centralized republic with a poITerful executive. 
It proscribed regionalism and private armies, and suppressed 
military fueros (privileges). The constitution suited the 
church, oligarchy and military, all of which wanted stability, 
control, and protection of status ouo interests. It did not 
appeal to urban dwellers and liberals who sought greater 
representative, legislative power. In 1866 a conservative 
military president was deposed i.n a mass uprising, but a 
counter-revolution by the military with oligarch and church 
support reaffirmed the centralism and authoritarianism of the 
Peruvian state. 
In 1872, the military found· that it could no longer 
govern Peru by simple virtue of its prestige or power, and 
that it could no longer dominate politics. Manuel Pardo rras 
elected Peru I s f_irst civilian president, def ea ting the 
"official" military candidate. Pardo also antagonised the 
military by pledging to replace it with·a national guard and 
thus remove the military from political life. Instead of a 
permanent standing army, Peru would have a militia which would 
be mobilized only rrhen internal security was in danger. Since 
it would "exist" only infrequently, the national guard-militia 
would have less political power and b~ more easily controlled. 
The Minister of 1.'lar, Colonel Tomfs Gu ti/rrez led the 
army in the overthrow of Pardo 1 s new government and announced 
a dictatorship, 1 but in Lima, the populace arose to defend 
1 , ( See Pike; I967; pp I3I-I32; Marett; I9G9; pp I03-IOL1.) 
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Pardo, and a ni8htmare of violence, murder and mutilation 
resulted, Rioting mobs lynched Guti~ ... rez, and hysterical 
soldiers killed ex-President Balta. For the second time in 
six years, a mass uprising had surprised and overthrown a 
military president who had military support. It disgraced the 
military and encouraged the civilismo (civilianism) cause, 
Despite its valiant defence of Callao harbour against an 
attacking Spanish nival force in I866, 1 the military no 
longer had the prestige or ~ccepted right to dominate politics. 
In disgrace and disarray, the military accepted without demur 
President Pardo 1 s military reforms and reductions of armed 
strength, 75% of the army became instantly unemployed when 
it was reduced to 2,500 men, and contracts with British ship 
yards for two new warships ~ere cancelled. For security 
Pirdo relied on diplomacy, 2 and his new National Guard. 
Military revolts against the neu policies ~ere put doTin by 
loyal army units and the new Guard. 3 Military disunity was so 
pronounced that army and navy units fou 0ht each other in 
support of their respective leader-candidates for the 1876 
elections. The uncertainty of 1ailitary coercive power permitted 
widespread violence and assaGsination throu~hmut the I87O's • 
. The pitiful state of Peruvian military might encouraged 
Chilean aggression in I879. Diplomatic efforts failed to 
obtain vital security pacts with Argentina and US, and the 
1. (War ~eveloped between Spain and Peru over some quite 
minor disagreements, but Peru really feared that Spain 
was trying to re-assert herself in the Latin American 
Continent, especially after Spain had re-annexed Santo 
Domingo in I86I. Marett; 1969;, pp II2-II3; Seebelow 
Chapter VI pp 89) 
2. (Peru made efforts to improve and consolidate relations 
0ith Argentina and US in the hope that ~ecurity pacts 
might eventuate.) 
3. (.See Pike; 1967; pp 138) 
valour and enthusiasm of the Peruvia~ defenders failed to 
compensate for the lack of strong, permanently mobilized 
armed forces. 1 In the post War of the Pacific period after 
I883, during a time of political and military disunity, 
civilians permitted the military to govern and reconstruct 
war~torn Peru. The defeat by Chile, the unresolved border 
disputes with Brazil, Colombia and Ecuador, and military 
infirmity emphasised the dire need for a powerful, reliable 
and respected war machine. 
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In I895, military president C{ceres manipulated election 
results to prolong his stay in power. Civilistas, oligarchs, 
liberals and the mo~tofieros 5uerrilla fighters made an informal 
alliance, ace epted the leadership of 11Democratic Caudillo 11 
Nicolas Pie'rola and marched against ca'.'ceres and his military 
dictatorship. Realizing that he could not rule in the face 
; 
of civil war, Caceres resigned. Armed civilians had again 
overthrown a military government. Military mono}olization 
of power, as in the days prior to I872 was no longer possible. 
President Pie'rola realized that permanent, standing 
armed forces were vital for security, but he also wanted to 
discourage militarism and ensure government control of the 
military. A modernization programme was instituted which 
radically changed the nature of the Peruvian military. 
Professional pride was encouraged, nen military schools bullt 
offering a scientific, technical education, and reliable 
salA ries and pensions were assured.2 The Charrillos military 
school ~as opened in I89~ an obligatory service law was 
·, 1. See Pike; 1967; PP 143-147 
2. Pike; 1967; pp 173 
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enacted and a French military mission was hired in I898. 
The military's increased bureaucratic, and professional nature, 
the greater unity, discipline and rogimentation all helped 
reduce the propensity for intervention. 1 Modernization was 
intended not only to depoliticalize the military but also to 
defend Peru's soverignty since border disputes had re-opened 
with Chile, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Brazil, 
In February I9I4, I9 years after the last military 
intervention, the military acted a~ain, deposing the civilian 
President Guillermo Billinghurst, The reforms and abrasive 
manner of Billinghurst antagonised conservative Civilistas 
who approached the military for relief, They warned the 
officers that the President had dictational plans and intended 
ceding territory to ·Chile, The army had a duty, they 
declared, to preserve constitutional proceedure by deposing 
the dangerous Billinghurst. 2 The army also faced the prospect 
of further reductions in budget allocation, 
After the coup d'etat, General Oscar R, Benavides headed 
a junta which governed until elections were held in March 
I9I5. The duration of intervention was short because the 
military was unwilling to take the lead.from civilians, 
In July I9I9, some units co-operated with the henchmen 
of Augusto B. Legu{a, and placed him forcefully in the 
presidency. Reasons for military co-operation are not clear, 
but could have been in retaliation for budget cuts by the 
deposed government, or a desire among officers to participate 




/ To rule as a dictator, Leguia needed military-support 
and to obtain this he almost destroyed the Peruvian military 
as a disciplined, unified and cohesive body. The airforce he 
created fostered inter-service rivalry, and his Guardia Civil 
competed uith ~he army and destroyed its armed supremacy. 
, 
When he bought and promoted officero in favour, Leguia destroyed 
1 the autonomy of the officer corps. The cuartreros (horse 
thieves) officers precluded any concerted effort by officers 
to resist injury to their profession. 2 IThen the 1930 
, 
depression made it impossible for Leguia to continue buying 
military support, Lieutenant Colonel Luis M. sfnchez Cerro 
gained the support he had long sought to depose the dictator. 
In 1930, there appeared in Peru a new political party 
which threatened the military as an institution for three 
decades. Alianza Ponular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) 
was a continent-wide party, but its only significant cell was 
the Peruvian which was an extremely well organized, elitist 
and disciplined socialist pa.rty. I ts 111·1inimum Proe;ramme 11 
advocated the disbandment and replacement of the military. 
I' ~ Led by Victor Raul Haya de la Torre, APRA presented a·grave 
threat to the military. It had the arms, organization, 
discipline and leadership to' compete with the army, and to 
undermine it from within.3 
APRA quickly gained itself a violent reputation. It 
was believed to be i~plicated in naval and army mutinies 
against sa'nchez Cerro. It was able t.o fight a full fledged 
civil war against the army, and with the near assassination 
1. (1.Velch ~, Smith; I<J7l1; pp Il;.8) 
2. (Seo Rozman; JIAS: Vol XII No 4; 1970; pp 548-550) 
3. (Marett; 1969; pp 155. For an excellent accourit of the 
foundation a ncl support of APRA see Klar6n 1973; Welch 
& Smith; I97l1-; pp 150) 
Marshal Oscar R Benavides, 
President of Peru 
1914 - 1915, 1933 - 1939. 
Au gusto B Legu{a, 
President of Peru 
1908 - 1912, 1919 - 1930. 
ABOVE: Lieutenant Colonel Luis 
/ Sanchez Cerro, President of Peru 
ABOVE and BELOW : 
v{ctor Ra61 Haya de la Torre, 
founder and leader of APRA. 
1930 1933 
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of the dictator, indicated the fanatical deter~ination of 
its membership. Of vital significance to the military, APRA 
and Peruvian politics was the Trujillo Massacre of July I932, 
when APRA fighters killed some soldiers they had captured 
during an uprising in Trujillo. The army, which suppressed 
the revolt, responded by killing many of its Aprista prisoners. 
As i consequence, both APRA and the military feared retribution 
if one should ever overwhelm the other. Anti-APRA feeling 
ran so deep in the military that every year since it 
remembered the (first) Trujillo Massacre with a day of 
mourning for fallen comrades, killed by APRA. 1 
The civil war between the military and APRA and an 
escalating war with Colombia were ended in April I933 when 
sa'nchez Cerro vras assassinated. His successor, General 
Benavides took a moderate line and refused to impose an 
extremist, hard line,· fascist rule. He reduced repression 
and freed political prisoners. He also insisted on a high 
level of honesty during his rule to I939 and instituted 
numerous reforms. Benavides created a social security system 
and expanded education, communications and public works. 
The mil~tary was re-organized and re-equipped. A German 
military mission was hired and professionalism, weakened by 
Leguia was reaffirmed. Unfortunately, Peru remained torn 
during the I930 1 s by extremists of both the left (APRA) and 
the right (fascist Union Revolucionaria set up by sJnchez 
Cerro). In March I939, President I3enqvides had to suppress. 
another well planned APRA - inspired military revolt. The 
1. (See Lieuwen; I964; pp 28-29) 
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party seemed very adept at gaining the suprort of the lower 
ranks of the military and thus undermining its solidarity. 
Jos, Luis Bustamante y Rivero was elected President in 
1945 with the support of APRA but the party, which controlled 
Congress, atte~pted instead to undermine his Presidential 
authority. As Bustamante found it more difficult to rule 
through Congress he came to rely more on the military to 
govern. Violence and terrorism, usually associated with APR/\., 
increased. Bustamante and the military realized that H~ya 
artd APHA were as unreliable, ambitious, violent and subversive 
as ever. 
During 1947, President Bustamante filled his cabinet posts 
with officers and ruled by decree. In February 1948, there 
was a revolt of junior officers of the army and navy. APRA 
was again11believed to be implicated. Further military revolts 
were crushed by loyal.forces, but finally in October 1948, 
General Manuel Odr(a issued a pronuncio.miento \'!hich was 
supported by units in Lima. Bustamante who lacked military 
power, resigned, and Odria took over as head of a new junta, 1 
I' To combat the growing disorder, Odria passed a harsh 
decree of Internal Security which gave him complete poTTer to 
deal as he saw fit with his enemies. He used this authority 
frequently because of _the growing popular disapproval of his 
rule. In 1950 he nw.nipula ted elections to make himself 
President for a constitutional term. The junta of 1948, 
which served as a provisional government, was dissolved. 
Odria realized that he could not rule for long without 
popular consent and co-operation. Aware of the growing 
1 • (See M~rett; I~69i· pp 171-175; Lieuwen; 1964; pp 28-29, 
and Lieuwen; I96.,; pp IL1-3-I1+5) . 
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discontent of the labouring classes, 0dria announced his 
sympathy, provided work on new government projects, improved 
pay and conditions and set up vrelfare schemes. Like Legu{a, 
S~nchez Cerro and Benavides, Odrfa was anti-union, not anti-
worker in his ponservatism. 1 
Political opposition hibernated until 1956 when Odrfa 1 s 
constitutional term of office was to expire. Unrest among 
bureaucrats, military and businessmen was minimized by 
financial pay offs. Corruption, bribery and peculation were 
commonplace during Odria' s ochenio ( e~ght years in power). 
Inflation and debt were consequences of lavish public 
spending and a fall in export prices. Popular discontent and 
,; 
military concern prevailed on 0dria who obeyed the constitution 
and stood down in the 1956 elections. 
To the presidency was elected, for the second time, 
Manuel Prado y Ugartethe, who had almost completed this 
second term of office when he was overthrown in July 1962. 
The military wanted to cancel an election result it did not 
like. In the I962 elections, APRA had won sufficient se~ts 
in Congress to make Haya de la Torre the most likely choice 
to succeBd Prado as President. 2 After thirty years of conflict, 
the Peruvian military still distrusted and feared APRA. That 
an APRA government still posed a threat to it was confirmed 
in I960 when the party announced that atomic warfare had 
made the Latin American military obselete.3 
Initially, the military applied pressure on Haya to 
stand down, and on the National Election Jury and President 
1. (See Payne; I965; pp 5I) 
2. (For election results see Marett; I969; pp I85-I86) 
3. (Van Cleve; IAEA: Vol 30 no 4; Spring I977;pp 40) 
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Prado to declare the elections void. The military also 
; 1 rejected another presidential term for Odria on APRA support. 
Younger officers prefered the young, reformist, and popular 
; 
technocrat Fernando Delaunde Terry, but he had been excluded 
from the Presidency by the voting. Higher ranking officers 
also preffered the Acci~n Popular candidate. Perhaps it was· 
significant also that the ~rmy commander, General Nicolts 
Lindley 16pez, had personal and family ties with Belatnde 
Terry. 2 
The military junta of the four officers of Comando 
Coniunto took over the government and exiled President Prado. 
Headed by General Pfrez Godoy, the j_unta declared that the 
election was fraudulent, politicians irresponsible and the 
National Election Jury inefficient. 3 Although rather 
authoritarian, and believing that the army could do bettir 
, 
than civilians in tackling Peru•~ problems, General Perez 
Godoy promised free elections for June I963.4 In the interim 
the jurita took a moderate approach to government, - the press 
was uncensored, _and civil rights were respected. It even 
initiated reforms, setting up several pilot land reform 
projects and training labourers. Instituto de Planificacio'n 
Nacional (or National Planning Institute.) ~as established, 
as well as Banco de la Vivienda, which extended low-interest 
credit for buying houses and clearing slums. 5 
In March 1963, the army commander, Lindley 16pez, 
, 
suddenly replaced Perez Godoy as Chief President of the junta. 
(See Patch; AUFS:(WCS~ Vol IX No 6; Sept. 1962 pp 8tl3 & I5) 
(Needler; pp 243 in Von Lazar and Kaufman (ed) 1969; 
(See Lieuwen; I96~; pp 27-29) 
(Marett; 1969; pp 187) 
(Pike; I967i pp 301; Patch; AUFS (WCSA) Vol X No I July 
1963; pp 5) 
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The reshuffled junta accused Perez of being dictatQrially-
minded and personalist. He had ignored the mandatory date for 
his retirement from service, and was no longer consulting the 
other three co-presidents of the junta. He had also resumed 
contact with his old friend Odria, and was showing reluctance 
to hold elections. It appeared that the events of I948-I950 
rnigh t repeat themselves. 1 General Pfu~ez Godoy did not respond 
to these attacks or resist his removal since this would lead 
to the further politicalization of the military. The new 
junta did not renege on its pledge to hold free elections in 
June 1963. Electoral reforms enacted by the junta eliminated 
the minor candidates, and Belau'nde, benefitting from his 
) 
third attempt, was decisively elected President, 
Militarism developed very quickly in Peru. The landed 
elites, which could have provided civilian leadership in the 
post-independence period stayed out of politics to repair their 
war torn lands. The military stayed close to politics because 
it feared replaceuent by~ militia and the reduction or 
abolition of their pensions. 2 By its dislike of civilians, the 
military also gained a sense of superiority and confidence 
that justified to the officers their political involvements.3 
The recovery and growth of the Peruvian economy after 
I845 facilitated peace, stability and unity, and ended civil-· 
war militarism. The expansion of State and military power 
made it impossible for caudillos and private armies to compete 
with army, and accordingly ensured the political dominance 
1 • 
2.' 
(Patch; AUFS: (WCSA) Vol X No. I; July 1963 pp 6) 
(Rozman; JII\S: Vol XII No, ~; October I970; pp 5L1.0-51+2; 
Villarln; I900; quoted in Tulchin (ed) I973; pp 360-361) 
(Said Simon Bol:Cvar to the Pert1vian officers in I82L1.: 
"you (are) among the first saviours of Peru" See Lieuwen; 
1964; pp 28) 
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of the military, and the economic and social do~inance of 
the oligarchy. The military needed money, the oligarchy 
wanted security. Between the two groups there developed an• 
affinity of interest which figured behind the subsequent 
history of Per~vian politics. 1 
Up to 1872 militarism involved continuismo (prolonged 
office holding) and the protection of the oligarchy from 
peasant land invasions and strikes. However, the overthrow 
of the military government by mass, popular uprising in 1872 
indicated that public opinion could no longer be flouted, 
The confidence, co-operation and acceptance of the public were 
now vital pre-requisites for military intervention and 
government. 
During the presidency of Manuel Pardo (1872-1876) the 
military learned that reduced political power could mean 
reduced military coercive power which in turn endangered 
. territorial soverignity. The temporary occupation in 1866 
by Spain cl the guano Chincha Islands which were vital to Peru's 
economy, and the permanent loss to Chile of the valuable 
Peruvian-Bolivian nitrate fields in the War of the Pacific 
made the• Peruvian military highly sensitive about its coercive 
power, and any issues affecting it. 2 Only the military and 
conservative, oligarch-dominated governmmbts would maintain 
military strength. 
When the war against Chile was over, there was a partial 
return to the old caudillo rivalist-faction militarism of the 
post-independence period. Soldiers governed because everybody 
1. (See Marett; 1969; pp 95. North; 1966; pp 22) 
2. (See Einaudi; R~ND: R-586-DOS: April 1971; pp 64) 
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accepted their ability tp rebuild a defeated Peru. It was 
an emergency situation, but the republic had developed too 
much politically and socially to permit the old militarism 
to continue. The war hero and military caudillo Agustin 
/ Caceres, who wanted the presidency, realized that he had to 
conform to political styles and so accordingly his partisans· 
set up for him a new political party, Partido Constitucional. 
It was no longer possible to rely solely on military force 
for political support. Patriotism and courage in war did 
not bring legitimacy in politics, especially when the public 
mood was anti-militarist. 
After the 1895 mass uprising against / Caceres, the military 
had to accept the growing power of civilian politics. This 
realization was as vital to the future of civil-military 
relations in Peru as was the modernization and professional-
ization o-f the military under taken by Pitrola. Entrance, 
promotion and training were standardiz~d, unity, efficiency 
and esprit de corps grew. As a disciplined hierachic and 
bureaucratic structure the military became less involved in 
politics and less subject to the personalist leadership or 
domination of individual officers. 
The decline of military interventionism after 1895 was 
not due exclusively to professionalism. Quite simply, 
civilians' adherence to the socio-economic, and legal status 
guo also led to political stability. 1 Few calls were made by 
civilians on the military to intervene in politics. When 
civilian approaches to the military did succeed as in 1914 
they were related also to professional, institutional security 
1. (See Nun; 1969; pp 25, 30, 44) 
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of the military itself, rather than to individual officers' 
self improvement. The military accepted its constitutional 
obligations and permitted itself to be used to maintain order 
and protect the interests of the groups in power, according 
to lmv. 1 
The adherence of the middle classes to the oligarch 
status quo weakened in 1912 when Billinghurst was elected. 
The Conservatives and oligarchs of the aging Civilista party2 
encouraged the military to depose Billinghurst since they 
could not deal vrith him, or would not .accept hir:.1. 
From independence to 1872, and from the defeat by Chile 
to 1895, the military intervened on its own initiative to fill 
a political void left by apathetic or irresponsible politicians. 
In l9I~ the military no longer acted at whim and had to be 
cajoled with appeals to its senses of responsibility and 
preservation. The cotip d'etat none-the-less reaffirmed the 
affinity of interest of military and oligarchy, and was 
essentially preventative, not aimed at furthering military or 
individual political power.3 
In 1919, military unity nas sufficiently nea.k to permit 
a few units to place Legu!a in power in a sudden putsch. 
During the oncenio (eleven years in power) Legu{a prevented a 
military counter-revolt by underminirig its discipline and 
unity, and thus riskine Peruvian security. It was only after 
., 
numerous attempts that Sanchez Cerro ob\ained the support he 
, 
needed in Lima to depose Leguia. 
1. (See Payne; 1965; pp 38) 
2. (The same party, which under Pardo in the 1870 1 s had tried 
so h8.rd to remove the mil:L tary from politics) 
3, (See Welch and Smith; 1974; pp 147, Einaudi; RAND 
R-586-DOS: April 1971; pp 34) 
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By 1930 the military-oligarch affinity was beginning 
to weaken because officers were starting to sympathize with 
reformist and modernizing groups, including APRA. For a 
time, friendship and co-operation marked relations between 
APRA and the military. The mestizo origins of many officers 
corresponded to the incligeni,sta ideology of APRA, and S5nchez 
Cerro himself was considered a reformer and modernizer. 1 
Unfortunately, as a result of the Trijillo Massacre, 
APRA doomed the military to remain involved in politics in 
support of conservatism and status cue. The military could 
not c9ndone APRA-led change if it also meant change to its 
own existence and autonomy. Change or progress of any sort 
had to be strictly controlled by the military. Consequently 
the military prefered to manage national affairs on its own 
rather than allow modernizing civilians to do so. 2 
rrhe pronunciamiento vrhich brought General Odrfa to power 
in 1948 also aimed to prevent an APRA revolution by replacing 
Bustamante 1 s powerless goveDnment uith a military one. The 
military had a responsibility to guard the State against 
subversion.3 Concerned about social upheaval, it also 
realized· that change, not repression was a desirable, if not 
vital goal. Odr{a showed by his reforms, and the military's 
acceptance of them that the military-oligarchy affinity was 
_ended. 4 
The ochenio of Odrfa had a major affect on the military. 
Many officers, proud of their careers, were ashamed of the 





(Einaudi; R1ND: R-586-DOS; ~pril 1971; pp 59. See also 
Pike; 1967; pp 254-255) 
(Welch and SLlith; 1974; pp 149) 
(See Article 213 Title 12 of the 1933 Constitution in 
Einaudi; RtND: R-586-DOS: April 1971; pp 33) 




Odria. Thciy wanted to withdraw compl~tely from politics, 
reject the links with the oligarchy and improve the army's 
prestige which had fallen so much. Many younger officers felt 
that the army could embrace a reform programme or take an 
active part in a civilian programme. Some even supported the 
presidential candidacy of Fernando Belaefnde Terry in 1956. 
The extent of military autonomy was apparent during the second 
presidency of the oligarch Manuel Prado (1956-1962) when forty 
airforce officers forced the President to rescind transfer 
orders for a particular airforce general. 1 The military was 
prepared to defy the representative of its former oligarch 
allies. 
The' 1962 coup d I eta t sho':Ied that the Peruvian military 
had a high standard ·of professionalism, expertise and unity 
not seen since 1914. It showed also the trend set in 1948 
that seni9r, general officers led interventions, not the 
intermediate jefe ranking officers. Personalist or ideological 
leadership at any level was now replaced by a completely rigid 
general-to-private institutional authority. The 1962 junta 
was non-personalist, non-caudillo and purely institutional 
in nature. Prodding by civilians was ndt evident.but public 
response to the intervention indicated that the military 
had not misjudged the civilian mood of despondency. 2 
During their stay in power (1962-1963), military men 
made it clear that in the coming elections, they favoured 
Belafulde Terry and his Accitn Popular. First, Belau"nde 1.•ras 
a reformist and technocrat_• who appeared to offer Peru the 
. 1 • 
2. 
( The general cone erned, Varco.s Praclct., 
junta which replaced Prado in 1962. 
pp ?9-30; Patch; AUFS; ('i/C.SA) Vol IX 
pp 15) 
vras later in the 
LicU'.'!9n; I96.li; 
No 6; Sept. I962; 
(Patch; 1\UFS: (~IJC,SA) Vol IX No. 6; Sept. I962; pp 5-6) 
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leadership she needed. Second, Belaunde could be relied upon 
not to seek APRA support against the military 1 and third, he 
was a nationalist, -who2e views reflected those of the military: 
during the 1963 election campaign the AP candidate had declared 
that he would solve within 90 days of inauguration the 
"problem" involving the International Petroleum Company~ 2 
1. (Cotler; SCJD: Vol VI No 5; 1970-71; pp 98-99) 
2. (Olson; JDA: Vol 9 No 3; April 1975; pp 396) 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE COUP D'ETAT of 1968 
For many years, the International Petroleum Company, 
(a Canadian firm owned by Standard Oil of New Jersey) had 
stirred Peruvian xenophobia and nationalism. Holding 80% 
of the domestic petroleum market, and prominent in Peru's 
oil industry for forty years, the IPC symbolised Peru's 
colonialism, foreign exploitation and underdevelopment. 
Difficulties had long existed between Peruvian governments 
and the IPC over territorial concessions, sub-soil rights 
and company profits, e.nd al though Belaifnde had promised to 
solve these problems within three months of taking office, 
t . t· d d f f' 1 nego 1~ ions ragge on or ive years. 
When an agreement was reached on Ist October 1968, 
there was a public and Congressional outcry because page 
eleven which dealt with profits, was found to be missing 
from the document accepted by the government. 
; 
Belaunde 1 s 
cabinet resigned on 2nd October. After two days of 
political indecision and national indignation, the military 
intervened. BelaUnde was exiled, and an all-military .junta, 
the Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces (RMG) was 
formed. The IPC deal was cancelled, and on 10th October, 
1968, the RMG headed by General Juan Velasco Alvarado 
confiscated the IPC installations in Peru. Later in the 
month, the RMG declared that there would be no .immediate 
return to constitutional government. 
Numerous reasons can be given to explain the coup d'etat 
1. (Olson; JDA; Vol 9 No 3; April 1975; pp 396. Cotler; 
SCID; Vol VI No 5 I970-I97I; pp IOI) 
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of October I968, ~ccording to the deposed president, the 
military feared an APRA victory in the 1969 elections. 1 The 
military had supported Be1ati.1de I s candidacy in 1962 and 1963 
because of his rejection of APRA, 2 but unfortunately, 
Belat°nde 1 s party, Acci6'n Popular, never a strong cohesive 
party, had begun to break up by the rnid-I960 1 s. This 
coincided with the break up of the alliance between APRA 
/' and the conservativ~, right-wing party of General Odria, A 
new coaliti6n began to emerge of APRA and the middle class 
urban faction of the disintegrating AP, This coalition 
might have b~come a potent political force capable of 
winni~g the next Presidential election,3 
A second reason for intervention was the military's 
traditional concern about APRA coercive power which 
threatened to grow, as in the early 1930's, uhon economic 
conditions worsened, This was particularly evident in the 
Aprista strongholds in the northern coastal sugar and cotton 
plantations. The military wanted stronger control in the 
north to prevent a resurgence of APRA subversion, terrorism 
and rebellion, Li 
A third reason uas the need for effective government, 
After the I963 elections, Belafnde faced overwhelming 
APRA-UNO opposition in Congress and his own popularity 
declined,5 ABRA and UNO in Congress reduced funds for 
numerous projects and reforms, They also tried to make the 





(See Clinton; lAEA Vol 2l1- No l+ Spring I97I;. pp 11-5) 
(See Cotler; SCID; Vol VI No 5 1970-1971; pp 98-99) 
(See Cotler; SCID; Vol VI ~o 5 I970-I97I; pp IOO-IOI; 
Welch & ,Sm:i.th; I97L1.; 11p 163) . 
(How socio-economic conditions made possible APRA power 
and resilience refer to Klaren; 1973) 
(Welch & Smith; I974; pp I62) 
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peasant reform. Such obstruction was possible because the 
1933 Constitution gave Congress great importance in Peru's 
political process. 2 The APRA-UNO-dominated Congress forced 
on the Belaunde government nearly IOO cabinet changes in 
five years. 
Contributing to the loss of effective government was the 
attitude of the US, which reduced or withheld aid and credit 
until the IPC "problem" was cleared up. Nor was US 
ambassador in Peru pleased to find APRA rejected by the 
government and the military, since the US believed it to be 
Peru's best agent for reform under the Alliance for Progress.3 
Effective government was vital in Peru, first, because 
society was so dependent on regulation, 4 and second because 
only the State could initiate the reforms and development 
that Peru so desperately needed. To the military, effective 
government meant centralized government, and when Belaunde 
permitted provincial and municipal elections to be held for 
the first time in forty years, he encouraged regionalism 
and endangered Statism. Even worse, the elections benefitted 
the highly regionalist APRA and UNO parties which trailed 
the AP-DC vote by a mere 0.6%. After thirty mont~s in 
power, the government failed to win a decisive and resounding 
victory against the opposition. 5 APRA, UNO and regionalism 
inhibited effective government. 
A forth reason for intervention was to gain greater 





(Cotler; SCID; Vol VI No 5 I970-I97I; ?P 99) 
(Executive power in Peru is not as great as that of 
other Latin \merican countries. See Chaplin; pp 30 in 
Chaplin; (ed) I97G) 
(~~lch & Smith; I974; pp 175. APRA was also considered 
to be a reliable anti-comillunist party. See also Van 
Cleve; It.EA1· Vol. 30 N9i. 4_; fpring ·1977; pp 37-39. , (See Payne; 967; pp 2Iu-2I9 
(Sec Alisky; pp 3II in Burnett & Johnson; (ed) 19GB) 
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insurgency. Hugo Blanco, and later Luis de la Puente, 
etcetra, indicated a growing rural political crisis, and 
Belaifncte's prestige vras not increased by his enemies' 
exaggerations of the situation. 
-~ 
Inflation, devaluation of the sol and the growing 
national debt indicated economic mismanagement, and this 
often encouraged intervention. 1 Despite the steady growth 
in the early I960's, the economy began to falter by the 
mid-1960 1 s and politico-economic crises loomed for the late 
1960 1 s. In the 111!/hite Book" published by the RMG it was 
explained that intervention was necessary because corrupt 
politicians in Congress had failed to remedy the economic 
disruption. 2 The military could have been concerned about 
its budget allocation. Officers believed that the military 
had to be well equipped, and on 4th October 1967 (exactly 
a year prior to the coup) 16 French Mirage fighter-bombers 
were purchased for $US20 million. This contributed 
considerably to Peru'~ $US 120 million deficit. Political 
adversaries though they vrnre, President Belatlnde, APR/\. 
.,.. 
leader Haya de la Torre, and General Odria all agreed that 
the budget had to be balanced in 1968.3 The military might 
have predicted intolerable budget cuts regardless who 
occupied the presidency after I969. 
A sixth reason for intervention could have been that 
General Velasco, who was approaching retirement age, might 
1. (See Taylor; JIAS; Vol IX No I; January 1967~ pp 88 and 
Welch & Smith; 1974; pp 19) 
2. (Reported in New York Times; 2nd December 1968; pp 7~.) 
3. (Reported in the New York Times; 25th October, 1967; 
PP IL1) 
Fernando Be l aunde Terry, 
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have preferred to cap his career with the presidency rather 
than resign his commission. 1 Although General P/rez Godoy 
was removed in I962 after exceeding his retirement age, 
General Velasco appeared more in tune with the overall mood 
of the army than was his successor. 
Finally, the military might have been protecting its 
reputation and prestige by intervening. A congressional 
committee was investigating a smuggling operation which 
might have implicated the military. 2 Since thi ochenio of 
Odria, the military, especially the army, had sought to 
improve its image and ~rotect its integrity by rejecting the 
oligarchy and by taking an active part in civic action 
programmes. Credibility and respect would be lost if the 
army were found implicated in illegal activities. 
The citizens of Lima, the Peruvian capital, believed 
for months that a coup d'etat was imminent, but when the 
RMG made no announcement of elections (thus indicating a 
prolonged intervention) it was obvious that the military 
had its own long-term reasons for deposing Belatinde. 
General Velasco later hinted that the smuggling scandals, 
the deadlocked Congress, the factionized political parties, 
a possible APRA victory in 1969 and the IPC scandal were all 
purely coincidental.3 
After the expropriation of the IPC facilities, the RMG 
seized foreign fishing boats, expelled US military missions 
and rejected the scheduled Rockefeller mission. Land owned 
1. (Clinton; IAEA; Vol 24 No 4 Spring 1971; pp 46. Cotler; 
SCID; Vol VI No 5 1970-1971; pp IOO and Einaudi; RAND; 
R-586-DOS; April 1971; pp 14) 
3. (Olson; JDA; Vol 9 No 3; April 1975; pp 401, 404) 
2, (Clinton; IAEA; Vol 24 No 4 Spring 1971; pp 46. See 
also Wales and Preston; IAEA; Vol 26 No 2 Autumn 1972} 
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by the oligarchy and by foreign companies including 
W.R. Grace & Sons, was expropriated. Some land was partitioned 
and redistributed, whole plantations were turned over to 
co-operative control. 
A new industrial law gave the State control over basic 
industries (steel, basic chemicals, paper, oil). 1 Investment 
and finance also came under State control. 
Administrative reforms saw the abolition of some 
government departments and the creation of others. 2 
Administration and planning were made more efficient when 
the Instituto Nacional de Planificaci6n was overhauled. 
Centralization and bureaucratic method were emphasised. A 
National Development Plan for I97I-I975 was formulated, and 
a biennial budget dr.awn up.3 
Several factors account for the military's refusal to 
return to·constitutionalism, as in 1963, and for the formal 
establishment of the RMG. 
First was the influence of the Centro de Altos Estudios 
Militares (CAEM,. Centre for Higher Military Studies) and 
the new military thought. CAEM provided courses for mid 
and senior ranking officers and civilians. It taught lessons 
on national soverignty which was defined as a military 
( . ' . obligation to increase Peru's capacity for maneuvre vis-a-vis 
the outside world and particularly the US. This was in 
accordance first with Article 213 of the 1933 Constitution 




(see Jaquette; WPQ; Vol 25 No 4 Dec. 1972; pp 654; 
Welch & Smith; 1974; pp 165) 
(See below; Chapter VIII; pp 117,) 
(See Klitgaard; IAEA; Vol XXV No 3; Winter I97I; 
pp I0-12) 
IOI 
soverignty, 1 and second with the growing anti-US sentiment 
of the military. Since defence was their major concern, 2 
officers looked away from the US when it began to restrict 
its arms sales to Latin America during the mid I96O 1 s. 
Ideologically, the military felt no compulsion to side with 
US in the Cold War against USSR. Officers felt that the 
confront0tion would not affect Peru and that the Cold War 
was merely super-power rivalry. 
The CAEM also showed that Peru's security depended on 
the republic's own political and economic strength. It was 
evident from Peruvian history, and perhaps even from both the 
Vietnam and Six Day Wars that Peru would have to fight any 
war alone, since reliance on other nations was no guarantee 
of, or substitute for, national security. Since defence 
capability rested on political and economic strength, Peru 
would have to modernize her old political and economic systems 
if she was to increase her military power. In stressing this, 
the CAEM applauded Kemal Attaturk and Gamal Abdul Nasser, two 
military modernizers who faced and accepted the problems 
of modernization and security.3 The Peruvian military had to 
follow t~e Turkish and Egyptian leaders' examples and 
modernize Peru. Lessons on land reform, taxation, foreign 
policy and industrialization, etc., at CAEM taught the 
officers much about the technical,and administrative problems 
of modernization. 
1. (Einaudi; RAND; R-586-DOS; April I97I; pp 25) 
2. (See above; Chapter VI pp 89) 
3~ (See Van Cleve; IAEA; Vol. 3O,No. 4; Spring 1977; pp 41) 
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The failure of the civilians and the parliamentary 
system to achieve anything made the officers more certain 
that they would have to take the initiative. General Lindley 
Lopez emphasised the need for officers to prepare for a new 
1 . p 1 roe in eru. 
The official army journal Revista Militar illustrated 
the new military thought. Editions in the I960 1 s, unlike 
those of the r94o•s· and I950's were concerned about the 
military's image, and role in Peru. Revista also discussed 
internal subversion and guerrilla warfare. Articles even 
recognised the legitimacy of guerrilla objectives and 
suggested that alleviating the problems that made possible 
insurgency would undercut future guerrilla support. 2 
Nationalist themes also appeared more frequently in the I960 1 s. 
The guerrilla campaign in the Andes during the mid I960 1 s 
hardened military thought against civilian politics. In 
1967, while on a visit to US, General Edgardo Mercardo Jarr1n 
told officials that development and subversion were directly 
related. Castro-communist agitators were publicizing to the 
Peruvian masses that only violent revolution, not reform 
could achieve justice. Anti-communism was insufficient, 
declared Mercardo, unless policies were directly related 
to economic development.3 
Even those officers who were reluctant to re-enter 
politics after 1963 were convinced of its necessity by.I968. 
CAEM had long taught its students that civilians had failed 
1. (The commission set up by President Prado in 1956 to 
study agrarian and housing problems was one such 
failure. See Patch; AUFS; (WCSA) Vol IX No 4; Apri~ 1962; 
pp 15-16; and Vol X No- 1 ; July 1963; pp 4) 
2. (North; 1966; pp 52-53) 
3. (Speech reported in Corbett; 1972; pp I6. Einaudi; 
pp 411 in Chaplin; (ed) 1976) . 
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to develop Peru, but officers were influenced more by the 
Cuban experience, where officers were exiled, jailed or shot, 
and their own experiences and difficulties wiping out the 
Andean guerrilla fronts. In their minds the two expE_1riences ·· 
were not unconnected. The ri~{. of renewed insurgency forced. 
the military to become a development ~lite. 1 That the 
military could adopt such a role•was not new in Latin 
A . 2 merica. 
Encouraging military thinking about change was the 
army's sympathy for the lower classes and Indian peasants. 
Officers believed that they understand and represent these 
less privileged groups. Although paternalist, these beliefs 
and views were never-the-less genuine, given the ethnic and 
social origin of many officers including General Velasco 
himself.3 
Second, the military believed that its needs and 
wishes corresponded with those o~ Peru. Strong centralized 
government was one such common need. 4 Nor did many officers 
feel that it was in the best interests of the military and 
Peru for them to act as lackeys of traditional elites and 
repress change. Officers were contemptuous of it9 old 
allies the oligarchs who acted orily in self-interest.5 
Greater efficiency was another desirable goal for Peru 




(Astiz & Garcia; WPQ; Vol 25 No 4 Dec 1972; pp 678) 
(See Malloy; JIAS; Vol 14 No 4 November 1972; pp 45~ 
(See Einaudi; RAND; R-586-DOS April 1971; pp 49, 55-57 
· and Einaudi; pp 402-403 in Chaplin (ed) 1976. See 
also table in Astiz and Garcia; HFQ; Vol 25 No 4 
Dec, 1972; pp 680) 
(See above; Chapter VII; pp 96-97) 
(See Patch; AUFS; (WCSA) Vol X No 1; July 1963; pp 4-6; 
Welch & Smith; 1974; pp 158) 
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administrative capacity was weak, 1 but the RMG was to 
sidestep the issues of greater administrative, bureaucratic 
efficiency by setting up a virtual counter-bureaucracy of 
officers and tfcnicos (Technocrats). All decision making 
was done along military lines and civilian advisers were 
consulted as to means rather than ends. 2 
Time, and therefore a formalized government were 
necessary if the military was to strengthen State control, 
increase efficiency and consolidate the changes made. To 
facilitate these, the RMG introduced the Corporativist 
system and created Sistema Nacional de Apoyo i la 
Movilizaci6n Social (SlNAM0S or National Social Mobilization 
Support System).3 
As an institution of planners, the military long 
considered the lack of planning a major impediment to Peru's 
development. To the military, planning was an integral 
part of strong, efficient government. General Morales 
Bermudez, the Minister of the Economy in the RMG said that 
the State would fulfill a regulatory role in planning to 
make cohesive the State, private and co-operative sectors 
of the economy. All planning would be made in the lnstituto 
Nacional de Planificaci6n (lNP or National Planning 
Institute) set up by the 1962 junta.4 The RMG 1 s planning 
was also indicative of the support given to the regime by 
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(See Fitzgerald; 1976; pp 
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confered on it a degree of legitimacy. Although extensive, 
• RMG planning was not definitive, as it hoped for an 
unpromised high degree of foreign investment which would be 
controlled by the State. It was the RMG 1 s intention that the 
Peruvian state should control 56% of internal investment by 
I975. It was also hoped to reduce inflation, increase 
employment, achieve a 7.5% annual growth rate and complete 
land reforms all by·r975. 1 
Another concern of great significance to both Peru and 
the military was national unity. Dependent on the resources 
of a unified state for money, recruits and leadership, the 
military had always favoured a high degree of centralised 
State-controlled political and economic power. Regionalism 
and devolution were always anathema to the Peruvian military. 
Accordingly, the RMG centralized Peru's administration in 
Lima and halted the trend toward devolution begun by 
Belau'nde when he permitted local elections in I963 and I966. 
Local power or autonomy might create dissension with Peru, 
and even threaten the authority which Comando Conjunto held 
on regionally based units. Regional sentiment and insufficient 
control from Lima permitted, for example, the Areiuipa 
garrison to raise frequently the standard of revolt. 
In addition, by replacing the oligarchy as the economic 
patron of Peru, the RMG, as a truly National institution 
would be able to create a new nation-state. Peruvians could 
cease to be employees of the oligarchy and become active, 
enterprising citizens. As long as Peruvians felt little 
1. (Klitgaard; IAEA; Vol XXV No 3; Winter I97I; pp I3-I5) 
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loyalty toward their country, Peru would be weak, perhaps 
even 11 a mere geographic expression. 111 The guerrilla campaign 
taught the military that its civic action work could not 
only undercut guerrilla support, but also gain peasant 
allegiance to the State. Both the military and the 
enlightened citizenry were subject to xenophobia and 
nationalism, particularly where foreign dominance and 
competition in the economy were involved. lPC, WR Grace and 
Company, and Cerro de Pasco Copper Company were major 
foreign firms whose properties in Peru were later 
expropriated by the RMG. The Peruvian military gained the 
emnity of the US in 1962 when it prevented Haya de la Torre 
from gaining the presidency. 2 This hostility strengthened 
the nationalist cause in the military. 
I Because of Belaunde's stand on the IPC question, the 
US cut or reduced its trade and ·aid to Peru in order to 
encourage a favourable settlement. This indicated clearly 
the dangers of a receptive colonial style economy being 
too dependent on one market. Economic nationalism grew 
among officers and te'cnicos who w~nted an economically 
independent Peru. Of particular concern also to the 
military was the defence of Peru's natural resources, 
particularly petroleum.3 This amounted to the conservation 
of Peru's heritage for the future. 
Another matter worrying the military was eeru's 
dependence on the US for military equipment. In October 
1. (See Plank; in Baily; (ed) 1971) 
2. (See Van Cleve; lAEA; Vol. 30 No. L~; Spring 1977; . 
pp 37, 39, 41-42) 
3. (Einaudi; RAND; R-586-DOS; April 1971; pp 39-40) 
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1967, the airforce bought 16 French Mirage but on 22nd 
January 1968, the US reiterated its disapproval of Latin 
American republics buying equipment which suited the needs 
of international rather than internal (guerrilla or civil) 
wars. 2 Miffed.by the Mirage deal,the US halted military aid 
to Peru~ The US was obviously unreliable as a supplier 
of defence equipment on the world market. 
Peru also needed a President accepted throughout the 
republic. The 1962 and 1963 elections shared not only 
electoral indecision but also highly regionalized political 
support. 4 In neither of these elections did the candidates 
obtain a nation-wide mandate. After 1966-1967, Belalinde 
had lost the goodwill and popular support (including that 
of the military) which he had gained in 1963. 5 He had 
failed to satisfy an almost impossibly broad spectrum of 
pplitical opinion. Officers believed that only they enjoyed 
the prestige and national outlook needed to provide effective 
leadership. 
Domestic stability was an important goal to the military 
and Peru. Peasant discontent, land invasions and guerrilla 
insurgency were increasingly frequent during the 1950 1 s and 
I960 1 s. The military hoped that agrarian reform would eliminate 
most peasant discontent. By creating a petit bourgeois class 
of peasant land owners the agrarian reform would offset the 
danger of a landless revolutionary proletariat. 6 The 
1. (See above; Chapter VII; pp 98) 
2. (See speech by US Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara 
reported in lAEA; Vol .21 No 4; Spring 1968; pp 89-92) 
3. (New York Times; 17th May 1968; pp I;and 21st August 1968 
pp 9) 
4. (See Neira; pp 463 in Guide to Political Parties in 
Latin America; 1973) 
5. (See New York Times; 7th October, 1968; pp 2) 
6. (Chaplin; JIAS; 1968; Vol X No 4; October;pp 565; Gitlitz 
JIAS; V61 XIII No 3 & 4; July-October 1971; pp 462, ,467; Cotler; 
BCID.; Vol.VI No, 5; 1970-1.971; pp 105) 
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Industrial Communes would also create a conservative, 
property owning class of workers in the cities. 1 The military 
knew that change was inevitable in Peru and that resisting 
the irresistable would bring inevitable violence and 
revolution. This was unacceptable to the military and Peru. 
The lessons of Bolivia and Cuba were all too vivid. Under 
Article 2I3 of the I933 Constitution, which declared that 
the purpose of the military was "to guarantee the rights of 
the Republic, the fulfillment of the Constitution and the 
Laws and the conservation of public order,'' the military 
felt that it had legal as well as practical justification 
for i~tervention. 2 · Intervention then, was for the legal 
prevention of disorder and instability. Officers believed 
that if economic development was a source of security and 
iritegration of the nation and state, they were justified in 
using their technical and·administrative capacity for Peru's 
future.3 The RMG did not seek to inflame passions and give 
cause for violence. General Velasco himself prefered 
persuasion and compromise to coercion, often dealing 
personally with disputes. 4 The RMG prefered to reject 
repression and violence as political weapons and relied 
instead on keeping and nurturing public goodwill and 
acceptance. 
Third, was the existence in Peru of a corps of civilian 
t6cnicos who were sympathetic to the military. After I950, 
when the military-oligarchy relationship was weakening, new 
1 •· ( See below, Chapter VIII; pp 114) 
2. (Einaudi; RAND; R-586-DOS April I97I; pp 33; Einaudi; 
pp 406 in Chaplin; (ed) 1976; EVK Fitzgerald; I9?6;pp 39) 
3. (Cotler; SCID; Vol VI No 5 I970-7I; pp 109) . 
4. (See Welch & Smith; 1974; pp 166 and Cotler; SCID; Vol VI 
No 5 I970-7I; pp I06) 
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links were forming between politically minded, activist 
officers and civilian administrators, intellectuals, 
professionals and technocrats. Some had trained at military 
schools and had even attended CAEM. 1 
Many officers and t/cnicos shared attitudes and values. 
They prided themselves on their management skills, efficiency 
and organization. Their success rested on competition and 
merit. Their interests were the preservation of middle class 
values and income, and of tradition and religion. Both 
officers and t§cnicos were opposed to mass politics, inflation 
and the redistribution of wealth. 2 Both disliked the 
corruption, greed, indecision and self-interest inherent in 
the existing system. By their expertise social responsibility 
and problem-solving ability they felt confident to lead 
change. 
Initially the officers and te'cnicos supported Acci6n 
Popular, but witl;l the failure of the Belatf°nde government to 
enact change, they presented their own candidate for the 1969 
presidential election. 3 When the RMG was declared in October 
1968, many of these highly qualified and sympathetic civilians 
gave their support to it. Many of them were unemp.loyed in 
the Belaunde years because they lacked the political and social 
contacts needed to get a job. The RMG, which found them 






(Einaudi; pp 406 in Chaplin (ed) 1976; Einaudi; RAND; 
R-586-DOS; April I97I; pp 25; Corbett; I972i pp IO-II) 
(Jaquette; WPQ; Vol 25 No 4 Dec 1972; pp 658; · 
(Jaquette; WPQ; Vol 25 No 4 Dec 1972; pp 652) 
(Klitgaard; IAEA; Vol XXV No 3 Winter I97I; pp 9; Jaquette 
pp 42I in Lowenthal (ed) 1975; Welch & Smith; 1974; 
pp 170) 
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Forth was the need for a formalized government to 
help legitimize the coup d'etat. In 1962, no such 
government was established because the military intended 
staying in power for only a very limited time in a caretaker 
capacity. Fo~ this purpose, the Comando Conjunto (Joint 
Chiefs of Staff) of four co-presidents was sufficient. In 
I968 the Comando Conjunto formed an all-military cabinet of 
nineteen officers who took up the ministerial positions 
previously held by civilians. The RMG replaced the civilian 
cabinet at the head of the State bureaucracy. Initially 
autho~ity was to be exercised in the old way, through the 
State, not the military; but the RMG set up new organizations 
which tended to circumvent the State structures. 
A formalized government would legitimize the intervention, 
and by its efficiency, legitimize itself. The military would 
be able to make chang·es and correct them during its tenure of 
power. The manifesto of the RMG, published at the time of 
the coup was synonymous with RMG legitimization. It declared 
that structural reforms were necessary to ensure efficient 
government and 11a definite nationalist position. 111 The 
military would accept responsibility for government for an 
indefinite period. 
Assumption of power by the military also seemed 
acceptable to the Peruvian electorate because, first, the 
RMG would provide welcome security and leadership at a time 
of uncertainty, 2 and second, its sei~ures of IPC and 
Californian tuna boats, disputes over compensation, and US 
1. (El Peruano; 4th October 1968, quoted in Jaquette; 
pp 421 in Lowenthal; (ed) 1975; Marett; 1969; pp 274-277) 
2. (See Marett; 1969; pp 249-251) 
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hostility all appealed to Peruvian nationalism, and thus, 
probably ensured legitimization for the regime. 1 
Formalized government also affected the military as an 
institution. The RMG made unnecessary the use of a supreme 
leader who, by virtue of the prestige and power gathered 
around him becomes partially independent of the military, a~d 
may even hold the institution to ransom. 2 The RMG also 
dispensed entirely with figureheads who like Leguia, were 
•difficult to control and might prove a liability. Nor could 
civilians project the values precious to the military of 
dedication, honesty, unity and nationalism. 
It was not possible to set up a political party of 
officers and campaign for a constitutional mandate for power 
as ciceres had tried to do in the I890 1 s.3 Direct and 
immediate intervention was necessary. The coup d'etat of 
~ October ~968 abruptly ended Belaunde's mandate and installed 
the RMG which obviated the need for political parties and 
public consensus. The unity and non-partisanship of the 
military during the coup helped ensure the apolitical nature 
of the new RMG.4 Simple caution and distrust of popular 
initiative also figured in the RMG disavowal of the 
Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (CDR) which 
were set up by civilian supporters of the military and later 
replaced by SINAMOs. 5 A formalized military government 
1. (Olson; JDA; Vol 9 No 3; April I975; pp 4I2; Welch & 
Smith; 1974; pp I69) 
2. (See above Chapter VI; pp 85-86) 
3. (See Pike; I967; pp I52-I58; and above; Chapter VI pp 90) 
4. (Cotler; SCID; Vol VI No 5; I970-7I; pp I09J 
5. (See Chaplin; pp I9; Einaudi; pp 407 on the influence 
of a I944 secret military lodge which emphasised 
military responsibility to Peru, and also Palmer 
~nd Middlebrook pp 430 in Chaplin (ed) 1976). 
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operating according to military precepts of loyalty, 
solidarity and honour was also more likely to be resistant 
to civilian corruption and temptation than a caudillo 
government like that of Odr{a. In the RMG essential unity 
and co-operation were preserved by ensuring that all three 
service chiefs agree to the choice of first President, and 
that all three sign any government decree. Undoubtedly, the 
RMG was an institutional government whose actions and policies 
were formulated by military minds. nowever, the leadership 




THE PERUVIAN MILITARY IN POWER 
El Gobierno Revolucionario de la Fuerza Armada 
(Revolutionary Military Government - RMG) quickly gained 
a reputation for radical reform, populism and left-wing 
nationalism. This resulted from a dramatic campaign of 
expropriation, reform and rhetoric which was lauded by 
Latin American leftists including Pablo Naruda and Fidel 
Castro. 
The first dramatic act was the expropriation of the 
$US200 million IPC installation in October 1968. That same 
month, the RMG announced that there would be no immediate 
return to constitutionalism, although civil rights were 
restored in November. In February 1969 the RMG announced 
the end of reliance on the US economy, and signed an accord 
with the USSR. 1 Peru seized Californian tuna boats poaching 
within her 200 mile territorial sea limits, expelled US 
missions, rejected the. scheduled Rocke fel·ler Mission and 
announced in June I969 a massive land expropriation and 
reform which included the exploration territories owned by 
the US, -the W.R. Grace & Company, and the Cerro de Pasco 
Copper Company. In the early I970's, Committees for the 
Defence of the Revolution (CDR) were formed which seemed 
most reminescent of Castro's Cuba. The RMG also 
expropriated three commercial banks (two foreign and one 
local) thus nationalizing credit and further reducing 
foreign penetration and dominance of the economy. The RMG 
1. (New York Times; 2nd February I969; pp 4 & 18th 
February 1969; pp I) 
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was not intimidated by the economic importance or foreign 
ownership of big efficient enterprises, which were turned 
over to co-operative control. 1 Basic industries including 
sugar and petroleum were nationalized, and telecommunications 
and electricity_were taken over, as were the railways. 
Foreign capital was excluded by decree from the fishmeal and 
cotton industries. 2 A new industrial law, Comunidad Industrial 
was announced which.introduced worker participation in 
business. Workers would have a vested interest in their 
factories and would eventually own a 50% share through 
savings and investment of wages. 3 The RMG compared Peru with 
Cuba and China, thus enhancing its revolutionary and 
nationalist reputation.4 
The RMG also gained a reputation by its rhetorical 
stand on humanism, social justice, social obligation, 
Christianity and welfare. 5 There was no attempt to coerce 
Peruvians or run Peru as a totalitarian state. There was no 
curfew, no mass arrests and only a limited censorship. 
During the I970's, the RMG extended its land reform 
programme. Metallurgic industries including copper were 
nationalized, and more foreign fishing boats seized by the 
navy. Peru signed trade agreements with China, purchased 
Soviet arms and accepted Soviet credit to the tune of 
$US500 million. 6 In 1974, the US Peace Corps was expelled, 





(See Jaquette; WPQ;Vol 25 No 4 Dec. 1972; pp 655. Cotler; 
SCID; Vol VI No 5 I970-7I; pp 105) 
(Fitzgerald; 1976; pp 29) 
(See Pearson; IAEA; Vol 27 No I; Summer I973i pp 26; 
Jaquette; WPQ; Vol 25 No 4 Dec. 1972 pp 663; 
(Jaquette; pp 406-407 in Lowenthal (ed) 1975) 
(See Morales Bermudez interview reported in 0iga 12th 
March I97I in Tulchin (ed) 1973. More detailed explanations 
of humanism Christianity and welfare can be fovnd in 
Drysdale and Myres; pp 2bI,263 in Lowenthal (ed) 1975) 
(Time; I0th January 1977; pp I4-I5) . 
II5 
declared that Peru was a revolutionary and not a socialist 
country, first-President Velasco enhanced the RMG 1 s 
reputation for nationalism, State control and modernization. 
Despite the many urgent social and demographic problems 
in Peru, the RMG concentrated chiefly on national and 
structural matters. Abolition of the old traditional oligar·chy 
expropriating its land was one such vital structural change. 
By driving the oligarchy away from agricultural, export, 
primary produce industries such as planting and mining, by 
ending gamonalismo and by ruling without Congress, the RMG 
neutralized the oligarchy's negative and conservative 
influence on politics. 1 The oligarchy took an active part in 
politics, dedicating itself to parliamentarianism, federalism 
and prevention of the growth of State expenditure which 
would necessitate higher taxes. Greater State control of 
the economy and centralism were anathema to the. oligarchy. 2 
The oligarchy impeded progress in Peru_by creating bver the 
course of four centuries an instinctively cautious and 
negativist society which responded sluggishly to change. The 
break down of modernization in previous years could be partly 
explained by the continuance of hidden, persistent non-modern 
values~ Peru remained so dependent on the political and 
economic status quo that any attempt to modernize the system 
and reduce this dependence automaticaliy threatened the 
republic's ekewed prosperity. The system was incapable of 
reforming itself. 
1, (The social, economic and politicil importance, and 
composition of the oligarchy and gamonalismo are 
explained. in Payne; I965;pp 273-277; Bourricaud; SCID; 
Vol II No 2 I966. ~ee also Glossary) 
2, (See also Marett; I969; pp 257) · 
3. (See Germani; SCID; Vol V No 8 1969-70; pp I58,I69-I70) 
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The removal of the oligarchy as a political, economic, 
social and intellectual impediment to change, and its 
replacement by the State was a vital structural reform, but 
the plantations and mines, now under the control of State 
and worker run co-operatives, were still vital to Peru's 
economy. Although not able to reduce immediately this reliance 
on extractive industries the RMG tried instead to lessen 
Peru's dependence on any one market, particularly that of the 
US. Trade wi~h Japan, China, USSR and East European countries 
was increased and economic co-operation was intensified with 
the Andean Pact countries. 1 
A vital aspect of non-modern values was the middle 
-
sector alignment and identification with the oligarchy. The 
middle sectors were usually conservative, conformist and even 
reactionary~ They did not develop a separate identity or 
value system. 2 Destruction of the upper-class oligarchy might 
have made the Peruvian middle sectors more effective. 
Accumulation of wealth and opposition to redistributive 
taxation also ensured oligarch dominance of the bureaucracy. 
By dispensing patronage, and appointing functionaries, the 
oligarchy made the bureaucracy corrupt, inefficient, and 
unreliable. State authority and official channels b~came a 
mockery.3 By destroying the oligarchy, the RMG could 
depoliticalize the bureaucracy, gain economic control of the 
country, reform the taxation system and industrialize. 
The RMG created new entrepreneurial sectors - a State 
1. (Bolivia, Chile, Colombia~ Ecuador, Peru & Venezuela. See 
Milenky; IAEA; 1971 Vol 25; No 3) 
2. (Marett; 1969; pp 253; Chaplin; JIAS Vol X No 4 1968; 
PP 553-554; Nun; 1969; PP 21-26) 
3. (Bourricand; SCID; Vol II No 2 1966; pp 27; Marett; 1969; 
pp 255; Paulston; JDA Vol 5 No 3; I97I; pp 405; See also 
Chaplin; JIAS; Vol X No 4 1968; pp 550; and Payne; 1965; 
pp 233-234) 
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sector controlling basic industrial development and production 
of raw material; a domestic private sector and a foreign sector, 
both of which would develop non-durable, consumer-product 
industries. 1 These entrepreneurial innovations would replace 
the oligarchy and stimulate modernization, development and 
investment by Peru's middle sectors. Rapid expansion of the 
State sector placed minerals, petroleum, transportation, 
power, exports, banking, communications, industry and housing 
all under State control. Three of the most important State 
enterprises were MlNEROPERU, PETROPERU and EPSA, all 
established in 1969-1970. All of these enterprises control 
prices and profit margins. 2 The state would also control and 
direct the level of foreign investment in the economy. 
There was also a restructuring of government to 
facilitate efficiency, a Consejo Asesor de la Presidencia 
(COAP or Presidential-Advisory Council) was set up to make 
policy. It comprised military chiefs and ministers. An 
all-military Consejo de Ministros or cabinet made 
administrative decisions while four main groups of agencies 
the Sub-Sector Publico Independiente were directly responsible 
to the r~levant ministry and were divided mainly into 
general, security, economic and social departments. 
Perhaps the most significant RMG plans for restructuring 
Peru were Corporativism and SINAMOS. Highly centralised, 
hierachic, vertically aligned, elitist, and dominated by 
top-down government initiative, the Corporativist structure 
1. (See Cotler; SClD; Vol VI No 5 1970-71; pp I08) 
2. (See Fitzgerald; 1976; pp 47-51) 
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was not only a feature of the Hispanic political past, but 
also approximated military values and structure. 1 The 
corporativist model of government must have appealed to the 
military as the ideal form for the future of Peru, - a 
definite break with the old system. Government must be 
direct and positive. 
To consolidate this model, enhance efficiency minimize 
conflict and channel popular expression, the RMG created 
SINAMOS in 1971. Operated from Lima, S1NAMOS had agencies 
at departmental, provincial, union and community levels~ 
Once c.alled "a school for participation" in which government 
officials "taught" the citizenry, S1NAMOS viewed popular 
participation as mere collaboration in local development, 
not decision making. Organization by (civilian and military) 
experts was the solution to Peru's structural and national 
problems. 2 
Unfortunately, the RMG neglected in part urgent social 
and demographic problems, some of which required immediate 
action because of the "lead time" they needed. Most of 
these problems were rural. 
Despite expenditure and civic action programmes in the 
countryside building irrigation systems and teaching peasants, 
the agricultural production of individual peasants remained 
low. 51% of the population was engaged in agriculture, but 
it contributed only 17.4% to the GNP. 3 Low food production 
meant food shortages, and Peru had to import food to prevent 
starvation. Production grew at 2.8% per year, but the 
1. (See Middlebrook & Palmer; 1975; pp 9-IO; 43; 46; Klitgaard 
1AEA; Vol XXV No 3; Winter I97I; pp 9-IO) 
2. (See Palmer & Middlebrook; pp 438 in Chaplin (ed) 1976; 
Middlebrook & Palmer; 1975; pp I8-26;and above Chapter VII 
pp 103-104) 
3~ (Marett; 1969; pp 228) 
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population was expanding it 3.02%. Agrarian reform was more 
likely to worsen this situation. 
Nor was there sufficient land for all peasants under 
the I969 Land Reform which fixed the sizes of holdings. 1 The 
lack of land for all peasants, and many other problems were 
a result of a population explosion in Peru which threatened 
to nullify economic gains. 2 
Population growth, rural conditions and pressure on 
land forced peasants to migrate to the cities, particularly 
Lima, the population of which tripled between 1940 and I96I. 
Entire slums grew around Lima. Population growth and 
migration exceeded new opportunities opening in employment 
and education. 
Oviously, population growth was a major problem in 
Peru, but the RMG did nothing to encourage family planning. 
In fact, the RMG closed down a family planning unit set up 
on a trial basis by the Belaunde government.3 
The old taxation system which relied mostly on import 
duties and int~rnal, indirect taxation inhibited savings 
and investment. ·rt also affected the lower classes more 
than the upper classes and big business. 4 Although the RMG 
occasionally threatened major tax reform, little or nothing 
was actually done. It did not use the income tax system to 
obtain much needed capital for State investment, or bring 
about a redistribution of wealth.5 
1 • 
2. 
(See Branco; JIAS; Vol IX No 2 April 1967; pp 227,229, 
Patch; AUFS;(WCSA) March 1964; Vol XI No 3; pp I3; Chaplin; 
JIAS; Vol X No 4; October I968; pp 566) 
(See Patch; AUFS; (WCSA) Vol IX No 4 April 1962; pp 35; 
Taylor; JIAS; Vol IX No I; January I967; pp 87; Alisky 
pp 29I, 292 in Burnett & Johnson (ed) I968) 
(Clinton; IAEA;Vol 24 No 4 Spring 1971; pp 57; Chaplin; 
pp 24 and Doughty; pp 77 in Chaplin; (ed) I976; Sanders; 
AUFS; (WCSA) Vol XVII; No 6; April I970) 
(See Taylor; IAEA; Vol 21 No 3; 1967; PP 53-54) 
(Jaquette· pp 423 in Lowenthal (ed) I975; Fitzgerald; 
1976; pp' 44, 45, 47) 
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The inconsistencies and reforms of the RMG can be 
partially understood by examining the military base which 
influenced the course of events. The military which deposed 
President Prado in I962 wanted to take some part in 
modernization but was disinclined to dominate such a 
programme. It prefered a limited role in politics in order 
to regain and protect the prestige lost in the ochenio. Civic 
action appeared the most favourable means of military 
participation. 
/ General Perez Godoy lost the support of his mili~ary 
collegues in I963 because they were unwilling to follow the 
reformist lead he had set. The junta headed by General 
. , 1 
T.i ndl ey Lope 7, was considerably more conservative and cautious. 
Military morale and confidence rose sharply during 
I966-I967. First the I962 junta had given the military a 
new reputation for integrity, honesty and efficiency. It 
had also refuted its old ties with the-oligarchy. Second~ 
participation in civic action programmes had increased the 
military's standing among the peasantry. 2 
Third, the quick, efficient and victorious conclusion 
of the counter-insurgency campaign justified to the 
enlightened public the military institution. Its mood 
became more assertive, and it gained Bela~nde's permission 
to buy French war planes. Forth, military confidence had 
1 • 
2. 
(Marett; I969; pp I88; Pike; I967; :pp 302 and C-hapter 
VI; pp 87. Although Lieuv1en (I964) also credited 
Perez Godoy with junta reform, Patch (July I963) 
disagreed and placed the responsibility for the reforms 
on Lindley Lopez. See Lieuwen; I964; pp 3I; and Patch; 
AUFS; (WCSA) Vol X No 1; July 1963; pp 4-5) . 
(Einaudi; RAND; R-586-DOS; April I97I; pp 54-55) 
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been nurtured also its training and experience in organization, 
planning and development. 1 The radical, impatient element 
hankering for change became disillusioned with President 
Belaunde first because of the down turn in the economy in 
I966, and second because of the slow rate of reform. It 
appeared that the President had no real intention or ability 
to change anything. 2 
As malaise overcame the Belaunde government, the military 
waited for an opportunity which would assure legitimacy if 
and when it intervened. That opportunity arrived in October 
I968 when the electorate rose in indignation at the IPC 
agreement. Nationalism ~ppeared the stimulus for intervention, 
but the exact reasons remain speculative. 3 The mood of the 
military however, was reformist, activist and nationalist. 
It was prepared to repeat and extend the achievements of the 
1962 _ju_11_ta. 
The immediate need for the RMG was legitimacy which was 
satisfied for a time by the expropriation of the IPC. The 
military was never-the-less realistic: the cost of legitimacy 
might be the suspension of aid. 4 To assuage US feelings 
and discourage implementation of the Hickenlooper AmendmBnt 
the RMG ad0pted a conciliatory and moderate policy. First, 
the RMG announced that it would give priority to Peru's 
1 • 
2. 
(Cotler: SCID; Vol VI No 5; 1970-71; pp II3) 
(Jaquette; pp 432-433 in Lowenthal (ed) 1975, An interest-
ing personal impression of Belaunde Terry is contained 
in Patch; AUFS; (WCSA) September 1962; Vol IX No 6; ppIO-II) 
(See above; Chapter VII, pp 95-99) _ 
(In 1962 in the Brazilian state of Rio Grande do Sul, 
Governor Leonel Brizola expropriated the local ITT 
installations, and in consequent efforts to pressure 
President Goulart to resolve the matter, US Senator 
Hickenlooper had placed in an aid bill an amendment 
which suspended aid to any country which expropriated 
US property) 
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chief problem - the refinancing of $US250 million debt due 
for repayment within eighteen months. The RMG would also 
balance the budget, restrain wage increases continue foreign 
payments, maintain the exchange rates and adhere to a plan 
for mining inv~stment by Anaconda and the Cerro de Pasco 
Copper Company worth $US500 million. 1 The RMG also offered to 
pay compensation. 2 This indicated a most responsible, fiscally 
conservative, and traditional economic policy which should 
appeal favourably to the US as its Congress debated 
implementation of the Hickenlooper Amendment. The RMG also 
pledged eventual return to constitutionalism and democracy. 
This would encourage US recognition of the RMG and the 
continuance of aid to Peru.3 
Second, the RMG implemented its own anti-Hickenlooper 
Amendment campaign. The expropriation of the IPC, which was 
a Canadian firm, was called a "unique" case in which the US 
should not be involved anyway. Peru appealed to other Latin 
American republics for moral support and welcomed the new 
Soviet ambassador and his trade delegation. There was no 
expropriation campaign, the RMG declared, but if the 
Hickenlooper Amendment was enforced, Peru would suspend debt 
$ervicing, freeze remittances to US and expropriate properties 
as she saw fit. 4 The US found itself dealing with a proud, 
responsible and determined government which threatened to 





(The Economist; I2th October I968; pp 22-25) 
(New York Times; I4th October I968; pp 46) 
(New York Times; 26th October I968; pp I5) 
(See Olson; JDA; I975; pp 408-412 Vol 9 No 3 
Also New York Times; 4th October I969; pp 49. Cotier; 
SCID; I970-7I; Vol VI No 5; pp I03) 
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Unfortunately, it was not until I970 that the US 
decided against invoking the Hickenlooper Amendment, but 
in the interrim the US had taken an attitude toward Peru 
of "active malevolence." While the US debated the 
Hickenlooper Amendment's application on Peru, it greatly 
reduced aid, credit, investment and trade during I968-I970. 
For two years Peru lived in a state of uncertainty and 
economic deprivation. 1 The two years of US Congressional 
indecision had the same affect as the Hickenlooper Amendment 
if it had been invoked at the outset. It had a drastic 
affect on the RMG and the military, because it strengthened 
the· nationalist and radical element in the officer corps. 
Disagreements followed, and there were numerous resignations, 
purges, reassignments and promotions among officers. 
Although there were numerous changes in the RMG and 
the ranks~ the effect on policy was not easy to judge. 
Individual officers could not be categ~rized with accuracy 
as be~ng conservative, moderate or radical. Officers' 
views could vary from one issue to another, and the military 
was naturally secretive about officer opinion especially 
where politics was involved. 
It appears, however, that the radicalist, nationalist 
element managed to over come the more cautious, moderate, 
pro-US right-wing element in the corps. 2 First, the US 
attitude meant that the US and the moderates in the 
Peruvian military were ·unable to justify their moderation or 
restrain those officers who favoured the radical 
1. (Olson; JDA; Vol 9 No3; April 1975; pp 405-408) 
2. (New York Times; 26th June 1969; pp 4) 
expropriations as envisaged in the anti-Hickenlooper 
Amendment. 
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Second, the military had to justify the I968 
displacement and replacement of constitutional government 
continually to.the Peruvian public. Unable to operate an 
economy efficiently because of the US sanctions, the RMG 
had to appeal to nationalism and use rhetoric and reformist 
activity to commend itself to the people. 
Despite the radicalism, nationalism and fervour of 
the RMG, the public's acceptance of i~ remained tenuous. 
In I9?I, strikes became prevalent and there were outbreaks 
of violence in provincial areas. The military was also 
worried about US subversion. The RMG attempted to minimize 
doubt and uncertainty and neutralize criticism. Controls 
were placed on the media during I969-I970. Newspapers were 
expropriated and even·turned over to co-operative management. 
; 
In I972, Pedro Beltran, doyen of the oligarchy and editor 
of a leading Peruvian newspaper, 11 La Prensa", was arrested 
by the RMG. Officers feared that with the loss of prestige, 
credibility and public goodwill, the RMG's authority might 
come to rest on State terrorism and military coercive power. 
Opinion within the Officer corps diverged. Officers 
favoured either continued reform or cautious conservatism, 
either tighter government control, or a return to the 
barracks. In January I972 the military cabinet was 
reshuffled again. 
Judging the RMG and its military base is difficult. 
First, military and bureaucratic secrecy impedes assessment 
and rhetoric confuses the goals and aims being sought. 
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Leftist jargon was common, for example, "changing the basic 
structures of society" and "we are soldiers and we are 
revolutionaries." The RMG could be fostering a true 
revolution or a crash programme of Stite directed 
modernization. 1 Second, the RMG is a dynamic and changing 
institution so that any judgment of it is of mere transient 
relevance. 
A major influence on the RMG were military institutional 
concerns. Nationalism was one such influence. Military and 
civilian nationalists wanted to control and reduce foreign 
influence in Peru, especially in the economy. Jhey felt 
that Peru should ha·ve greater control of her own national, 
raw resources. 2 The .long predominance in the oil industry 
of the IPC aggravated the nationalists and the military. 
As early as 1960, the Peruvian Comando Conjunto publically 
declared that the IPC was "harmful to national soverignty"~ 
In defending this national cause, the RMG actually accepted 
some of the anti-imperialist proposals of the early APRA. 4 
Nationalism above all else most characterized the RMG. 
Allied to nationalism was national security. During 
the mid-I960 1 s, the army succeeded in locating and 
eradicating completely three guerrilla fronts, but it was 
very aware of the difficulty involved, that rural discontent 
could re-ignite insurgency and that had the guerrilla forces 
been stronger the army would have been hard pressed to 
1. (Clinton; lAEA; Vol 24 No 4 Spring 1971; pp 58) 
2. (Thls nationalism was not limited to Peru. See Corbett; 
1972; pp 18 on nationalism in neighbouring Bolivia) 
3. (Einaudi; RAND; R-586-DOS; April I97I; pp 30; Olson; JDA; 
Vol 9 No3; April 1975; pp 408-409) 
4. (See Malloy; JIAS; 1972; Vol 14; No 4; Klare'n; 1973; 
pp 113-1I5i Clinton; JlAS; Vol XII No 2 April 1970; 
pp 283-284) . . 
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contain them. No doubt the military was also aware of the 
US dtfficulties fighting the Vietcong. The army also learned 
how discontented peasants could respond to demagoguery. 1 
Contact with the peasantry in civic action programmes and 
during the insurgency indicated that agrarian and social 
reform in the countryside could undermine guerrilla support. 
The RMG 1 s rural strategy - building utilities, roads, 
irrigation systems and redistributing land, was to in~titute 
sufficient improvement and change as to prevent future 
insurgency. 2 
The military was also very concerned about its coercive 
strength. Peru remained dependent on extractive industries 
which had to be protected against armed invasion. A 
territorial dispute with Ecuador appeared resolved, 3 but 
border conflict could break out at any time with Brazil, 
Colombia or Chile. When Peru purchased another sixteen Mirage 
fightAr-bomberR in 1970 (bringing her total Mirage strength 
to 32), the other republics began to rearm and modernize 
their forces, 4 An arms race began. In I974 the ~MG acquired 
from the USSR 250 T-5 tanks and scores of anti-aircraft 
missiles. In I976 it bought 36 Soviet Su-22 bombers. 5 
Although the RMG and the military were particularly concerned 
about Chile, they also believed that Peru needed a military 
machine respected by all her neighbours. An additional reason 
1. (Some peasants imitated their hero Hugo Blanco, by 
wearing shoes and growing beards. See Huizer; I973;ppII9) 
2. (Astiz and Garcia; WPQ; Vol 25 No 4 Dec I972; pp 682. 
Fitzgibbon; JIAS; Vol XII No 2; Apr.I970;pp198-199;Paulston; 
JDA;Vol 5 No 3; Apr.197l;pp406.That the rural population was 
expectant of change was evident by their response to the 
back country campaigning of Belaunde Terry during the late 
1950's.See Marett;l969;ppI82-I83;208.Huizer;l973;ppl05-I08) 
3. (Slaght; lAEA; 1973; Vol 27; No2) 
4. (New York Times; 7th June 1970; pp 1) 
5. (Time; IOth January 1977; pp I4-I5) 
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for arms purchases might have been to maintain military 
prestige, unity, co-operation and morale as political fatigue 
manifested itself among the officers. 1 
Conservatism, authoritarianism, centralism and caution 
which typified the military institution typified the RMG. 
Despite beliefs that the officers corps was a middle class 
institution, the prevalence of officers from "military" 
families indicated that military values and life styles were 
more attractable to officers than those of the middle class. 
Consequently, it was to the military rather than to the 
middle class that officers owed their loyalty, and 
institutional not bourgeois class matters concerned them 
most. Middle class influence on the RMG was low. 2 
The RMG did much to help the material well being of many 
lower class citizens, but it did nothing to enlighten them 
politically or socially. For example, while changes were 
made in education, there was no mass rural adult literacy 
campa~gn which would have qualified more people for the vote~ 
The barriadas population of Lima, which might one day 
erupt like a Parisian mob, was accepted by the RMG as an 
insoluable problem. The RMG coopted some prominent barriada 
members into government jobs, built schools, allocated funds 
and granted land titles. This made the barriadas dependent 




(See above Chapter II; pp ?.2-23) 
(See Chaplin; pp 3I in Chaplin (ed) 1976; Einaudi; 
RAND; I97I; R-586-D0S; April; pp 56; Nun; 1969; ppI7-21) 
(Chaplin; pp 30 in Chaplin (ed) 1976; Webb; pp II7 in 
Lowenthal (ed) 1975) . · 
(See below, Chapter VIII; pp 13Q; Marett; 1969; pp 242, 
245, Jaquette; WPQ; Vol 25 No 4 Dec 1972; pp 663; 
Collier; pp 159-160 in Lowenthal (ed) 1975 and Doughty; 
pp 105 in Chaplin (ed) 1976) 
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.The RMG also ensured strong State control of development. 
Government te"cnicos were in complete charge of everything. 
They managed the Pueblos Jovenes (Young Towns) project set 
up in late 1968. The locals who would benefit were excluded 
from planning and decision making. Their participation was 
1 limited to building footpaths, roads, dwellings, sewers, etc. 
Interventors and tfcnicos were appointed by the RMG to 
initiate the land reforms and set up the workers' co-operatives. 
Peasants and workers remained passive and uninvolved while 
the RMG initiated the changes, but when they tried to 
implem~nt the reforms on their own initiative they were quickly 
suppressed. 2 The RMG permitted free elections to the 
co-operative directorates set up to administer the 
expropriated coastal plantations, but when APRA scored well, 
the RMG altered the rules to prevent APRA from gaining control. 
It also coopted willing APRA leaders, and jailed others in 
order to reduce their power in the co-operatives. In addition 
State representation on the directorates was increased.3 
The RMG even supported Communist labour organizations in 
order to undermine APRA - controlled unions. 4 
When· the CDR 1 s were formed by enthused supporters of the 
RMG in March 1970, the RMG disavowed them and set up its own 
support organization, SINAMOs. 5 The RMG perceived an inherent 
conflict between full popular participation, and internal 
security. By organizing popular participation, SINAMOS would 
reduce pressure group, political party and foreign influences 
1. (Cotler; SCID; Vol VI No 5 1970-71; pp IIO) 
2~ (See Cotler; SCID; Vol VI No 5 1970-71; pp IIO) 
3. (Gitlitz; JIAS; Vol XIII No 3&4; July-Oct I97I;pp 463-464) 
4. (Jaquette; pp 430 in Lowenthal (ed) 1975) 
5. (See above; Chapter VII; pp lO~;and Chapter VIII; pp 118) 
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in Peru and facilitate harmony in conflict situations such 
as between employers and workers. 1 SINAM0S was hierachic, 
and centralized in Lima. Its top, responsible positions 
were filled by senior ranking officers. The RMG also believed 
that its control was justified by the identical interests of 
.the military and the people of Peru. 2 SINAM0S could not have 
been expected to modernize Peru for its budget was no larger 
than that of the separate agencies it replaced.3 
Partly to preserve its image of being "above politics" 
and partly to maintain social order, the RMG relied on the 
old clientele system of patron-client relations which permitted 
economic interaction between individuals of different social 
classes. 4 After 1968, State bureaucrats replaced the oligarchy 
as dispensers of patronage. Class and status continued to 
dominate Peruvian society. 
Military authoritarianism permeated the RMG. The military 
distrusted the initiative of others, and prefered to 
monopolise political as well as coercive power. This distrust 
and desire to dictate change were reflected in the creation 
of SINAM0S and in officers' fears that even peaceful reform 
movements·could endanger security.5 
Nor did the RMG redistribute the nation's wealth although 
it made several threats to do so. A major reason inhibiting 
the redistribution of wealth was the officers' respect for 
the principle of private property. The RMG certainly 
1. (Palmer and Middlebrook; pp 448 in Chaplin (ed) 1976) 
2. (Middlebrook and Palmer; 1975; pp I9-22) 
3. (Bourgue and Palmer; pp 205 in Lowenthal (ed) 1975) 
4~ (See Pike; I973; pp 29-31; Jaquette; WPQ; Vol 25 No 4 
Dec 1972; pp 660) 
5. (Einaudi; pp 4I3 in Chaplin (ed) 1976) 
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expropriated the oligarchy's land, but they received 
compensation in the form of bonds redeemable if invested 
in industry. The RMG also made capitalists of the barriadas 
squatters who were given title deeds for the land they 
occupied. Worker ownership was also a feature of the 
Industrial Commune system. 1 
Perhaps indicative of uncertain aims as well as of 
military institutional behaviour were RMG caution and 
pragmatism. These are not characteristic of planned activity. 
Indicative of RMG caution (and General Velasco's personal 
concern) was the General's talking to students who objected 
to a new law that made students pay for their secondary 
education. This law excluded the poor from education and 
the resulting discontent led to violence. After talking to 
the students, General Velasco accepted many of the 
modifications they proposed. 2 The RMG was cautious, and 
susceptible to pressure sufficient to overcome the reasoning 
for the original decision. 
The RMG also circulated among interested groups its 
proposed laws and regulations. The military knew that 
caution, compromise and opinion were vital if it was to 
survive in politics.3 It concentrated on short-term problems 
because the military realized that it lacked the prestige 
and authority needed to force through long term solutions 
to new and traditional problems. To help relieve the 
shortage of administrators at local level and neutralize 
1. (See above; Chapter VIII; pp 114) 
2. (Cotler; SCID; Vol VI No 5 1970-71; pp I06. Welch & 
Smith; 1974; pp 165-166) 
3. (See Einaudi; RAND; RM 6048 RC; May 1969; pp 11-13. 
Jaquette; WPQ; Vol 25 No 4 Dec 1972; pp 663) 
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dissent, the RMG actually coopted some of its critics into 
responsible government positions. A successful ~ase of 
cooption by the RMG was the appointment to SINAM0S of the 
I ,; . 
imprisoned guerrilla leader Hector Bejar. Attempts to 
persuade Hugo Blanco to take a job were less successful. 1 
The 1969 Agrarian Reform which was a vital necessity was 
an electoral goal of the Acci6n Popular-Democristiano 
coalition. 
The 1969 Agrarian Reform was a pragmatic innovation. 
It was a vital neccessity and in step with the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Latin America2 and Accitn Popular-
Democristiano goals.· There was widespread acceptance in 
Peru for reform. Major land owners like the sierra g_0mona:L_~s 
and the Cerro de Pasco Copper Company were under increasing 
pressure in the I960 1 s to give land to the landless peasants 
who were invading their properties with evergrowing frequency. 
Knowing that the peasants.could not be denied land for much 
longer, the RMG coopted into the Agrarian Reform programme 
Edgardo Seoane who was Belaunde's former"agrarian expert." 
The Industrial Commune reform of the RMG was planned by 
He'°ctor Cornejo Ch&vez the Democristiano leader, but never 
implemented by the Belallnde government. 3 It appears that the 
RMG was often only enforcing or implementing laws passed by 
earlier governments, and that although it was concentrating 
on immediate problems it expected long term programmes to 
take until 1990 to complete.4 
1. (See Blanco; 1972; pp 15) 
2. (See Ramirez Gomez; SCID; Vol II No 8; 1966) 
3. (Jaquette·; pp 427 in Lowenthal (ed) 1975) 
4. (Benton; Conflict Studies; 1970; pp II. Cotler; pp 70 
in Lowenthal (ed) 1975) 
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The RMG was nationalist and pragmatic and made decisive 
changes in the internal economic structure of the country. 
Rather than breaking with the past and building a new society, 
the RMG acted within the context of the Peruvian situation 
and tended to re-affirm tradition. The ~range of reforms 
and innovations have exceeded the more superficial and 
mat~rial improvements made by previous Peruvian military 
governments but as usual, the military in power thought only 
in institutional terms, responded only to institutional 
concerns and provided only what it considered necessary or 
best for the country •. 
How the Peruvian case appears in the context of Latin 
American militarism and how it compares with the Brazilian 





Militarism as defined in Chapter I does not effectively 
summarize or explain the violence and instability of Latin 
American political life. An important feature of 
militarism in the European context was the high degree of 
international confiliict and tension which made national 
security, nationalism and the military vital public concerns. 
By comparison, the Latin American region has been relatively 
free of international conflict and tension, with most 
disputes, particularly over border lines, being solved 
peacefully by diplomatic action. Only two small republics, 
El Salvador and Paraguay ever experienced militarism as 
defined in this work. 1 In Latin America, the military is 
r~cognised as being a principal subsystem of the entire 
political system with a constitutional role to play. It 
operates within the system, and is not excluded ·from it, or 
from participation in decision making. 2 
Despite attempts to exclude the military from politics, 
it has been tooimportant to reject completely. Military 
schools have trained civilians. Officers have held high 
public office, and have headed many commercial and industrial 
enterprises. Frequently civilians have asked officers to 
intervene in politics on their behalf. The military has 
also evicted squatters, suppressed dissent, crushed strikes 
and removed unwanted governments. It has also participated 
1. (See above; Chapter I; pp 5; and Corbett; 1972; pp 3-4) 
2. (Rankin; LARR; Vol IX No I; Spring 1974; pp 81) 
in varying degrees to national development and social reform. 
In general, Latin American militarism involves interference 
in public affairs, and the displacement and - or replacement 
of incumbent regimes. 
The 1960 1 9 mark an important turning point in the 
military's involvement in the political system. The military 
junta in Peru during 1962-1963 proved to be a prototype for 
new styles of intervention in Argentina, Bolivia, Peru and 
Brazil. The military institutional component contrasted with 
that of the 1920-1961 period. Officer? were very confident 
of their ability to govern their countries and they pledged 
their careers and prestige on future success. They believed 
the military to be the sole national repository of progress, 
patriotism and honesty. National and developmental problems 
could be solved by a military government applying military 
experience, ability and technology to planning, simulation 
and administration. 
The motivational component also contrasted with the past. 
Intervention was stimulated by a military, political ideology 
or doctrine of "national objectives" thought out in the 
advanced .military colleges. Military education generally has 
improved greatly since World War II and has increased officers' 
perceptions of national problems and their administrative 
abilities. 
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Improvements in primary and secondary education have 
facilitated greater social diversity in the officer corps. 
Cadets tend to be lower-middle class and urban, and this 
accentuates reformism among officers. 1, 
The Latin American military has never been so 
professional. It fulfils the three conditions of 
professionalism (expertise, responsibility and corporateness) 
as expounded by Huntington. 2 Never-the-less, the Latin 
American military remains conservative and distrustful of 
others. Anti-individualist, the military favours the nation-
state as the ultimate political institution and that it 
must be ready to meet any threat to internal and external 
security. Promotion by merit and competence are considered 
vital. Expenditure on armament is. as important as 
expenditure on salaries. 
Professional officers saw civilian _political life as 
unpredictable, corrupt and indecisive. Politicians and 
bureaucrats often used patronage to advantage and favoured 
weak state power as they worked toward personal, material 
goals. Occasionally politicians tried to undermine military 
discipline, unity and neutrality by fomenting interservice 
conflict. The professional military, as a separate, elitist 
institution came to dislike the political system of which 
,it was part, and sought to protect itself, first by 
1. (See Ropp; 1AEA; Vol 24 No 2; Autumn 1970; pp 35) 
2. (Huntington's thesis (1957) that professionalism led to 
an apoljtical military has long been discredited by 
Finer (1962) and the facts. See Corbett; 1972; pp 4; 
Welch and Smith; 1974; pp 20 and Waymen; 1975; pp 15-16) 
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stressing its autonomy, and second by seeking modernization 
and reform. 1 By the I960 1 s, the overt manifestations of 
intervention reflected professionalism. Generals, not jefe 
officers led the military into politics and they now chose 
to exercise power through an impersonal, institution-bound 
junta comprising the joint chiefs of staff. 
A deep sense of urgency pervaded both civilian 
society and the military in Peru and Brazil during the I960's. 
Both countries were experiencing growing social unrest, 
political violenc~ economic uncertainty and weakening 
government. Urban and rural masses were mobilizing, and 
guerrilla insurgency seemed immenent. The feeling grew that 
the status quo could not prevail against rising forces and 
new challenges. The revolution in Cuba in the I950's was 
a clear indication of what could happen when a country was 
unable to· respond to new and increased demands for political 
and social justice. By the early I960~s both Peru and Brazil 
had come to doubt and distrust the efficency of their 
political systems. Their doubt was manifest in both the 
enlightbned citizenry and the military. 
The urgency increased military disposition to int~rvene 
in both countries. Brazilian officers conditioned by ESG 
teaching and the FEB experience felt that Brazil could be a 
1. (See Maingot; pp 353 in Tulchin (ed) 1973) 
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future world power if she could recover economic strength 
and proscribe Communist influence. 1 Peruvian officers were 
encouraged to intervene by the twin successes of the I962-
I963 junta and the anti-guerrilla campaign of the mid-I960 1 s. 
I 
These successes and the failure of the Belaunde government 
in the "last ~ivilian chance to initiate change" showed 
that the military would have to take the lead. 2 The Peruvian 
military had already formulated an ideology or doctrine 
prior to the intervention. While precise goals were not 
clea~ pragmatism, nationalism and humanism were acknowledged 
principles. 3 
By I966, the officers had lost confidence in President 
,; . 
Belaunde, but they tolerRted him until Octobet I968 when the 
IPC controversy hardened military opinion in favour of a 
coup d'etat. Only eight army officers in strategic positions 
/ made the actual decision to depose Belaunde, but they knew 
in October that they had the support they had lacked for two 
years. 4 
Not anticipation, but desperation activated the 
coup d'etat of 1964. Soldiers had not taken part in the 
1963 and ·1964 mutinies, but it was only a matter of time 
before the army, too would factionize. When President 
Goulart made his speech to the sergeants on 30th March 1964 
1. (see Ja9uaribe; SCID; Vol II No 4; I966; pp 67) 
2. (see Eina udi; I969; RAND; RM 6048 RC; pp I5,I6) 
3. (General Morales Bermudez, Minister of the Economy, 
interview reported I2th March I97I in Tulchin; 
PP 375-378; (ed) 1973) 
4. (Cotler; pp 58 in Lowenthal (ed) 1975; Einaudi; pp 403, 
412 in Chapltn (ed) 1976) 
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it was clear that he was encouraging factionism in the army. 
Factionism in the countryside was also growing during Goulart•s 
presidency. Communist agitators from Hungary and China were 
believed to be active fomenting unrest among Brazil's 
discontented popula tion. 1 
Institutional preservation prompted the Brazilian coup 
d'etat of 196~-, while developmentalist aims and reform 
stimulated ~hat in P~ru four years later. 2 The different 
reasons for intervention resulted in the two different aims 
of the SRC and the RMG. 
To the military there were legal obligations to 
intervention. In the Peruvian Constitution of 1933, Article 
213 Title I2 declared that the military had to guarantee the 
rights of the republic3 which were comprised by Peru's 
neo-dolonialist status in the international economic ordero 
J 
The Talara agreement and the missing page eleven conflicted 
with the republic's rights under the Constitution. Articles 
I76 and I77 of the Constitution of 1946 obliged the Brazilian 
military to obey the President only within the limits of the 
law and to defend the Constitution, Law, and order. 4 
Despite attempts to retain democratic traditions, the 
SRG ran Brazil in a conservative manner typical of Latin 
American military governments. The Officers halted reform 
movements and suppressed critics, liberals and leaders. 





(Worcester; 1973; pp 225) 
(Rankin; LARR; Vol IX No I; Spring 1974; pp 
(Einaudi; RAND; R586DOS; April I97I; pp 33) 
(Stepan; I97I; pp I04-I05) 
IOO) 
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institutions harmed by the political, economic and social 
instability of the Goulart presidency. The SRC took a firm 
inflexible hold of Brazil, protecting the rights of private 
property against the assault of social equality, 
redistribution and expropriation. 
In Peru, the RMG expanded social welfare programmes, 
improved labour laws, built roads, expropriated private 
property, instituted worker participation in industry and 
mobilized the population in. construction projects. On closer 
examination of these achievements the conservatism of the 
RMG becomes evident. The peasants who benefitted from the 
land reform had to pay the State for their land. Nor was 
there any major redistribution of wealthier or political 
power, and the principles of private property and compensations 
were not rejected. Despite the expropriati©n of the IPC, nine 
other foreign ©il companies were able to strengthen their 
position in Peru, and foreign investmen~ continued to be 
- 1 
welcome. The 11 social work" undertaken by the RMG was typical 
of previous military governments under Benavides and Odr{a. 
Both military governments were authoritarian. Both 
minimized popular participation in decision making and dictated 
to their citizens what the military felt was in their best 
interests. The RMG established new institutions and 
proceedures which would supposedly benefit Peru in the future. 
1. (Werlich; Current History; February.1977; pp 62; Quijano 
I97I; pp II5; Astiz and Garcia; WP~; Vol 25 No 4; December 
1972; pp 680, 682, 683i Co~ler; pp 65 and Webb; pp 124 
in Lowenthal (ed) I975J 
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The SRC felt initially that a short period of tutelary 
military rule was necessary. Both governments wanted to end 
the mercenary and corrupt politics of their civilian 
predecessors. 
The RMG appealed to Peruvian. nationalism. First, the 
military had no reason to subordinate their nationalism to 
friendship with the US, which had cut off arms sales to Peru~ 
and had supported APRA in two Presidential elections. 2 US 
neglect of Bolivia, which had fulfilled the preconditions set 
by the Alliance for Progress, convinced the Peruvian military 
that US friendship was not to be relied upon. Second, 
nationalism and the·expropriation of the IPC helped legitimize 
the coup d'etat and the RMG. This was a vital issue since 
the public's willingness to comply with RMG rule would ensure 
greater efficiency, good relations and national unity. 
As a result of the FEB experience, friendships between 
US and Brazilian officers, Brazilian officers' satisfaction 
with capitalism and finally, tradition, the SRC suppressed 
naiionalism in favour of friendly US relations. Siding with 
the US in the Cold War against all forms of leftism, the 
SRC denounced its critics and enemies as Communists and 
continued with the traditional 11 unwritten alliance. 11 
Hemispheric security and US investment were vital to Brazil's 
future. 3 The pro-US (and the unpopular) economic policies, the 
1 • (Einaudi; RAND; R586DOS; April 1971; pp 31) 
2. (Van Cleve; 1AEA; Vol 30; No 4 Spring 1977; pp 37, 39, 
4I-l~2; Patch; AUFS 'GWCSA) Vol IX No 6; September I962 
pp I6-I7) 
3. (See Burns; 1966; pp I60-I80; Corbett; 1972; pp 13; 
Stepan; 1971; pp 239-244) 
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betrayal of public confidence in the moderator role and 
hardening political control all deprived the SRC of legitimacy. 
Public dislike, anger, frustration and discontent with the 
SRC necessitated suppression which created more dislike, anger 
frustrations and discontent. 
National security, a professional military concern 
motivated the military governments to increase defence 
expenditure and strengthen State control of the nation. Army 
intelligence taught the Peruvian military that subversion 
and insurgency were effects of underdevelopment on a nation-
wide sqale. Officers were very concerned about the "latent 
state of subversion" in Peru whereby communists - or any.other 
foe, internal or external - could expl"oit national weaknesses 
(as in the War of the Pacific).' The officers' definition and 
range of "national weaknesses" were vast and all-embracing. 1 
Subsequent·RMG plans were intended to redress these weaknesses. 
Not a concern to the Peruvian offiqers was military 
unity •. The collapse of discipline and efficiency were not 
envisaged since APRA had moderated so much since the 1940's. 
An APRA government was still undesirable because the party 
still threatened military political influence and coercive 
power. 
The 1935 communist uprising, the Cold War and Castro 
all created anxiety among Brazilian officers about domestic 
and external security. Peasant organizations and labour unions 
1. (Einaudi; pp 410-411 in Chaplin; (ed) 1976; Cotler; pp 49 
in Lowenthal (ed) 1975) 
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were proscribed as latent threats to Brazil. The long Atlantic 
coast, vulnerable since the Dutch invasions of the 17th 
century, had to be guarded against Cuban infiltration. 
Firm, confident and decisive government was necessary 
also to deter foreign pressure, especially from Argentina. 
Eventually both the SRC and RMG increased expenditure on 
defence~ Officers in both the Brazilian and Peruvian military 
received new promotions, pay increases and even decorations. 
These improvements made to individual careers were routine, as 
well as ensuring continued loyalty and unity, but in general 
the military increased its share of the budget for equipment 
rather than for personal aggrandizement. 1 
Essential differences appear on the military governments 
emphases~ The RMG concentrated on modernization and reform, 
making structural, inGl:i.lutio11al changes to Peru so that 
society and economy would relate to Peruvian interests. The 
intention was to rid Peru of her semi-colonial status and 
permit her to become a modern state co-existing on equal 
terms with the whole world. The RMG envisaged a "completion" 
date of reform and modernization of 1990. The SRC emphasised 
development, - building factories, increasing production, 
exploiting raw resources, extending communications and 
2 
exporting finished goods. 
Officers were satisfied with Brazil's institutional 
' 
1 • (See Astiz and Garcia; WPQ; Vol 25 No 4; Dec~ 1972; pp 684; 
Burns; 1971; pp 372; Stepan; 1971; pp 223,269; and New 
York Times; 7th June 1970; pp I) 




set up and her relations with foreign capital. Expansion and 
development within the existing framework took precedent over 
reform and social welfare. 
Tradition and outlook dictated the emphases. First, 
national development was an old Brazilian military pastime. 
The expeditions of General Rondon were typical of the role the 
military had played in exploration, communication and 
education.1 Brazil had long been aware of its great, unexplored 
and unexploited wealth, and that it had the potential to be a 
wbrld power~ Although Peru was also aware of her own wealth, 
the difficulty and cost involved in exploration, communications 
and development all retarded an outlook like that of the 
Brazilian military. 
Second, Brazilian officers had long experience and 
contact with industrial and commercial sectors. Frequently 
they held very high positions in private enterprises! The 
officers were therefore very familiar with developmentalist 
institutions and were themselves loyal practitioners of 
capitalism. This contrasted with the poor contacts Peruvian 
officers had with commerce. Of 630 top positions in Peruvian 
business, only 4 were held by officers in 1963. Consequently 
Peruvian officers had little business or financial skill,and 
experience and contact with commercial and industrial sectors 
was slight. In its proud association with the people, the 
1. (See Nunn~ JLAS; Vol 4· No I; 1972; pp 36) 
2. (See Johnson; 1974; pp 2II-2I2) 
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Peruvian military rejected the oligarchy and plutocracy. 1 
Third, in taking a benevolent attitude toward the 
lower classes, the RMG expressed officers' concern about 
their fellow countrymen. Seventy percent of army officers 
came from the sierra and the coast (excluding Lima) and after 
taking part in the anti•-insurgency campaign, they had plenty 
of personal contact with peasants, workers and "small" 
businessmen. Radical Christian thought was also evident· 
among officers. 2 
Brazilian officers usually came from urban areas, but 
despite the high rate of urban drift they did not have first 
hand contact with the masses. Popular discontent and 
revolutionary potential were much more abstract, distant 
and-liypothetical concepts to Brazilian officers than they 
were to Peruvian military men. This is evident from the 
Brazilian officers' fear of populism, labour and peasant 
unions and from past Peruvian military governments'preparedness 
to "look ,:qfter" the lower classes, especially in urban areas. 
Certainly the level of control exercised in Brazil by the 
SRC was much greater than that of the RMG in Peru.3 
Military education conditioned the two military 
institutions, especially in the post World War II period. 
The CAEM established in Lima in 1950, taught senior ranking 
officers tha~ institutional modernizafion was necessary to 
ensure national soverignty whereby Peru gained "room" to act 
1. (Einaudi; RAND; R586Dds; April I97I; pp 42-43, 54-57) 
2. (Drysdale and Myers; pp 263 footnote; in Lowenthal (ed) 
1975) 
J• (See Wayman; 1975; pp II-13) 
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in the international system. 1 The ESG in Rio de Janeiro 
showed its officers that national security and national 
development were inseparable issues. Economic output had 
to be rationalized and maxim~zed, nati6nal disunity minimized. 2 
Both academies stressed old themes of order and control. 
The two military governments earned themselves each a 
dis tine ti ve yet complimentary reputation,. The SRC was 
labelled 11 liberal-internationalist" because of its adherence 
to democratic methods of government and its non-nationalist 
policies which accepted US and foreign investment in the· 
economy. The RMG became known as "authoritarian-nationalist" 
because of its reje6tion of democracy and its nationalist 
desire to take control of its own economy while ignoring the 
admonitions of international finance.3 
Despite the reputation of the SEC, many Brazilian officers 
disagreed with the stand taken and the policies adopted. 
They prefered a more assertive nationalist policy and the 
complete suspension of the 1946 Constitution. They felt that 
the military should take total control of Brazil. The 
promulgation of Institutional Acts indicated that circumstance 
was forcing the liberal-internationalists toward illiberalism. 
The nationalist linha dura officers gathered around President 
Costa e Silva, and in December 1968, two months after the 
Peruvian coup, they were able to force an authoritarian-
nationalist solution on Brazilian military politics. An 
obvious difference between the two military regimes by 
1. (See Einaudi; RAND; R5,86DOS; April 1971; pp 25 
2. (Stepan; RAND; R 586 DOS; April I97I; pp 82, 85) 
3. (See Corbett; I972; pp I3-I4) 
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December 1968 was that the Peruvian military had given 
civilian government "one more chance" in 1963, and then 
replaced it completely, but in Brazil, the military tried to 
work with civilians - a situation which became gradually 
less tenable as· time went by and unrest grew. Both Peru 
and Brazil were considered (along with Guatemala) "moderately 
. 1 
democratic" during the 1945 - 1960 period, and both 
experienced together the "transitional or intermediate 
category" interventions of 1962 and 1964, respectively. In 
1968, within two months of each other, Peru and Brazil 
experienced new institutional military governments which 
broke wit~ the old styles, but neither acted without precedent: 
Argentina in 1966 and Bolivia and Panama both in 1968 gained 
new style military governments. In each case civilians 
were excluded except in an advisory capacity. Military men 
took over -all positions of. responsibility, refused to 
promise elections and proceeded to rule.their countries 
accord~ng to a doctrine of "national objectives" thought up 
in superior war ~cademies~ Military initiative, discipline, 
expertise, confidence and responsibility were prodominant 
2 themes in government. 
Frequently the new interventionism has been called 
nasserismo, but this term is not really applicable. In 
contrast to the Egyptian case, Latin America was more highly 
developed,and popular mobilization too far advanced for the 
1. (Johnson and Burnett; pp 513-515 in Burnett & Johnson 
(ed) 1968) 
2. (See Mignens; SClD; Vol VI No I; I970-7I; pp 7-12) 
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military to make the same dramatic improvements to the 
situation. Nor did Latin America have the same immediate 
colonial experience of Egypt. Rational organization of 
institutions, not technical innovations were needed. 1 
The two military governments signified major changes in 
Peruvian, Brazilian and Latin American militarism, but these 
changes do not signify a revolution. Both governments were 
constrained by institutional conservatism, caution and 
authoritarianism so that changes made in the interest of 
mean 
national security did notAradical changes for society. The 
RMG d~d make important innovations in modernizing Peru so that 
she related in more equal terms to the international economic 
and political system, but neither government improved the 
plight of their peoples. Both relied more on time plus 
modernization and development to solve national social problems. 
Political· control and stability were the governments' main 
priorities. 
T~e militarism of intervention and interference irt 
civil-military relations-has not died out in Latin America~ 
rather its nature has changed from personalist, reactionary 
and predatory to institutionalist and progressive. 
Regardless what one may think of militarism, it is 
likely to continue in Latin America as long as the military 
sees itself as harbingers of change and nationalism in 
backward, underdeveloped republics •. That the military should 
take responsibility for solving the awesome problems which 
1 • (Nun; 1969; pp 61) 
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beset the republics is a testament to its sincerety. 
Never-the-less, world criticism is often"emotive, often 
valid, but one may hope that the military in Peru and Brazil. 
will find the subtle balance between their own interests and 




Partido Acci6n Popular (Popular Action Party) AP was formed 
in 1956 by Fernando Belalinde Terry who led it in the 1956, 
1962 and 1963 elections. It was a loosely organized party 
and was reformist and technocrat in ideology. (See Guide to 
the Political Parties of South America; 1973; pp 424-440) 
APRA 
Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (American Popular 
Revolutionary Alliance) APRA was formed during the 1920s to 
challenge the dictator~hip of Augusto Legu{a. It was an elitist 
party, tightly organized, highly disciplined and led throughout 
its existence by Haya de la Torre. Support came from those 
areas depressed by the oligarchic and forBign monopoly of land, 
water rights, commerce, etc. particularly in the north coast 
of Peru where the big sugar and cotton plantations are located. 
APRA was continentalist, reformist and socialist in ideology 
and aimed to proscribe the military when it came to power. 
As a result of thBs~ policies, APRA was frequently banned 
ftom political activity. In response, its followers £esorted to 
terrorism. As Haya ~atured from firebrand radicalism to pragmatic 
conservatism, so did APRA. Haya's integrity as a leader, 
democrat and politician is often doubted. (See Klarin; 1973; 
Clinton; JIAS; Vol. 12 No. 2; April 1970; and Guide to the 
Political Parties of South America; 1973; pp 401-422) 
Barri ad as 
Squatter settlements. 
CAEM 
Centro de Altos Estudios Militares (Centre for Higher Military 
Studies) Set up in the 1950s in Lima, the CAEM aimed to teach 
non-military, developmentalist subjects to J.efe rank officers 
seeking promotion to general rank. It related national and 
defence matters. Select civilians could also attend, but 
although the CAEM had a reputation for merit in its academic 
assessment, it tended rather to reinforce institutional 
characteristics such as discipline and conformity. (See Astiz 
and Garcia; WPQ; Vol. 25 No. 4; December 1972) 
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Caudillo. 
Personalism and charismatic leadership characterizes the 
caudillo. The coercive power he holds, and the authority he 
enjoys over a specific group or area are more significant 
than any military rank he might have. Caudillisrno is not 
unique to Latin America since it can exist in any country 
where personalism has had to compensate for the lack of 
state organization and established proceedures for the 
transfer of power. (See Maingot; pp 66-73 in Tulchin; ed; 
1973; Stokes; WPQ; September 1952; Vol 5 No 3; pp 447-450 
and Lambert; 1967; pp 155-162) 
Cholo 
A person of black (negro) and Indian ancestry. 
Comando Conjunto 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, comprising the heads of all the armed 
forces. One of these officers, usually a soldier, is 
appointed Chairman, and it is usually this officer who leads 
the military-junta governmenL. 
Coronel 
To form a counter force against the regular army in Imperial, 
Brazil, Emperor Pedro I commissioned specific fazendeiros as 
coro~~!.§. (colonels) This legitimized the fazendeiros' privat:~ 
armies which now constituted a civil guard to be used in 
service of the monarch. It also accentuated regionalism. 
So many fazendeiros were appointed coronals that the two 
terms became virtually synonymous. 
Coup d'etat 
This is a skillful military operation to overthrow a government, 
and requires consummate military unity, discipline, leadership 
and planning. Often coups are bloodless, as in Peru in 1962 
and 1968, Brazil in 1964 and Pakistan in 1977. (The most 
significant work on the coup d'etat is Luttwak; 1969) 
Creole 
A white, European person born in Latin America who is without 




Partido Democr~ica Cristiano (Christian Demociat Partyr or 
Democristiano) This party was formed in 1955 as a platform 
,,for ex-President Bustamante who had been deposed seven years 
previously by General Odr{a. In 1963, led by Htctor Cornejo 
Chivez, the DC joined the AP and successfully campaigned for 
power. In the alliance, the DC is nationalist, statist 
and moralist. (See Guide to the Political Parties of South 
America; 1973; pp 440-443) 
ESG 
Escola Superior de Guerra (Higher School for War) Set up in 
Rio de Janeiro in 1949, the ESG trained officers for promotion 
to senior, general rank. It also taught select civilians. An 
essential aim was to relate together national and developmental 
policies. (See Stepan; 1971; pp 245-247) 
Estado Novo 
(New State) Declared by President Vargas in 1937, the Estado 
N6vo was supposed to represent a Brazilian fascist state. 
Fazendeiro 
Land or plantation owner in Brazil. They produced coffee and 
sugar for export and formed the imperial, e:eonomic oligarchy 
of Brazil. The fazendeiros exercised control ov~r large areas 
and dominated local politics. Their politico-economic 
status was protected by their private armies of retainers 
which were sanctioned by the Imperial government. 
FEB 
F$r9a Expedicionlria Brasileira (Brazilian Expeditionary Force) 
It entered the war in 1944, and fought in the Italian 
campaign under the command of US General Mark Clark. The 
44,000 man contingent, which also included airforce units, 
fought with distinction against the Nazis. The FEB experience 
greatly inflenced Brazilian military attitudes towards the US. 
Ga.monal 
Land owner in the sierra of Peru. The gamonals were the 'poor' 
oligarchy whose lands, though poor, were coveted by the 
152 
landless peasants. ~~~_?_~~~-~~~ (also called ~ac_:1-3u<;s) were 
significant not for their social or economic wealth but for 
the political control they had over their regions and for 
the support they could give to the government in Lima.· 
(See Lambert; 1967; pp 153-155, How~ politician with a 
strong local base could project himself onto the national 
stage and make his presc .ence felt theret see Chester, Hodgson 
and Page; 1969; pp 268-269, 272-275) 
Hacendado 
Landowner. His power and authority usually extended beyond 
his own landholdings. 
IPC 
The International Petroleum Company. Registered in Canada, IPC 
was a subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey. 
Legitimacy 
A government has legitimacy when the people accept it and 
acknowledge its right.to hold power. If a government lacks 
legitimacy, it must rely on surveillance and force to remain 
in power, or leave office, It is the essential difference 
between government by authority and government by power, 
Mestizo 
A person of creole and Indian ancestry. 
Mula.tto 
A person of creole and black (negro) ancestry. 
Oligarchy 
This term usually refers ~o a republic's upper class, the 
'forty families' or •ten clans' etc. which dominate all 
political, economic and social life. The oligarchy takes an 
active part in politics, seeking first, to. limit State 
expenditure (which necessitates higher taxes), second to 
prevent an increase in internal demand (and the concomitant 
demand for a redistribution of wealth) and third, to prevent 
inflation which might necessitate devaluation and financial 
'controls'. Free trade and laissez faire economic policies 
·, .. ·--~--~-- ~----.~--..---. 
which benefitted the oligarchy as a planter, miner exporting 
class might be ended, (See Payne; 1965; pp 272-277; 
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Bourricaud; SCID; Vol II No 2; 1966; pp 26~ .· 
Pronunciamiento 
This refers to a specific method of overthrowing a government. 
Military units in the periphery of central authority announce 
their rejection of that authority. To re-impose its authority 
over the mutineers, the central government must dispatch troops. 
The pronunciamiento succeeds when the 'loyalist' units refuse 
to obey their orders to march against their fellow soldiers 
and instead overthrow the government which gave.those orders. 
In this way, civil war is avoided. (See Luttwak; 1969; _ 
pp 24-25) The pronunciamiento is indicative of regionalism~ 
poor military loyalty toward its master and empl9yer, the 
State, but strong loyalty to itself. 
Putsch 
This is a form of direct intervention whereby military units 
acting on their own, attempt to seize power in a manner akin 
to the cou_pJ' etat. However, the putschists 1 decision to act 
is made spontaneously and recklessly without organization or 
planning. The putschists hope that surprise will compensate 
for poor coordination, lack of support and any tactical 
failure. Hopefully, troops uninvolved in the :eutsch, and able 
to resist it, will accept the fait accompli situation. The 
putsch is indicative of poor military discipline and 
ambitious commanders, and as a crude form of intervention, 
is rarely successful. 
There is a semantic aspect to the )2U_!sch. Commentators who, 
for partisan reasons disapprove of an intervention will call 
it a 'putsch' which has mercenary connotations, but if they 
approved of it, they frequently call the intervention 
a 'revolution' which seems more justified, more noble and 
more 'popular'. 
RMG 
The Revolutionary Military Government, an abbreviation for 
El Gobierno Revolucionario de la Fuerza Armada (Revolutionary 
Government of the Armed Forces) 
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UNO 
Unicin Nacional Odriista (National Union of followers of Odria) 
The personalist party of General Odr{a, UNO was a conservative 
but pro-worker party regionalised in the North where Odr{~ 
was remembered for his personal courage in the war with 
Ecuador in 1941, and in Lima where workers remembered his 
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POSTSCRIP'l' 
MOURNERS SEIZE COFFIN 
·NZPA Lima. 
Chanting mourners wrested the coffin of 
former Peruvian President General Juan 
Velasco Alvarado from its hearse and 
carried it on their shoulders nearly five 
kilometers in a procession joined by 
200,000 people. 
Velasco, who died on Saturday at the age 
of 67, was buried in the Angel cemetery 
near the presidential palace, where he 
ran Peru with a firm hand from 1968 until 
a military coup ousted him in 1975. 
A day of national mourning was declared 
by General Francisco Morales Bermudez, 
the man who replaced Velasco as president. 
He did not attend the funeral but the 
commanding generals of the three armed 
forces were among those who did. 
When the coffin was brought from the 
cathedral where services were held, 
the crowd gathered outside broke into 
applause and chants of 'Long live Velasco'. 
Taranaki Daily News 
28 December 1977 
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